A Supreme Court bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Augustine George Masih has dismissed a batch of writ petitions challenging the constitutionality of sentences imposing imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission. The apex court held that life imprisonment under Section 53 read with Section 45 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) means imprisonment for the entire remaining natural life of a convict, terminating only at their last breath. The Court reaffirmed that judicial authority to substitute death penalties with life imprisonment without remission is settled law and termed attempts to re-agitate the issue an abuse of the legal process. It also held that courts cannot sit in appeal over executive clemency orders passed by the President of India under Article 72 of the Constitution.
Background of the Case
The judgment resolved four connected writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution:
- Ramasrey @ Fakkad challenged the sentence imposed by the Allahabad High Court, which modified his death penalty under Sections 364A, 302, and 201 of the IPC to imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life. He contended that Section 302 IPC envisages only two punishments—death or life imprisonment—and that imprisonment for the remainder of natural life is unconstitutional.
- Chander Kant Jha, convicted under Sections 302 and 201 IPC, challenged a Delhi High Court order modifying his death sentence to imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life without remission.
- Atbir Singh, convicted under Section 302/34 IPC, challenged his sentence after his mercy petition was accepted by the President of India under Article 72, commuting his death penalty to life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without parole. He argued that “remainder of natural life” clauses were added by Parliament only for sexual offences and that such sentences defeat statutory remission rights under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).
- Sarabjit Singh, Gurdev Singh @ Baldev Singh, and Satnam Singh, convicted under Sections 302/307/148/149 IPC and the Arms Act, challenged Presidential clemency orders that commuted their death sentences to life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life with no remission.
Arguments of the Parties
Senior Counsel Rishi Malhotra, representing the petitioners, argued that the IPC specifies only death or life imprisonment as penalties under Section 302, and that the “remainder of natural life” term lacks statutory support outside amendments specific to sexual offences. The petitioners further contended that such sentences infringe upon statutory rights to seek remission under Section 432 CrPC and urged the Supreme Court to independently reduce their sentences despite the prior exercise of clemency powers under Article 72 or Article 161.
For the respondents, Attorney General R. Venkataramani, alongside Additional Solicitors General S.V. Raju and Raja S. Thakare, raised preliminary objections regarding maintainability under Article 32. They submitted that the Supreme Court cannot sit in appeal over executive power exercised by the President or Governor, and that Article 32 cannot be utilized to circumvent established legal procedures.
The Court’s Analysis
Addressing maintainability under Article 32, the Court referred to precedents such as L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, Daryao v. State of U.P., Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India, Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, and K.D. Sharma v. SAIL. The bench noted that while Article 32 is a fundamental right and part of the basic structure of the Constitution, it cannot be used as a shortcut to bypass appellate procedure or seek re-evaluation of executive decisions.
Examining the scope of judicial review over executive clemency under Articles 72 and 161, the Court cited Epuru Sudhakar v. Govt. of A.P., Maru Ram v. Union of India, K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay, Kehar Singh v. Union of India, Union of India v. V. Sriharan, and Pyare Lal v. State of Haryana. The bench reiterated that judicial review of clemency orders is permissible only on narrow grounds:
- The order was passed without application of mind;
- The order is mala fide;
- The order was passed on extraneous or wholly irrelevant considerations;
- Relevant materials were kept out of consideration; or
- The order suffers from arbitrariness.
The Court observed that none of these grounds were satisfied by the petitioners, making any attempt to alter Presidential clemency orders unviable.
On the constitutionality of “remainder of natural life” sentences, the Court referred to Section 53 read with Section 45 of the IPC (and corresponding provisions under Sections 4 and 2(17) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita). Reaffirming the three-judge bench decision in Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, the Court emphasized that courts possess the authority to create a special category of sentence for cases falling just short of the rarest-of-rare threshold.
Highlighting the rationale from Swamy Shraddananda (2), the Court quoted: “A far more just, reasonable and proper course would be to expand the options and to take over what, as a matter of fact, lawfully belongs to the Court i.e. the vast hiatus between 14 years’ imprisonment and death.”
The Court further cited from Swamy Shraddananda (2): “Further, the formalisation of a special category of sentence, though for an extremely few number of cases, shall have the great advantage of having the death penalty on the statute book but to actually use it as little as possible, really in the rarest of rare cases.”
The Court noted that the five-judge Constitution Bench in Union of India v. V. Sriharan conclusively settled this legal question, citing the majority holding: “We hold that the ratio laid down in Swamy Shraddananda (2) that a special category of sentence; instead of death can be substituted by the punishment of imprisonment for life or for a term exceeding 14 years and put that category beyond application of remission is well founded and we answer the said question in the affirmative.”
Addressing the petitioners’ re-agitations before a two-judge bench, the Court observed: “Where does the scope arise for it to be contended that such sentences are invalid/unconstitutional or trample upon statutorily granted rights in the form of Section 432 CrPC, that too before a Bench of two judges? We can only say that such an endeavour is a misuse, if not the abuse of process of law.”
The Court also addressed Joseph v. State of Kerala, clarifying that while executive instructions cannot completely eliminate premature release options, judicial orders imposing special category sentences beyond 14 or 20 years without remission remain valid based on the gravity of the offense.
Decision of the Court
The Supreme Court dismissed all four writ petitions as misdirected:
- The petitions of Ramasrey @ Fakkad and Chander Kant Jha were dismissed because they had not approached the appropriate government or constitutional authorities for remission, and life imprisonment legally denotes remainder of natural life.
- The petitions of Atbir Singh and Sarabjit Singh & others were dismissed as the President of India had already exercised clemency powers under Article 72, and no recognized ground for judicial review was established.
Case Title: Ramasrey @ Fakkad v. State of Uttar Pradesh
Case No.: Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 553 of 2023
Bench: Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Augustine George Masih
Date: July 29, 2026
