The Delhi High Court, in a revision petition under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (DRC Act), has held that a tenant cannot dictate terms to a landlord regarding how their property should be utilised or which floor or premises they should use to run their business. Dismissing a revision petition challenging an eviction order, Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar held that the scope of revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is strictly supervisory in nature, prohibiting the High Court from re-appreciating evidence or supplanting the findings of the Rent Controller.
Background of the Case
The matter originated from an eviction petition filed under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the DRC Act by the landlord, Rajiv Gupta HUF, seeking eviction of the tenants, Kishore Lal and Sons & Anr., from a commercial shop (Shop No. 4328 and Kothri No. 4330/3) located at Ansari Road, Darya Ganj, New Delhi.
The landlord pleaded bona fide requirement for the expansion and operational ease of the printing and publishing business run by its members, Rajiv Gupta and his wife Alka Gupta. The landlord stated that the existing space was inadequate to accommodate large machines, equipment, and employees. Furthermore, storing paper on the first floor was cumbersome and increased operational costs.
The tenants were granted leave to defend on December 11, 2019. In their written statement, the tenants raised objections regarding the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship, the bona fide nature of the landlord’s requirement, and the alleged availability of alternative accommodations. However, during final arguments before the trial court, the tenants conceded the landlord-tenant relationship. On November 11, 2025, the Additional Rent Controller (ARC), Patiala House Court, Delhi, allowed the eviction petition. Aggrieved by the order, the tenants filed a revision petition before the High Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Before the High Court, counsel for the tenant argued that the landlord had sufficient space on the ground floor and first floor and had suppressed material facts regarding available space. It was contended that while the landlord claimed to have only 400 sq. ft. on the ground floor, he admitted in cross-examination that the total ground floor area was approximately 100 sq. metres (1076 sq. ft.), leaving around 631 sq. ft. available even after accounting for tenanted portions and the staircase. The tenant argued that the trial court failed to reconcile this discrepancy and failed to evaluate whether the available area was sufficient.
The tenant further submitted that the landlord possessed alternative accommodations, including the first floor of the subject property, properties in DLF Ankur Vihar and Tronica City in Ghaziabad, and a property in Dayanand Vihar, Delhi. Citing Sarbate T.B. v. Nemichand and Khem Chand & Ors. v. Arjun Jain & Ors., the tenant argued that the burden of proving bona fide requirement lies on the landlord and that the rule stating the landlord is the best judge of his requirements cannot be applied inflexibly. Additionally, relying on Dr. (Mrs.) N.D. Khanna v. M/s Hindustan Industrial Corporation and Abdul Hamid & Anr. v. Nur Mohammad, the tenant argued that the eviction petition lacked foundational pleadings regarding the non-availability of alternative accommodation, a defect that could not be cured merely by leading evidence. Lastly, the tenant contended that the petition was non-maintainable for want of prior permission from the Slum Authority under Section 19(1)(a) of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, as the property fell within a slum area and structural changes were allegedly contemplated to join adjacent portions.
Court’s Analysis
Examining the scope of revisional powers under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act, the High Court reiterated that its jurisdiction is supervisory in character and not appellate. Citing the Supreme Court decisions in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, as well as Delhi High Court rulings in Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover, the Court highlighted that it cannot hold a roving inquiry or supplant its own view for that of the trial court.
The High Court quoted the Supreme Court’s ruling in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua:
“The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature.”
Addressing the factual contentions, the Court observed that the ARC had extensively analyzed the evidence regarding available space and alternative properties. The ARC noted that the tenant’s counter-site plan claiming 800 sq. ft. ground floor availability was not tendered in evidence and lacked dimensions, whereas the landlord’s site plan showed around 400 sq. ft. Citing V.S. Sachdeva v. M.L. Grover and Rishal Singh v. Bohat Ram & Ors., the ARC correctly accepted the landlord’s site plan.
Regarding alternate properties, the Court agreed with the ARC’s reliance on Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery, Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan, Uday Shankar Upadhyay v. Naveen Maheshwari, and Rahabhar Productions Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajendera Kumar Tandon, holding that residential properties in Ghaziabad could not serve as commercial alternatives in Delhi. The Court noted that the subject property is situated in Darya Ganj, a known publishing hub containing the core client base of the landlord. The Court affirmed that a tenant cannot dictate terms or force a landlord to conduct business from upper floors, basements, or different locations.
On the issue of pleadings and alleged concealment, the High Court referenced Nalini Kant Gupta v. Lajja Gupta and Durga Devi Jain v. Dr. Harish Chander Banga, noting that since the tenant was granted leave to defend and both sides led full evidence without prejudice, the petition could not be dismissed on technical pleading deficiencies.
Regarding the requirement of permission under the Slum Act, the High Court affirmed the ARC’s reliance on the Supreme Court ruling in Shafait Ali v. Shiva Mal (Dead) by LRs, which cited Ravi Dutt Sharma v. Rattan Lal Bhargava, quoting:
“Section 14A, 14 (1)(E), 25A, 253 & 25C of Delhi Rent Control Act are special provisions so far as the landlord and tenant are concerned and further in the view of the non obstante clause in the Section, these provisions override the existing law, so far as the new procedure is concerned. in that view of that matter, we are of the opinion that the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 would have no application in these cases covered by Section 14A and 14 (1)(E) of the Delhi Rent Control Act specially in view of provisions which were added by the Amending Act of 1976. In view of the procedure in Chapter IIIA of the Rent Act, the Slum Act is renderd inapplicable to the extent of inconsistency and it is not, therefore, necessary for the landlord to obtain permission of the competent Authority U/s. 19(1) (A) of the Slum Act before instituting a suit for eviction and coming within Section 14(1) (e) of the Rent Act.”
The Court also noted PW-1’s clarification that joining the tenanted space with the adjoining portion required no structural alteration other than creating a door opening in a partition wall.
Decision
The High Court concluded that the ARC had duly applied its mind to all contentions and evidence, returning well-reasoned findings free from jurisdictional error, perversity, or manifest illegality. Finding no merit in the grounds raised, the High Court dismissed the revision petition along with pending applications, upholding the eviction order dated November 11, 2025.
Case Title: Kishore Lal and Sons & Anr. v. Rajiv Gupta HUF & Ors.
Case No.: RC.REV. 78/2026 & CM APPL. 17302/2026
Bench: Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar
Date: August 14, 2026
