The High Court of Andhra Pradesh has addressed the critical legal question of whether the recipients of lands assigned under a rehabilitation package are to be treated as “owners” with full alienable rights or as “assignees of Government land” with restricted, non-alienable rights.
The division bench of the High Court set aside a Single Judge’s order dated November 4, 2013, which had directed the State to initiate land acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The division bench ruled that a Government Memo issued by the Principal Secretary cannot override a Government Order issued in the name of the Governor to alter the non-alienable nature of assigned lands. Consequently, the State’s resumption of the assigned lands for a public purpose was held valid, and the assignees are entitled to compensation determined at par with landowners, but they cannot demand formal land acquisition proceedings as absolute owners.
Background
The case originates from the displacement of families from their lands at Sriharikota, Nellore District, which were acquired by the Government of India to establish a Rocket Launching Station (RLS). To rehabilitate these displaced persons, the State of Andhra Pradesh issued G.O.Ms.No. 1024 (Industries and Commerce Department) on November 2, 1970. Under this order, displaced families were granted Government land free of cost for cultivation purposes (subject to a maximum of 5 acres of dry land or 2 acres of wet land per family), with remaining lands assigned to landless poor persons under the normal assignment policy.
Decades later, the State and its authorities sought to resume these rehabilitation lands in Thondur Village to establish an Industrial Park/Special Economic Zone (SEZ) to be developed by the Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited (APIIC) and M/s. Sri City Private Limited.
This resumption led to several rounds of litigation:
- W.P. No. 561 of 2007: Filed by the affected persons apprehending forcible dispossession. Disposed of on July 17, 2008, with directions to determine and pay ex-gratia compensation to the petitioners in terms of G.O.Ms.No. 1307 dated December 23, 1993.
- Resumption Order (September 23, 2008): The Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO), Tirupati, cancelled the Cooperative Joint Farming Society (CJFS) lease/pattas and ordered the resumption of the lands, offering compensation of Rs. 2,50,000 per acre for dry lands and Rs. 3,00,000 per acre for wet lands.
- W.P. No. 26439 of 2008: Filed by eighteen petitioners challenging the resumption. Disposed of on December 15, 2008, holding that applying the Full Bench principle in LAO-cum-RDO, Chevella Division v. Mekala Pandu, the assignees were entitled to compensation equivalent to the full market value of the land on par with full owners, determined in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The coordinate bench did not set aside the resumption order itself.
- Proceedings dated July 21, 2010: RDO Tirupati issued an order determining and depositing the compensation.
- W.P. No. 23208 of 2010: Filed by the writ petitioners challenging the July 21, 2010 compensation proceedings. The Single Judge allowed this writ petition on November 4, 2013, setting aside both the resumption order and the compensation proceedings. The Single Judge relied on a Government Memo dated September 16, 2000, to declare that the repatriates had been granted absolute rights of alienation and must be treated as “owners” whose lands could only be taken through formal proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
The judgment under appeal arises from three Writ Appeals (W.A. Nos. 205 of 2014, 259 of 2014, and 848 of 2022) filed by Sri City Pvt. Ltd., APIIC, and the State Government respectively, challenging the November 4, 2013 order. It also addresses a fresh writ petition, W.P. No. 26568 of 2014, filed by 61 other petitioners challenging the 2007/2008 resumption.
Arguments of the Parties
For the Appellants (Sri City Pvt. Ltd., APIIC, and the State of Andhra Pradesh)
- The appellants argued that the Single Judge erred in declaring the assignees as absolute owners of the land based on a mere administrative Memo.
- They contended that the Government Memo dated September 16, 2000, is administrative in nature, lacks statutory backing, and cannot override or modify G.O.Ms.No. 1024 or G.O.Ms.No. 1142, which are statutory Government Orders issued in the name of the Governor.
- They asserted that three previous coordinate benches had already decided petitions between the same parties on the basis that the writ petitioners were “assignees of Government land” rather than owners, though entitled to equivalent compensation. Therefore, judicial discipline prevented a subsequent coordinate bench in the fourth writ petition from declaring the petitioners to be absolute landowners.
- Furthermore, they pointed out that the lands were already resumed and handed over, with extensive developments—such as a school, a hospital, a heliport, and public expressways—already operating on the subject lands.
For the Respondents (Writ Petitioners)
- The respondents argued that the lands were granted in lieu of their ancestral lands acquired at Sriharikota, making them land-for-land owners.
- They contended that the Government Memo dated September 16, 2000, was a valid clarification confirming that they possessed the right of alienation, which effectively elevated their status to that of absolute owners.
- They argued that because they had the right of alienation, the State could not dispossess them through executive resumption. Any taking of their property for public purpose had to be initiated through formal compulsory acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, and failure to do so violated their constitutional right under Article 300-A.
Court’s Analysis
The Division Bench consisting of Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari and Justice Maheswara Rao Kuncheam analyzed the nature of the assignment, the legal validity of the Government Memo, the distinction between resumption and acquisition, and the binding nature of the previous coordinate bench decisions.
