The Delhi High Court, in a division bench comprising Justice Prathiba M. Singh and Justice Madhu Jain, has dismissed an appeal filed by the State against the acquittal of an accused charged with penetrative sexual assault under Section 3(d) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, and rape under Section 376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The Court ruled that the statutory presumption of guilt under Section 29 of the POCSO Act cannot be triggered when the prosecution’s foundational facts are plagued by material contradictions, delayed disclosure, and a lack of independent or medical corroboration.
Background of the Case
The prosecution’s case arose from an incident alleged to have occurred on February 23, 2014, at around 9:00 p.m. at the house of the minor prosecutrix in Wazirpur, Delhi. The prosecutrix alleged that her paternal uncle (Tauji), Phool Chand, entered the house while she was cooking, sent her younger brothers outside, and subjected her to penetrative sexual assault. She further alleged that he gagged her mouth with a cloth, sat on her feet, and removed her salwar.
According to the prosecution, the girl’s father returned home during the incident, caught the respondent, and slapped him, after which neighbours gathered and beat the respondent before he managed to flee.
Although a call was immediately made to the police control room, the initial information recorded in the daily diary (DD No. 25PP) only mentioned a “quarrel” near a local dispensary. When the police reached the spot that night, the girl’s father reportedly stated that the conflict was over a “personal matter” which he wanted to resolve internally.
It was only on the following day, February 24, 2014, that the prosecutrix and her mother approached the Ashok Vihar Police Station, where her statement was recorded, leading to the registration of FIR No. 115/2014. The trial court, vide its judgment dated March 2, 2016, acquitted the respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt due to the unexplained delay in disclosing the sexual assault and a potential property dispute between the parties over a rented jhuggi.
Arguments of the Parties
Submissions on Behalf of the Appellant (State) The Additional Public Prosecutor (APP) contended that the minor prosecutrix had consistently supported the prosecution’s version throughout the investigation and during her trial deposition. The State argued that her father corroborated her testimony as an eyewitness who arrived during the incident.
Furthermore, the APP submitted that the trial court erred in treating the delay in lodging the FIR as fatal, arguing that the close familial relation of the accused and the immediate chaos of the quarrel explained the initial hesitation. Relying on the landmark ruling in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh & Ors. (1996), the State argued that a conviction for sexual assault can be safely sustained on the sole, reliable testimony of the prosecutrix.
Submissions on Behalf of the Respondent/Accused Counsel representing Phool Chand defended the trial court’s acquittal, arguing that the prosecution’s case was severely compromised by material inconsistencies and unexplained delays. The defense pointed out significant improvements in the prosecutrix’s statements over time, noting that details regarding the respondent being under the influence of liquor and offering her food and clothes were completely missing from her initial statement.
The defense also highlighted a major contradiction between the testimonies of the girl and her father: while the father claimed the wooden door was bolted shut with an iron nail from the outside, the prosecutrix testified that the door was open during the incident. Finally, the defense argued that the family had falsely implicated the respondent to pressure his son into vacating an adjacent jhuggi owned by the prosecutrix’s father.
The Court’s Analysis and Observations
The High Court evaluated the case in light of the settled principles governing appellate interference in acquittals. Citing Mallappa v. State of Karnataka (2024), the Court noted that an appellate court must exercise caution and should not disturb an acquittal unless the trial court’s view is found to be perverse, impossible, or contrary to the evidence.
While the Court acknowledged that school records successfully proved the prosecutrix was a minor on the date of the incident, it clarified that proving her age did not automatically establish that the offence took place.
Addressing the statutory presumption of guilt under the POCSO Act, the High Court observed: “The presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act would arise only upon proof of such foundational facts and cannot be invoked to fill material gaps in the prosecution evidence.”
The Court noted that although a conviction can be based on the sole testimony of a prosecutrix if it inspires confidence, the oral evidence in this case was highly unreliable. Comparing her earliest police statement with her later statements under Section 164 of the CrPC and her court deposition, the bench noted several material additions that weakened her credibility.
Furthermore, the father’s claim of being an eyewitness was diluted by major omissions in his initial statement to the police (Ex.PW-7/DA), where he failed to mention how he opened the door or saw his daughter on the bed. Commenting on the father’s conduct on the night of the incident, the Court observed: “The failure to disclose the allegation to the police at the first available opportunity, and his statement that the matter was merely a family quarrel which was to be settled amongst themselves, is difficult to reconcile with his claim of having witnessed the alleged incident.”
The Court highlighted that the local police and PCR officers consistently recorded that the initial reporting was only about a family dispute. It observed: “Delay in lodging an FIR, particularly in cases involving sexual offences, cannot by itself be treated as fatal, if the delay is satisfactorily explained. However, the present case is not merely one of delayed reporting.”
The bench also drew attention to the non-examination of any independent public witnesses, despite the admitted fact that neighbours had gathered and beaten the accused. Citing Periyasamy v. State (2024), which referenced State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, the Court emphasized that where examined witnesses are related or interested, the testimony of independent witnesses assumes great importance. The Court stated: “The failure of the prosecution to examine any such witness deprives the Court of independent assurance on the occurrence and reinforces the doubt arising from the prosecution evidence itself.”
On the medical front, the Court noted that the mother’s refusal to allow an internal gynecological examination left the case completely devoid of forensic or medical corroboration. Evaluating the entire evidence, the High Court noted: “This Court finds that the doubt in the present case is not speculative, but arises from the prosecution evidence itself.”
Decision
Concluding that the trial court’s decision to grant Phool Chand the benefit of doubt was a highly plausible and reasonable view based on the material evidence, the Delhi High Court held that no compelling reasons existed to interfere with the acquittal. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the State’s appeal and upheld the trial court’s judgment dated March 2, 2016.
Case Details
Case Title: STATE vs PHOOL CHAND
Case No.: CRL.A. 157/2018
Bench: JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH, JUSTICE MADHU JAIN
Date: 7th July, 2026
