The Supreme Court of India has ruled that nominated members of Town Panchayats are constitutionally ineligible to vote in elections to the State Legislative Council from Local Authorities’ Constituencies. A three-judge bench of the apex court, comprising Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi, and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi, dismissed a batch of appeals challenging a Karnataka High Court verdict that had invalidated the inclusion of nominated members in the electoral rolls and set aside a legislative council election result. The Court affirmed that nominated municipal members hold only an advisory and consultative mandate under the Constitution, and allowing them to vote in such legislative elections would fundamentally undermine democratic decentralization.
Background of the Dispute
The dispute originated from the 2021 election to the Karnataka Legislative Council from the 12-Chikkamagaluru Local Authorities Constituency. The constituency includes representatives from various local bodies, including Zilla Panchayats, Taluk Panchayats, Municipal Councils, and Town Panchayats. In four specific Town Panchayats—Koppa, Mudigere, Sringeri, and Narasimharajapura—the State Government nominated three members each under Section 352(1)(b) of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 (KMA), resulting in a total of 12 nominated councillors whose names were added to the electoral rolls.
When the election was held in December 2021, the appellant, Pranesh M.K., secured 1188 votes (which included the votes of these nominated members), while the respondent, Shanthegowda, secured 1182 votes. Pranesh was declared elected by a razor-thin margin of just 6 votes. Following this, the inclusion and voting rights of the nominated members were challenged through writ petitions in the Karnataka High Court.
A Single Judge on November 3, 2022, held the inclusion of the nominated members to be unconstitutional, directing the deletion of their names. This view was subsequently affirmed by a Division Bench on April 20, 2023. Alongside these writ proceedings, election petitions were filed challenging the validity of the election itself on the ground that the 12 void votes cast by nominated members had materially affected the result. On January 29, 2025, the High Court directed the opening of the ballot boxes, the segregation of the 12 nominated members’ ballots, and a recount after excluding those votes. The appellant subsequently approached the Supreme Court, which permitted the recount to proceed but directed that the results be placed before it in a sealed cover.
Arguments of the Parties
Senior statutory counsels representing the appellant argued that once an electoral roll is finalized, it cannot be questioned in an election petition except under limited grounds of disqualification under Section 16 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, citing the precedents of Hari Prasad Mulshanker Trivedi v. V.B. Raju and Kunwar Nripendra Bahadur v. Union of India. They further argued that even if ineligible voters participated, the election should not be set aside automatically, relying on Shyamdeo Pd. Singh v. Nawal Kishore Yadav, P. Shardamma & Anr. v. Marithibbegowda, Gayatri Devi v. Suman Devi & Ors., and Rooplal Mehta v. Dhan Singh & Ors..
The appellant also contended that a recount requires exceptional circumstances and specific pleadings, citing P.H. Pujar v. Kanthi Rajashekar Kidiyappa, Mahant Ram Prakash Dass v. Ramesh Chandra, and R. Narayanan v. S. Semmalai. Structurally, they argued that the restriction on nominated members under Article 243-R and Section 352 of the KMA applies only to municipal meetings, and Section 27(2)(b) of the 1950 Act grants voting rights to “every member.” Furthermore, they contended that separating the votes would violate the secrecy of the ballot, referencing Jeet Mohinder Singh v. Harminder Singh Jassi.
In contrast, senior counsels for the respondents contended that nominated members have no constitutional voting rights and that their inclusion in the electoral roll was void ab initio. They argued that the writ petitions were fully maintainable because there is no effective pre-election statutory appellate remedy under Section 27 of the 1950 Act, placing reliance on N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer & Ors., Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of U.P., and Ram & Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana.
They maintained that “every member” must be read harmoniously with Article 243-R, which limits decision-making to elected representatives. Since the margin of victory (6 votes) was far less than the number of invalid votes cast (12), they argued that the election was clearly and materially affected, citing Ramesh Mehta v. Sanwal Chand Singhvi, Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal, and Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India. They also cited Maharashtra Chess Association v. Union of India and Rajbala v. State of Haryana to support the view that alternative remedies do not bar constitutional writ jurisdiction when a foundational illegality is at play.
