The Supreme Court, in a bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, has held that an offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) qualifies as a “heinous offence” under Section 2(33) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, as imprisonment for life constitutes its minimum prescribed punishment. The Court further held that the word “may” in Section 101(2) of the JJ Act is directory, conferring discretion upon the Sessions Court to seek expert assistance during an appeal rather than imposing a mandatory obligation in every case. Consequently, the Apex Court dismissed the appeal filed by a juvenile challenging the decision of the High Court of Judicature at Patna, which affirmed that he be tried as an adult for murder.
Background of the Case
The matter arose from an incident on May 1, 2022, when a boy went missing after leaving in a vehicle with the appellant and another boy. The deceased’s body was recovered the next day in the fields, leading to the registration of an FIR (Cr. No. 72 of 2022) at Kopa Police Station under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC. Upon completion of the investigation, the appellant raised a plea of juvenility under Section 9 of the JJ Act. The Juvenile Justice (JJ) Board determined his age to be 16 years and 4 months on the date of the alleged offence.
As the offence was punishable under Section 302 IPC and the juvenile was above 16 years of age, the JJ Board conducted a preliminary assessment under Section 15 of the JJ Act. By a majority opinion, the JJ Board concluded that the juvenile lacked the mental and physical capacity to commit the crime and decided to dispose of the case itself. The Presiding Magistrate dissented, finding that the juvenile possessed the capacity to understand his acts.
On appeal by the complainant mother, the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Chapra, set aside the JJ Board’s order and directed that the juvenile be tried as an adult. The juvenile challenged this order before the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Revision No. 300 of 2024, arguing that the Appellate Court failed to take the assistance of experienced psychologists or medical specialists under Section 101(2) of the JJ Act. The High Court dismissed the revision petition on July 24, 2025, noting that the trial before the Children’s Court had already commenced and witness statements were being recorded.
Arguments of the Parties
Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that Section 302 IPC falls within the definition of a “serious offence” under Section 2(54)(b) of the JJ Act because no minimum sentence is expressly provided in the text. Relying on Barun Chandra Thakur v. Bholu, counsel argued that the Appellate Court failed to abide by the mandatory procedure of taking assistance from experienced psychologists and medical specialists under Section 101(2) of the JJ Act. It was also argued that because Section 21 of the JJ Act prohibits sentencing a child to life imprisonment without the possibility of release, life imprisonment cannot be treated as the minimum sentence for classification purposes.
In response, counsel for the State of Bihar argued that since life imprisonment constitutes a minimum sentence of more than seven years, Section 302 IPC qualifies as a “heinous offence” under Section 2(33) of the JJ Act. Counsel for the complainant mother argued that the decision in Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT) of Delhi regarding unclassified offences does not apply, and the severity of Section 302 IPC is manifest from its prescribed punishments of death or life imprisonment.
Court’s Analysis
1. Classification of Offences under the JJ Act
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that Section 302 IPC should be treated as a “serious offence”. The Court explained that a court convicting an accused under Section 302 IPC cannot impose any sentence lesser than imprisonment for life, citing Babasaheb Maruti Kamble v. State of Maharashtra and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Nandu @ Nandua.
The Court observed: “A court convicting an accused of an offence under Section 302 of the IPC cannot impose any lesser sentence than imprisonment for life. The statute does not provide any discretion to the courts to award any punishment below imprisonment for life. Thus, life imprisonment is, by implication, the minimum punishment prescribed under Section 302 of the IPC.”
Addressing the use of the word “or” between death and life imprisonment, the Court held: “The word ‘or’ merely confers upon the court the discretion to choose between the two punishments having regard to the gravity of the offence. It does not open any avenue for the imprisonment to be lesser than imprisonment for life.”
The Court also rejected the argument that Section 21 of the JJ Act alters the minimum punishment for categorization, holding: “What Section 21 ensures is that a juvenile is not incarcerated for the entirety of his natural life in order to give him a chance to participate in the mainstream.” The Court specified that Section 21 operates at the stage of sentencing once guilt is determined and cannot be imported into the preliminary stage of determining the forum of trial.
2. Interpretation of Section 101(2) of the JJ Act
Analyzing whether the word “may” in Section 101(2) is directory or mandatory, the Supreme Court referred to rulings in State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford, and Official Liquidator v. Dharti Dhan (P) Ltd. The Court held that Section 101(2) confers a discretionary power upon the Sessions Court to seek expert assistance when factual circumstances necessitate it.
Distinguishing Barun Chandra Thakur v. Bholu, the Court observed: “The ratio of Barun Chandra Thakur, rendered in the context of proviso to Section 15(1), cannot be mechanically transplanted onto Section 101(2) so as to render the latter mandatory in every case.”
3. Factors and Materials in Preliminary Assessment
The Supreme Court detailed the four statutory parameters under Section 15(1)—mental capacity, physical capacity, ability to understand consequences, and circumstances of the offence—citing Shilpa Mittal, Barun Chandra Thakur, Child in Conflict with Law v. State of Gujarat, and Pradeep Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi).
The bench emphasized that the JJ Board must independently evaluate all materials rather than relying solely on expert reports: “The report by an expert in accordance with the proviso to Section 15(1) is one significant input among several considerations. In other words, it could not be the sole consideration in the Board’s decision. The expert opinion must be read and assessed along with its interaction with the child, the SBR, the SIR, the statement of witness, and other material placed before the Board, if any.”
The Court added: “The members of the Board are required to apply their mind independently on all such materials. We emphasize that the Board cannot abdicate its responsibilities by mechanically adopting the conclusions of the expert without examining whether the conclusions reached are supported by the totality of the material before it.”
Decision
The Supreme Court concluded that Section 302 IPC is a “heinous offence”, the Appellate Court’s power under Section 101(2) is discretionary, and the JJ Board must independently weigh all material, including the Social Investigation Report (SIR) and Social Background Report (SBR). Finding no error of law in the High Court’s judgment, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.
Case Details: Case Title: X v. State of Bihar & Anr.
Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. 3299 of 2026
Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan
Date: July 21, 2026