Nature of Assigned Lands and the Fiscal Role of Revenue Entries
The Court observed that the lands were assigned under G.O.Ms.No. 1024 of 1970, which was subject to the normal assignment policy of G.O.Ms.No. 1142 dated June 18, 1954. Under G.O.Ms.No. 1142, the assignment is heritable but strictly non-alienable.
Addressing the respondents’ reliance on Pattadar Passbooks, the Court clarified that such entries do not establish title:
“The entry in the revenue records, it is well settled, by itself is neither proof of title nor does it confer any title.”
The Bench cited the Supreme Court judgment in Vadiyala Prabhakar Rao v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, which summarized that revenue entries serve only a “fiscal purpose” and do not create or extinguish title. It further distinguished the Supreme Court’s decision in Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, noting that in Sunkalamma, the parties possessed an unquestioned sale deed alongside their passbooks, which is not the case here.
Validity of Government Memos vs. Governor-Sanctioned Orders
The Court extensively evaluated whether the Principal Secretary’s Memo dated September 16, 2000, could confer a right of alienation. Citing K.V. Ramana Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and P. Tejeswari v. The State of AP, the Court observed:
“In the hierarchy of executive legislation, a memo of the Government cannot supersede or depart from the provisions of any earlier order. Unless an order is expressed in the name of the Governor and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the rules, the same cannot be treated as an order made on behalf of the Government.”
Applying this principle to the present case, the Court held:
“The Government Memo even explaining the government order cannot be contrary to the terms of Government Order. The Government Memo therefore in our view is not explanatory and even if the submission be accepted, it is contrary to the Government Order No. 1024 read with G.O.Ms.No.1142 dated 18.06.1954. Therefore such an explanation is unsustainable and cannot confer the right of alienation, neither of its own nor by way of such explanation of the Government Order which clearly provided the assignment of land subject to the condition of non alienation.”
Consequently:
“The Memo can also not change the definition of ‘assigned land’ under the statute. In other words, notwithstanding the Memo dated 16.09.2000 or based on such memo, it cannot be said that the assignees acquired title to the land assigned to them. Consequently, mere issuance of the pattadar passbook or along with the alleged title deeds, can not confer any title on the assignees to the subject land nor can be a proof of title. Their status would continue to be that of ‘assignee of the Government land’ without any title or being owner to that land.”
Legal Distinction Between Resumption and Acquisition
The Bench highlighted the distinction between “acquisition” and “resumption” as established by the Supreme Court in Yadaiah v. State of Telangana:
“Acquisition denotes a positive act on behalf of the State to deprive an individual’s enjoyment of a pre-existing right in a property in furtherance of its policy whereas resumption denotes a punitive action by the State to take back the right or an interest in a property which was granted by it in the first place. The term ‘resumption’ must not therefore be conflated with the term ‘acquisition’ as employed within the meaning of Article 300-A of the Constitution so as to create a right to compensation.”
The Court observed that since the petitioners were not owners but DKT patta holders, and the land was resumed under valid conditions of the grant, the State was not required to initiate acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act.
Finality of Previous Coordinate Bench Judgments
The Division Bench noted that the coordinate benches in W.P. No. 561 of 2007 and W.P. No. 26439 of 2008 had already ruled upon the dispute, treating the petitioners as assignees who were entitled to full market value compensation but not declaring them as owners. The resumption order itself was never set aside in those proceedings, and those judgments attained finality. The Court observed:
“The impugned judgment cannot be sustained also for the reasons the judgment in previous writ petitions allowed finality between the parties, so in the fourth writ petition by the same writ petitioners, a contrary decision could not be arrived at by the co-ordinate bench.”
Decision
- Writ Appeals Allowed: The High Court set aside the Judgment and Order dated November 4, 2013, passed by the Single Judge in W.P.No. 23208 of 2010. Writ Appeal Nos. 205 of 2014, 259 of 2014, and 848 of 2022 were allowed.
- Compensation Protected: The Court clarified that the compensation amount determined, paid, or deposited pursuant to the previous coordinate bench orders dated July 17, 2008 (W.P. No. 561 of 2007) and December 15, 2008 (W.P. No. 26439 of 2008)—incorporating full market value, solatium, and interest benefits under Mekala Pandu—must be paid to the writ petitioners if still unpaid or partly unpaid.
- Dismissal of Delayed Petition: Writ Petition No. 26568 of 2014 was dismissed due to laches. The Court rejected the petitioners’ explanation for the seven-year delay in challenging the resumption, holding that it was an “afterthought.”
Case Details
- Case Title: M/s. Sri City Pvt. Ltd. and Others v. N. Sakkubayamma (died) per LRs and Others (and connected matters)
- Case No.: Writ Appeal Nos. 205, 259 of 2014, 848 of 2022 & Writ Petition No. 26568 of 2014
- Bench: Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari & Justice Maheswara Rao Kuncheam
- Date: 11.05.2026
