The Supreme Court has ruled that the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 cannot be invoked against an accused unless the prosecution proves the initial demand for a bribe beyond reasonable doubt. A bench comprising Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar set aside the conviction of a Talati-cum-Mantri and a Peon from Bechri Grampanchayat in Gujarat, holding that mere recovery of money in the absence of a proven demand is insufficient to establish charges under Sections 7, 12, and 13(1)(d) of the Act.
Background of the Case
The case originated in February 1996 when the complainant, Hasmukhbhai Maganbhai Chauhan, applied for an Income Certificate at the Mamlatdar office to obtain educational concessions. The application was forwarded to the Talati-cum-Mantri (Appellant No. 1, Rafikmiya Ahmedmiya Malek) of Village Bechri.
According to the prosecution, when the complainant met Appellant No. 1 on February 7, 1996, a bribe of ₹120 was demanded—₹100 for Appellant No. 1 and ₹20 for the Peon (Appellant No. 2, Sirajbhai Rasulbhai Vora). The complainant lodged a grievance with the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB), which subsequently arranged a trap on February 19, 1996.
During the trap, after receiving the Income Certificate, the complainant handed over a ₹20 note to Appellant No. 2, who placed it in his pocket. No money was offered to or recovered from Appellant No. 1.
Following trial, the Special Judge convicted both appellants under Section 7 read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, sentencing them to one year of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹2,000, while acquitting them of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court of Gujarat upheld their convictions in a common judgment on January 22, 2015, prompting the appellants to approach the Supreme Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Counsel for the appellants, Mr. Divyesh Pratap Singh, argued that the sanction to prosecute Appellant No. 1 was granted by the Deputy District Development Officer (PW-2), whereas the competent authority to remove a substantive Talati-cum-Mantri was the District Development Officer under the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961, rendering the sanction invalid under Section 19(1)(c) of the Act. He relied on Gopalbhai Mohanbhai Nagoda vs. State of Gujarat, Shamji Karshan vs. The State of Gujarat, and Mohd. Iqbal Ahmad vs. State of Andhra Pradesh.
The appellants further submitted that no money was ever offered to or accepted by Appellant No. 1, citing Pramatha Nath Taluqdar vs. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar and Shri Ram & Another vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh. Regarding Appellant No. 2, both lower courts found the demand doubtful; the defence maintained that the ₹20 was given voluntarily as an Eid festival tip after the certificate was handed over. Relying on N. Vijayakumar vs. State of Tamil Nadu and State of Lokayuktha Police, Davanagere vs. C.B. Nagaraj, counsel argued that without proof of demand, no presumption under Section 20 could arise.
Counsel for the State of Gujarat, Mr. Prashant Bhagwati, contended that concurrent findings established a demand of ₹120 by Appellant No. 1. He submitted that the successful trap and receipt of ₹20 by Appellant No. 2 proved both demand and acceptance, and that the sanction orders were issued after due application of mind.
Court’s Analysis and Observations
Examining the evidence, the Supreme Court highlighted serious discrepancies in the complainant’s testimony. During cross-examination, the complainant admitted that in a separate court case (Criminal Case No. 826/1996) filed against the accused for alleged threats, he had stated that Appellant No. 1 initially demanded ₹200 and settled for ₹120—a fact omitted in his current deposition.
The court also noted that despite ACB instructions to hand over the entire ₹120 upon demand, the complainant gave only ₹20 to Appellant No. 2. Appellant No. 2 did not make any demand, nor did he inquire why only ₹20 was paid when Appellant No. 1 allegedly directed the entire sum to be given to him.
Addressing the prosecution’s argument on statutory presumption, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that recovery of ₹20 from Appellant No. 2 automatically established the offence against both accused. Reaffirming the three-judge bench decision in N. Vijayakumar, the court observed:
“This contention cannot be accepted for the reason that the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Act of 1988 would come into play only after the initial demand is proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. If the initial demand itself is not proved, mere recovery of the amount of ₹20/- from A2 would not resurrect the case of the prosecution to enable the Court to hold that the charge was proved.”
The court also highlighted that the certificate had already been handed over before the money was given, referring to State of Lokayuktha Police, Davanagere, where it was held that payment made after completion of work cannot automatically be assumed to be pursuant to a demand.
On the issue of prosecution sanction, the apex court observed that the sanction granted to Appellant No. 1 by the Deputy District Development Officer was invalid because only the District Development Officer possessed the statutory power to remove a substantive Talati-cum-Mantri from office under Section 19(1)(c). However, the court added that it was not setting aside the conviction on sanction grounds alone, noting:
“Even otherwise, we find on an appreciation of the entire material brought on record by the prosecution that it falls woefully short of proving the charge against both the accused beyond reasonable doubt.”
Summarizing its conclusions on the failure of the prosecution’s case, the bench stated:
“Having found that the charge of demand of bribe amount has not been proved against A1 coupled with the fact that both the Courts have recorded a finding that no demand was made by A2, it is obvious that the case of the prosecution must fail. As noted above, mere possession of a currency note of ₹20/- with A2 by itself would not be sufficient to uphold the conviction of A1 and A2 for the offence punishable under Sections 7, 12 and 13(1)(d) of the Act of 1988.”
Decision
The Supreme Court allowed both appeals, setting aside the judgment of the trial court dated November 30, 1999, and the Gujarat High Court judgment dated January 22, 2015. Appellants Rafikmiya Ahmedmiya Malek and Sirajbhai Rasulbhai Vora were acquitted of all charges under Sections 7, 12, and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and their bail bonds were cancelled.
Case Title: Rafikmiya Ahmedmiya Malek v. State of Gujarat (with Sirajbhai Rasulbhai Vora v. State of Gujarat)
Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. 1177 of 2015 with Criminal Appeal No. 1183 of 2015
Bench: Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
Date: August 19, 2026
