The Patna High Court, comprising Justice Bibek Chaudhuri and Justice Rana Vikram Singh, has set aside a divorce decree granted to a husband, holding that electronic evidence such as WhatsApp messages submitted without mandatory statutory certification under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is legally inadmissible, and isolated domestic incidents spread across several years do not constitute mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
Background of the Case
The marriage between the appellant-wife and the respondent-husband was solemnized on February 12, 2010, at Muzaffarpur in accordance with Hindu rites and customs, without exchange of dowry. Following the marriage, the wife stayed at the husband’s ancestral village in Lakhisarai for a few days before returning to her parental home. At the time, the husband was employed as an officer in the State Bank of India in Daman & Diu and resided in Vapi, Gujarat. Two daughters were born from the wedlock in 2010 and 2014 at the wife’s parental home.
The husband filed a matrimonial suit before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Lakhisarai, seeking dissolution of marriage on the ground of mental cruelty as well as custody of the minor children. He alleged that the wife exhibited cruel behavior, denied conjugal relations between 2010 and 2018, used abusive language, and alienated him and their children from his family. He cited specific instances including her refusal to cook for his visiting father in January 2012, public humiliation during Chhath Puja in 2012 and during his father’s Shraddha ceremony in February 2015, refusal to participate in his mother’s last rites in March 2022, and refusal to cohabit at Deoghar, Jharkhand, following his transfer.
In her written statement, the wife denied the allegations of cruelty and made counter-allegations of physical and mental abuse, frequent beating, alcohol consumption by the husband, and humiliation of her family. She asserted that she had been residing with the husband pursuant to court-directed counselling orders and contended that the suit was filed with the ulterior motive of remarriage.
The Family Court recorded the testimony of the husband (PW-1), his sister (PW-2), and a village friend (PW-3), while relying on WhatsApp messages marked as Exhibit-1. The wife’s evidence was closed due to non-prosecution after her counsel reported having no instructions. On March 20, 2023 / April 1, 2023, the Family Court held that cruelty was proved and granted a decree of divorce while holding the husband responsible for maintaining the wife and children. Aggrieved by this judgment, the wife preferred an appeal before the Patna High Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Counsel representing the appellant-wife argued that the Family Court erred in granting a divorce based solely on the uncorroborated oral testimony of the husband and his interested witnesses. He submitted that the alleged incidents were vague, lacked specific dates, and were not supported by any contemporaneous police complaints. He further contended that the wife was prevented from properly contesting the suit, the minor daughters were not examined by the court, and the Lakhisarai court lacked territorial jurisdiction since the parties resided primarily in Gujarat.
Counsel appearing for the respondent-husband supported the trial court decree. They argued that a continuous course of cruel conduct was established through consistent witness testimony regarding public abuse, denial of conjugal rights since 2018, refusal to perform family obligations, and the breakdown of temporary cohabitation following court-directed counselling in June 2022. They asserted that territorial jurisdiction was valid because the husband’s ancestral home is in Lakhisarai and the marriage was solemnized within the jurisdiction.
Court’s Analysis and Findings
Re-evaluating the evidence in a first appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, the High Court observed that the alleged incidents of verbal abuse and conflict spanned over twelve years (2010 to 2018) but lacked precise dates, times, and surrounding particulars. The Court noted that isolated or sporadic acts of domestic friction do not meet the legal threshold of cruelty required for a divorce.
Relying on the Supreme Court ruling in Suman Singh v. Sanjay Singh, (2017) 4 SCC 85, the High Court highlighted that isolated past events cannot furnish a subsisting cause of action:
“A petition seeking divorce on some isolated incidents alleged to have occurred 8-10 years prior to filing of the date of petition cannot furnish a subsisting cause of action to seek divorce after 10 years or so of occurrence of such incidents. The incidents alleged should be of recurring nature or continuing one and they should be in near proximity with the filing of the petition.”
“Few isolated incidents of long past and that too found to have been condoned due to compromising behaviour of the parties cannot constitute an act of cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act.”
