The Supreme Court of India has held that the rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) does not operate as res judicata or prevent the police from registering a First Information Report (FIR) under Section 154 CrPC based on information disclosing a cognizable offence. A division bench comprising Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria dismissed an appeal filed against an Allahabad High Court order that had declined to quash an FIR for alleged job fraud against the appellant, Pramod Kumar Shukla.
Background of the Case
On December 24, 2024, a complainant filed a complaint alleging that the appellant, Pramod Kumar Shukla, represented that he had influence in the Directorate of Education, Prayagraj, and could secure appointments for the complainant’s son, Akhilesh Pratap Singh, and grandson, Kaushik Pratap Singh, to the post of Clerk for a sum of ₹20,00,000. Relying on assurances from the appellant and his father, the complainant transferred ₹50,000 on January 12, 2023, ₹25,000 on January 13, 2023, ₹50,000 on January 16, 2023, and ₹50,000 on January 17, 2023, to the appellant’s bank account.
No interviews took place. On May 19, 2024, when the complainant confronted the appellant near Prachi Hospital, Shantipuram, Prayagraj, the appellant allegedly abused him, threatened to kill him, and threatened to implicate him in false cases if he demanded repayment. The complainant informed the Station House Officer, Police Station Phaphamau, Prayagraj, providing bank statements and a photocopy of a purported examination result furnished by the appellant. Consequently, FIR No. 405/2024 was registered against the appellant under Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 504, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
Prior to this FIR, the complainant had filed an application under Section 156(3) CrPC before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Prayagraj. The Magistrate called for a police report, which indicated that the dispute pertained to a land transaction. Observing that the complainant’s version contradicted the police report, the Magistrate rejected the application on September 11, 2024, an order later affirmed in revision by the Sessions Court.
The appellant then moved the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash FIR No. 405/2024. On June 5, 2025, the High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the rejection of an earlier Section 156(3) application does not bar subsequent registration of an FIR if the information discloses a cognizable offence. The appellant subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Counsel for the appellant argued that the parties were property dealers with a civil land dispute, as reflected in the police report dated July 17, 2024. It was contended that the FIR constituted an impermissible second round of proceedings on allegations identical to the rejected Section 156(3) application. Relying on Mohan Karthik v. State of Tamil Nadu, the appellant argued that after a Section 156(3) rejection on merits, the complainant’s only remedy was a complaint under Section 200 CrPC. Additionally, invoking State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra, and Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the appellant argued that no cognizable offence was disclosed, the agreement was void under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and the FIR was mala fide.
Counsel for the State submitted that the FIR was lodged upon fresh material furnished after the rejection of the Section 156(3) application, including audio recordings in a pen drive, transaction details, and forged admit cards and results. Citing V. Ravi Kumar v. State, Shivshankar Singh v. State of Bihar, and Anju Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the State argued that a subsequent FIR is not barred when founded on fresh material or distinct facts. It was also submitted that five other FIRs of similar nature were registered against the appellant across two police stations. Relying on M/s Jayant Vitamins Ltd. v. Chaitanyakumar, the State contended that courts should not interfere with the statutory police investigation.
Court’s Analysis
The Supreme Court examined the statutory scheme governing Sections 154, 156(3), and 190 CrPC, referring to Sakiri Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy, SAS Infratech Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Telangana, and Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat.
Observing the scope of Section 156(3) CrPC, the Court noted:
“An order passed under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC is confined to directing, or declining to direct, the exercise of the statutory power of investigation under Chapter XII of the Code. Such an order neither entails an adjudication on the merits of the allegations nor determines any right or liability of the proposed accused.”
Addressing the doctrine of res judicata, the Court referenced its earlier decision in S.C. Garg v. State of Uttar Pradesh, which reconciled precedents such as Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab, Bhagat Ram v. State of Rajasthan, and State of Rajasthan v. Tarachand Jain with Devendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Muskan Enterprises v. State of Punjab. The bench held that res judicata applies only where there has been a final adjudication determining the issue on merits after trial.
The Court explicitly held:
“Applying the same principle, the rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC, being an order rendered at the threshold without any adjudication on the merits after trial, cannot be accorded such finality as would attract the doctrine of res judicata so as to bar the subsequent registration of an FIR or the continuation of criminal proceedings founded upon the same or substantially similar allegations.”
Reaffirming the principle laid down in Mahendri v. State of U.P., the Court observed that:
“The declining of the aforesaid prayer, would not affect the merits of the controversy, nor would it reflect the veracity of the allegations made by the complainant in the First Information Report which was subsequently lodged…”
The Court further highlighted that the duty of the police to register an FIR upon receiving information disclosing a cognizable offence flows directly from Section 154 CrPC, as held by the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh. It clarified:
“The rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC cannot curtail or extinguish the independent statutory obligation cast upon the Police under Section 154 of the Cr.PC.”
Distinguishing Mohan Karthik v. State of Tamil Nadu, the Court noted that the said case concerned the maintainability of a second application under Section 156(3) CrPC, whereas the present case pertained to an independent FIR registered under Section 154 CrPC.
Decision
The Supreme Court concluded that the allegations in the FIR prima facie disclosed cognizable offences under the IPC, including cheating, forgery, breach of trust, and criminal intimidation. The Court observed that the appellant’s arguments regarding bank transactions, earlier police reports, and evidentiary value belong to the realm of trial evidence. Finding no perversity in the decision of the High Court, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.
Case Details:
Case Title: Pramod Kumar Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others
Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. 3931 of 2026 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 12908 of 2025)
Bench: Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra, Justice N.V. Anjaria
Date: August 19, 2026