The Union of India, represented by Additional Solicitor General K.M. Nataraj, confined its submissions to the core legal issues. The Union argued that Article 171(3)(a) uses the broad term “members” without separating elected and nominated categories, unlike Articles 54 and 80. The Union also contended that once the final electoral roll is published, elections must proceed on that basis, citing Shyamdeo Pd. Singh and Lakshmi Charan Sen v. A.K.M. Hassan Uzzaman.
The Court’s Analysis and Observations
The Supreme Court began its analysis by upholding the maintainability of the writ petitions. The Court noted that the challenge was raised before the election and targeted the foundational composition of the electoral college rather than the election process itself. Because the Electoral Registration Officer (the District Magistrate) is also the appellate authority, any statutory remedy was deemed illusory. Citing Ram & Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana, the Court noted that the existence of an alternative remedy does not bar writ jurisdiction when the issue is a pure question of law.
Moving to the substantive issue of voting rights, the Court rejected the appellant’s literal, textual reading of Article 171(3)(a) of the Constitution and Section 27(2)(b) of the 1950 Act. It emphasized that constitutional provisions must be interpreted in light of the 74th Constitutional Amendment, which established local self-governments.
The Court observed: “The constitutional provisions cannot be construed in isolation or by adopting a purely textual approach divorced from the constitutional structure and every provision must be interpreted harmoniously so as to give effect to the Constitution as a coherent whole.”
Under Article 243-R of the Constitution and Section 352 of the KMA, nominated members are explicitly barred from voting in municipal meetings because they are appointed for their expertise and possess an advisory role rather than a democratic representative mandate.
The Court noted: “Therefore, the constitutional distinction between elected and nominated members is clear and intentional, as the elected members derive their authority from the democratic mandate of the electorate and represent the will of the people.”
Highlighting the contradiction of the appellant’s argument, the Court observed: “If Article 171(3)(a) of the Constitution was to be interpreted literally so as to include nominated members, an unreasonable consequence would follow, that is, a nominated member who is not allowed by the Constitution to vote in the municipality’s own decision-making process would still be allowed to vote in the election of a member of the Legislative Council.”
The bench further added: “The purpose of Article 171(3)(a) is not just to give representation to local authorities as institutions, but to ensure representation of democratically elected local self-governing bodies in the Legislative Council. Since nominated members are not democratically elected and cannot vote in municipal affairs, allowing them to participate in Legislative Council elections would dilute the democratic nature of the electoral process and go against the constitutional objective of strengthening local self-government.”
The Court, citing Ramesh Mehta v. Sanwal Chand Singhvi and Shelly Oberoi v. Office of Lieutenant Governor of Delhi, concluded that both the expressions “members of municipalities” in Article 171(3)(a) and “every member” in Section 27(2)(b) must be interpreted harmoniously to mean only elected representatives who possess voting rights within their respective local authorities.
Addressing the finality of electoral rolls, the Court distinguished the cases of Shyamdeo Pd. Singh and Lakshmi Charan Sen, stating that while finality is vital for electoral stability, it cannot be used to override the Constitution and validate the participation of constitutionally ineligible voters whose inclusion was void ab initio.
On the issue of the secrecy of the ballot and recounting, the Court held that the victory margin of 6 votes compared to the 12 invalid votes cast by the nominated members clearly satisfied the “material effect” requirement under Section 100(1)(d)(iii) of the 1951 Act. Citing Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, the Court held that while ballot secrecy is vital, it cannot be invoked to protect a constitutional illegality or undermine the purity of elections. Since the Returning Officer testified that the 12 votes could be segregated by comparing ballot papers, counterfoils, and marked copies of the rolls without exposing individual voting preferences, the High Court’s recount direction was fully justified.
Final Decision
Ultimately, the Supreme Court found no error, perversity, or jurisdictional flaw in the Karnataka High Court’s rulings. The bench dismissed all the appeals, confirming that nominated members appointed under Section 352(1)(b) of the KMA are not entitled to vote in Legislative Council elections.
The Registry was directed to transmit the sealed cover containing the recount results to the Registrar General of the Karnataka High Court. The respondent authorities have been ordered to execute the High Court’s recount directions within 30 days and submit their final report.
Case Title: Pranesh M.K. Versus Shanthegowda & Ors. etc. etc.
Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 9032-9034 of 2026
Bench: Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi, Justice Vipul M. Pancholi
Date: July 16, 2026
