The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad has set aside a divorce decree passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Banda, observing that the judgment was rendered under a statute that does not exist in any statute book. The Division Bench, comprising Justice Atul Sreedharan and Justice Vivek Saran, found that the trial court had repeatedly referred to the “Muslim Women Marriage Dissolution Act, 1986,” while the applicable law for the dissolution of marriage is the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.
Background of the Case
The appellant challenged an order dated January 28, 2026, passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Banda. By this order, the respondent-wife was granted a divorce. The appeal was primarily grounded on a significant procedural and legal discrepancy regarding the statute under which the plaint was entertained and the final judgment was delivered.
Arguments of the Parties
The counsel for the appellant argued that there was a “glaring discrepancy” in how the Trial Court handled the case. It was pointed out that the respondent-wife had filed her plaint under the “Muslim Women Marriage Dissolution Act, 1986”. The appellant contended that no such law exists.
While a similarly named act, the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, exists, it pertains to the protection of rights of women who have already been divorced. The dissolution of marriage, however, is governed by the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.
Court’s Analysis
The High Court acknowledged the trite law that mentioning a wrong provision or act in a plaint does not automatically invalidate a final judgment, provided the Trial Court had the authority under an existing law and correctly cited that law in the judgment.
However, the Bench noted that in this specific case, the Trial Court did not merely ignore the error in the plaint but adopted it in the final decision. The Court observed:
“The learned Trial Court records that the decision has been passed under the Muslim Women Marriage Dissolution Act, 1986. Such a law does not exist in any statute.”
The Bench further highlighted that the Trial Court repeatedly made this error in paragraphs 8.4, 9, and 10 of its judgment. Specifically, in paragraph 10, the Trial Court held that the case was “liable to be allowed in part as per the relevant provisions of the Muslim Women Marriage Dissolution Act, 1986.”
Critiquing the Trial Court’s approach, the High Court remarked:
“The learned Trial Court, presided over by a Judge of the rank of Senior District Judge has been rather casual while writing the judgment. It is for the Court to ensure that the statute referred to by it actually exists… merely an error in the plaint or the proceedings does not justify the learned Trial Court repeating the same error in the final judgment.”
The Court further stated that while a typographical error in an innocuous place could have been ignored, the repeated reference to a non-existent law rendered the judgment “bad in law and facts.”
Decision
Under these circumstances, the High Court set aside the impugned order dated January 28, 2026. The matter has been remanded to the Family Court, Banda, to pass a fresh judgment using the correct provisions of law.
The Court clarified that it was not directing a de novo trial and that the Family Court may rely on the material and evidence already on record. The Family Court has been requested to pass the final order expeditiously, preferably within three months.
Case Details:
- Case Title: Hafij v. Smt. Parveen Khatoon
- Case No.: FIRST APPEAL No. 178 of 2026 (2026:AHC:68880-DB)
- Bench: Justice Atul Sreedharan and Justice Vivek Saran
- Date: April 1, 2026
