In a significant ruling on the intersection of personal laws and child protection statutes, the Allahabad High Court has held that secular prohibitory laws enacted for public health and national policy override any exceptions provided in personal laws. Dismissing a writ petition filed by nineteen individuals accused of obstructing a rescue operation, a division bench of Justice J.J. Munir and Justice Achal Sachdev ruled that the legal age of marriage for all citizens, irrespective of religion, is governed strictly by the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (PCMA).
Background of the Case
The matter arose from a First Information Report (FIR) registered on February 15, 2026, at Police Station Kakor, District Bulandshahr, under Sections 191(2), 132, 121(1), 352, and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS). The FIR was lodged by Sub-Inspector Vinay Kumar after a joint team of the police and Bulandshahr Child Line, acting on credible information, attempted to stop the impending child marriage of a 16-year-old minor girl named Sonam.
When the Child Line case workers questioned the minor’s family and expressed their intention to produce her before the Child Welfare Committee, a hostile crowd consisting of nineteen named petitioners and around fifty unidentified individuals allegedly threatened, abused, and physically assaulted the public servants. The crowd forcibly took the minor girl away from the team’s custody. Although the officials managed to escape the aggression and eventually rescued the girl, the incident led to the registration of the criminal case. The petitioners subsequently approached the High Court seeking to quash the FIR.
Arguments of the Parties
Ms. Pooja, counsel representing the petitioners, argued that under Muslim personal (Shariat) law, a girl is competent to marry upon attaining puberty, which is generally regarded as fifteen years of age. She contended that the PCMA does not affect the personal laws of the petitioners. To support her contentions, she cited Section 3 of the Majority Act, 1875, which contains a non-obstante clause under Section 2 excluding matters of marriage, dower, and divorce. She also relied on Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, to assert that Shariat law must rule decisions regarding marriage when the parties are Muslims.
The motion was strongly opposed by the State’s representatives, Additional Government Advocate-I Mr. Ghanshyam Kumar and Additional Government Advocate Mr. Shashi Shekhar Tiwari.
Court’s Analysis
Addressing the conflict between personal law and special protective legislations, Justice J.J. Munir and Justice Achal Sachdev noted the varying opinions among different High Courts but expressed complete agreement with the Kerala High Court’s decision in Moidutty Musliyar v. Sub Inspector Vadakkencherry Police Station.
Rejecting the petitioners’ arguments, the bench made a clear legal observation: “no personal law can wipe out the prohibition of child marriage brought about by the PCMA, and the effect of the POCSO Act, which renders sexual intercourse with a child, that is a person below 18 years, a crime under that statute. The age of marriage, in our considered opinion, for every citizen of the country, irrespective of religion, is that, that is spelt out by the PCMA.”
The Court explained that carnal relations are almost inseparable from the institution of marriage, meaning that permitting the marriage of a person under eighteen years of age would inevitably lead to an acknowledged violation of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). The bench described both the PCMA and the POCSO Act as modern, scientific statutes based on national policy and public health, stating that there can be no escape from them.
The Court further noted that since the PCMA and POCSO Act are later, all-encompassing statutes, they prevail over historical exceptions made under the Majority Act, 1875. In its analysis, the bench tracked the evolution of the law on this issue, citing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Independent Thought v. Union of India and Society For Enlightenment & Voluntary Action v. Union of India, alongside the orders in Javed v. State of Haryana and the Delhi High Court’s observations in Mohd. Amaan Malik v. State (NCT of Delhi).
On the factual aspects, the Court observed that the police and the Child Line Team were acting strictly within the law to prevent a crime. The physical resistance and assault they faced during the rescue operation prima facie established the offense of obstructing public servants in the performance of their duties.
Decision
The High Court concluded that the nature of the allegations was serious and did not warrant any interference to block the investigation at its preliminary stage. Consequently, the division bench dismissed the writ petition and vacated the interim stay order previously granted on April 6, 2026.
Case Details:
- Case Title: Rubi and others Versus State of U.P. and others
- Case No.: Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 4846 of 2026
- Bench: Justice J.J. Munir, Justice Achal Sachdev
- Date: July 01, 2026
