The Allahabad High Court has ruled that an appointing authority cannot mechanically reject a selected candidate’s appointment merely based on the pendency of a criminal case or adverse administrative recommendations without conducting an independent assessment of suitability. Delivering the judgment, Justice Manish Kumar Nigam quashed an order passed by the Superintendent of Police, Mau, which had cancelled the selection of a police constable recruit due to an ongoing prosecution under the Excise Act and an uninvestigated non-cognizable report (NCR). The Court remitted the matter back to the authority for fresh consideration within two months.
Background of the Case
The petitioner, Suraj Kannaujiya, participated in the Uttar Pradesh Police Constable Civil Police Direct Recruitment, 2023. After qualifying the written examination and clearing the medical examination on April 19, 2025, he was declared successful on the official recruitment portal.
During the subsequent character verification process, the local police station in Turkpatti, District Kushinagar, submitted a report on May 16, 2025, revealing that Case Crime No. 12 of 2021 under Section 60 of the United Provinces Excise Act was registered against him, wherein a charge-sheet had been filed on June 4, 2021. The report also cited NCR No. 139 of 2018 registered under Sections 323 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Following this, the Superintendent of Police, Kushinagar, sought further guidance from the District Magistrate, Kushinagar, who on June 5, 2025, submitted a report advising against the petitioner’s appointment. Relying on these inputs, the appointing authority—the Superintendent of Police, Mau—issued an order on August 26, 2025, cancelling Kannaujiya’s candidature. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a writ petition seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the cancellation order and a mandamus directing the authorities to offer him appointment.
Arguments by the Parties
Appearing for the petitioner, learned counsel Shri Abhay Pratap Singh, along with counsel on record Brijesh, argued that Kannaujiya was never served with the verification report dated May 16, 2025, and that mere pendency of a criminal case cannot justify denial of appointment without an evaluation of the factual matrix and the nature of the alleged offence. It was highlighted that under Government Order dated April 28, 1958—which governs verification of character and antecedents—even a conviction does not automatically result in disqualification unless it involves moral turpitude, violence, or an attempt to overthrow the government by violent means. Counsel submitted that Kannaujiya had not been convicted, was never served summons, surrendered promptly upon learning of the Excise Act case, and was granted bail on May 16, 2025. It was further asserted that the FIR under the Excise Act lacked independent witnesses and that the NCR was never investigated.
Conversely, the learned Standing Counsel and Chief Standing Counsel (C.S.C.) appearing for the State respondents contended that the police service is a disciplined force demanding personnel of immaculate character and high integrity. It was argued that once an FIR had been lodged, a charge-sheet filed, and a criminal trial remained pending, the employer suffered a loss of confidence. The State maintained that the Superintendent of Police, Mau, took a conscious decision based on inputs from the District Magistrate, Kushinagar, under the 1958 Government Order, and that such administrative discretion warranted no judicial interference.
Relevant Rules and Precedents Considered
The Court examined Rule 16 of the Uttar Pradesh Police Constable and Head Constable Service Rules, 2015 (as amended in 2017), noting that while it mandates character verification before appointment and training, the rule itself specifies no criteria or parameters to determine how a candidate is to be adjudged unfit. The field is instead guided by Government Order No. 4694-II-B-321-1947 dated April 28, 1958, which explicitly provides that even a conviction need not by itself entail refusal of a character certificate if the offence does not involve moral turpitude or violent crimes.
The Court referred to established precedents:
- Avtar Singh v. Union of India (2016), where the Supreme Court laid down comprehensive guidelines emphasizing that employers must consider the trivial nature of offences, applicable government instructions, and whether there was deliberate suppression of facts.
- Commissioner of Police v. Sandeep Kumar (2011), wherein the Supreme Court observed that minor indiscretions of youth should be condoned rather than branding individuals as criminals for life.
- SPO/Constable IRB Satpal Singh v. State of Punjab (2026), reiterating that public employment cannot be denied solely on the ground of the pendency of a criminal case without due justification.
- Mohammed Imran v. State of Maharashtra (2018), where the Supreme Court held that mechanical or rhetorical incantations of moral turpitude cannot be used to deny public employment.
- Umesh Chand v. State of U.P. (2023), where the High Court held that an appointing authority is legally bound to examine applicable government orders rather than negating a candidate’s claim simply due to criminal case pendency.
Addressing the authorities cited by the State—including Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited v. Anil Kanwariya (2021), Union of India v. Methu Meda (2021), State of Rajasthan v. Chetan Jeff (2022), Satish Chandra Yadav v. Union of India (2022), and Imtiyaz Ahmad Malla v. State of Jammu & Kashmir (2023)—the High Court distinguished them on facts, observing that those decisions pertained either to deliberate concealment/suppression of criminal history or the effect of acquittals on technical grounds, neither of which arose in Kannaujiya’s case.
Court’s Analysis and Key Observations
Upon reviewing the record and the impugned order, Justice Nigam observed that the appointing authority failed to apply its own mind and merely acted as a rubber stamp for external recommendations.
The Court held:
“Respondent No. 3 has merely accepted the recommendation of District Magistrate, Kushinagar and Superintendent of Police, Kushinagar and has not independently recorded any finding on the candidature of the petitioner that whether mere pendency of criminal case of trivial nature, it would not be proper to appoint the petitioner as per the Government Order dated 28.04.1958. The appointing authority has to make an independent consideration after considering the reports submitted before them. In the present case no such consideration has been accorded by respondent No. 3.”
Scrutinizing the criminal allegations, the Court noted:
“This Court may also note that the perusal of the F.I.R. indicates that a case was registered against the petitioner under Section 60 of the Excise Act and there was no independent witness for the seizure made by the Police. The other case relied upon by the respondent is an N.C.R., which was never investigated by the police and therefore, cannot be of any use for not issuing character certificate to the petitioner.”
Reiterating the scope of judicial review over executive discretion, the Court remarked:
“This Court is conscious of the fact that it is exclusive domain of appointing authority to assess the suitability of candidate and once the suitability of the candidate is assessed on the settled principle of law, this Court should not interfere with the discretion of the appointing authority unless said discretion has been exercised arbitrarily. In the present case, the impugned order is that the same has been passed on the basis of recommendation made by District Magistrate, Kushinagar. Respondent No. 3 has not given any consideration to the nature of charge levelled against the petitioner in F.I.R. and the fact that the F.I.R. has been lodged on 30.05.2021 and more than five years have passed yet trial has not been concluded and the petitioner has also been granted bail on 16.05.2025 in the aforementioned case. In such view of the fact, this Court finds that the petitioner cannot be denied appointment on the basis of criminal case, more so when the order impugned has been passed without application of the mind.”
Decision
Finding the impugned cancellation unsustainable in law, the High Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the order dated August 26, 2025, passed by the Superintendent of Police, Mau. The Court directed the appointing authority to reconsider the petitioner’s candidature afresh in light of the observations made by the Court and the relevant Supreme Court precedents, expeditiously and preferably within two months from receiving a certified copy of the order.
Case Details
Case Title: Suraj Kannaujiya v. State of U.P. and 3 Others
Case No.: WRIT-A No. 8280 of 2026
Bench: Justice Manish Kumar Nigam
Date: September 30, 2026
