In a significant verdict on criminal jurisprudence, a Supreme Court bench comprising Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar acquitted an accused convicted of rape under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), holding that the prosecution’s testimony cannot be selectively accepted to prove rape after being rejected to acquit the accused of abduction under Section 366 IPC. Setting aside the conviction and 10-year rigorous imprisonment sentence upheld by the Punjab and Haryana High Court, the bench ruled that criminal liability cannot rest on the trial judge’s value judgments, surmises, or perceived immorality in the absence of clinching evidence.
Background of the Case
The prosecution alleged that on June 19, 2009, at around 7:30 PM, the prosecutrix (PW-1), a Class VIII student, went to buy household groceries in Ludhiana when she was accosted by the appellant, Paramjit Singh Bedi. Bedi, an acquaintance whose daughter was her friend, allegedly invited her into his car to meet his daughter. She was driven to the LIG Flats in Ludhiana, accompanied by two unidentified boys who later left.
According to PW-1, the appellant confined her in the flat for two days and engaged in forcible sexual intercourse with her. On June 22, 2009, he allegedly took her on a scooter to an abandoned factory in Malerkotla, where she was confined in a room until June 25, 2009, and subjected to sexual assault under threat of death. She stated that on June 25, 2009, the appellant brought her back to Ludhiana, where police personnel and her father (PW-2) intercepted them at Railway Colony No. 5. An FIR was registered at Ludhiana Division No. 5 Police Station under Sections 363, 366A, and 376 IPC, and police later chargesheeted the appellant under Sections 366 and 376 IPC.
On June 1, 2012, the Sessions Judge, Ludhiana, acquitted the appellant under Section 366 IPC, concluding that the prosecutrix was a major aged around 19 years based on an ossification test and had accompanied the appellant voluntarily without raising any alarm. However, the trial court convicted Bedi under Section 376 IPC and sentenced him to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 5,000, reasoning that a woman might agree to accompany a man and spend the night with him without consenting to sexual intercourse. On September 12, 2013, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissed the appellant’s appeal, relying on the statutory presumption under Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Supreme Court granted leave and enlarged the appellant on bail on January 30, 2015, after he had undergone nearly six years of incarceration.
Arguments of the Parties
Advocate Rajiv Kataria, appearing for the appellant, argued that Bedi had been falsely implicated due to preexisting civil and financial disputes. He pointed out that PW-2 had borrowed Rs. 1,50,000 from the appellant and threatened him with criminal implication when asked to repay. Additionally, a tenancy dispute was pending between Bedi and Major Singh, a relative of PW-2.
Counsel emphasized that the trial court’s finding acquitting Bedi of kidnapping and abduction under Section 366 IPC had attained finality, as neither the State nor the complainant challenged it. He contended that the prosecutrix was a consenting party who travelled across crowded markets, bright intersections, and on a train without raising any hue and cry or attempting to escape. He also highlighted that medical examinations revealed no external or internal injuries on the prosecutrix, and her clothes were recovered from the scooter’s storage compartment, establishing that she had left home prepared for an extended stay.
Opposing the appeal, Advocate Nupur Kumar, representing the State of Punjab, submitted that the conviction under Section 376 IPC was fully justified because the prosecutrix had testified that the sexual acts were committed without her consent. She argued that school records indicated the prosecutrix was approximately 15 years old at the time of the incident, rendering consent immaterial, and that the appellant had failed to rebut the legal presumption under Section 114A of the Evidence Act.
The Court’s Analysis
The Supreme Court examined the evidence and the statutory provisions governing abduction, kidnapping, and rape prior to the 2013 criminal law amendments. The court observed that the trial court’s determination that the prosecutrix was an adult aged 19 years, and that her movement with the appellant was voluntary, had attained finality without any appeal by the State.
Scrutinizing the testimony of PW-1, the bench noted glaring material contradictions. While she claimed in her examination-in-chief that they returned from Malerkotla to Ludhiana in a car, she stated during cross-examination that they travelled ticketless on a crowded train without raising any alarm or informing co-passengers. Furthermore, during a 1.5-hour scooter journey through crowded bazaars and illuminated intersections, she never sought assistance, attempted to alight, or raised a hue and cry. Consequently, her assertion that she screamed inside the confined room at Malerkotla was found unworthy of credence.
Addressing the forensic evidence, the bench observed:
“Mere presence of spermatozoa in the vaginal swab of the prosecutrix would not prove rape given the surrounding circumstances.”
The apex court firmly rejected the trial court’s rationalization that some women voluntarily travel with men yet refuse consent for sexual relations. While noting that such a scenario could exist in abstract circumstances “(though the use of the word ‘daring’ prefixing ‘women’ is totally uncalled for)”, the court held that the context was fundamentally different here, as the prosecutrix had voluntarily absented herself from home for 5 to 6 days to travel and stay with the appellant.
On the core legal issue of evaluating witness testimony, the Supreme Court laid down:
“While it is true that on the basis of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, an accused can be convicted of rape but for such a conviction, it would also require that such statement of the prosecutrix must inspire the confidence of the court. There cannot be partial rejection of the evidence of the prosecutrix for the purpose of Section 366 IPC and partial acceptance of the very same statement for the purpose of proving the charge under Section 376 IPC. If the evidence of the prosecutrix is of unimpeachable character, it has to be accepted in its entirety. There cannot be part acceptance and part rejection of the statement of the prosecutrix.”
Emphasizing the requirement of strict legal proof over moral disapproval, the bench held:
“When the learned Sessions Judge had disbelieved the prosecution version insofar the charge under Section 366 IPC is concerned, the very same prosecution version could not have been accepted to convict the accused-appellant under Section 376 IPC. While the conduct of the appellant may be immoral and unethical, that by itself would not justify a conviction under Section 376 IPC without any clinching evidence. Such a charge must be proved on the basis of hard evidence and not on the basis of the surmises and conjectures based on the value judgment of the presiding judge. Immorality of an act sans credible evidence cannot justify a conviction.”
Decision
Holding that the conviction and sentence passed by the Sessions Judge and affirmed by the High Court could not be legally sustained, the Supreme Court set aside the judgments dated June 1, 2012, and September 12, 2013. The court cleared the appellant of the charge under Section 376 IPC and allowed the appeal.
Case Title: Paramjit Singh Bedi v. State of Punjab
Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. 203 of 2015
Bench: Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
Date: September 25, 2026