“In our considered opinion, both the courts below failed to take note of this material aspect of the case and thus committed jurisdictional error in passing a decree for dissolution of marriage. We cannot, therefore, countenance the approach of the High Court because it did not, in the first instance, examine the grounds taken in the petition to find out as to whether such grounds constitute mental cruelty or not? The finding, therefore, though concurrent does not bind this Court.”
“We are not impressed by the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that an incident which occurred somewhere in 2010 when the appellant visited the office of the respondent and alleged to have misbehaved with the respondent in front of other officers would constitute an act of cruelty on the part of the appellant so as to enable the respondent to claim divorce. In the first place, no decree for divorce on one isolated incident can be passed. Secondly, there could be myriad reasons for causing such isolated incident. Merely because both exchanged some verbal conversation in presence of others would not be enough to constitute an act of cruelty unless it is further supported by some incidents of alike nature. It was not so.”
On the issue of electronic evidence, the High Court found that the WhatsApp messages marked as Exhibit-1 were legally inadmissible because no mandatory certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 was produced. Citing the Supreme Court judgment in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1, the Court observed:
“We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required under Section 65-B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence by way of electronic record, as correctly held in Anvar P.V. [Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473: (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 27: (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 24: (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 108] and incorrectly ‘clarified’ in Shafhi Mohammad [Shafhi Mohammad v. State of H.P., (2018) 2 SCC 801: (2018) 2 SCC 807: (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 346: (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 351: (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 860: (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 865]. Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot possibly suffice as Section 65-B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law. Indeed, the hallowed principle in Taylor v. Taylor [Taylor v. Taylor, (1875) LR 1 Ch D 426], which has been followed in a number of the judgments of this Court, can also be applied. Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act clearly states that secondary evidence is admissible only if led in the manner stated and not otherwise. To hold otherwise would render Section 65-B(4) otiose.”
Regarding the legal standards governing mental cruelty, the Court referenced the decision in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511, reiterating the illustrative principles:
“No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in dealing with the cases of ‘mental cruelty’. The instances indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative and not exhaustive: (i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible for the parties to live with each other could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty. (ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation is such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with other party. (iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a degree that it makes the married life for the other spouse absolutely intolerable. (iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty. (v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse. (vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave, substantial and weighty. (vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect, indifference or total departure from the normal standard of conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental cruelty. (viii) The conduct must be much more than jealousy, selfishness, possessiveness, which causes unhappiness and dissatisfaction and emotional upset may not be a ground for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. (ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day-to-day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. (x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty. The ill conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty. (xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of sterilisation without medical reasons and without the consent or knowledge of his wife and similarly, if the wife undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical reason or without the consent or knowledge of her husband, such an act of the spouse may lead to mental cruelty. (xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for considerable period without there being any physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty. (xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after marriage not to have child from the marriage may amount to cruelty. (xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental cruelty. No uniform standard can be laid down; each case must be decided on its own facts.”
Decision of the Court
The Patna High Court concluded that the husband failed to discharge the burden of proving cruelty of the required degree, gravity, and continuity under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Finding the trial court judgment unsustainable, the High Court passed the following operative order:
- The appeal is allowed.
- The judgment and decree dated March 20, 2023 / April 1, 2023, passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Lakhisarai, in Matrimonial Suit No. 68 of 2021, is set aside.
- The matrimonial suit filed by the respondent-husband for divorce is dismissed.
- Both parties shall continue to discharge their parental obligations towards their two minor daughters. Any future disputes concerning custody, visitation rights, or maintenance shall be determined by the competent court upon an appropriate application.
- Yearly regular updates shall be shared through the designated nodal officer handling records.
Case Title: Jyoti Rani vs. Nishant Kumar
Case No.: Miscellaneous Appeal No.32 of 2024
Bench: Justice Bibek Chaudhuri and Justice Rana Vikram Singh
Date: 06-08-2026
