The Supreme Court has held that a public servant may be prosecuted under Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 even where the alleged demand for an undue advantage is made through subordinates or for the benefit of another person. Setting aside a Karnataka High Court order that had quashed a corruption FIR against a Police Sub-Inspector, the Court ruled that the allegations disclosed a prima facie offence and that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by effectively conducting a “mini-trial” at the stage of considering a plea for quashing.
A Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh allowed an appeal filed by the Karnataka Lokayukta Police and restored the FIR and all consequential proceedings against the police officer.
Background of the Case
The case arose from a complaint filed by a resident of Ballari district against a Police Sub-Inspector posted at Siruguppa Police Station. According to the complaint, police officials seized his motorcycle and mobile phone in March 2023 while accusing him of illegally transporting ration rice meant for distribution through fair price shops.
The complainant alleged that despite repeatedly visiting the police station over the next several weeks, his requests for return of the seized articles yielded no result.
On May 28, 2023, the complainant met the Sub-Inspector, who allegedly informed him that he had spoken to a private individual, Mohammed Ali, regarding the matter. The complainant subsequently contacted Mohammed Ali, who allegedly demanded ₹50,000 on behalf of the police officer.
According to the complaint, when the complainant again met the officer on June 1, 2023, the officer directed a police constable to release the motorcycle and remarked that since the complainant had not done anything for him, he should at least “do something” for the other police personnel. Thereafter, a constable allegedly demanded ₹5,000 as a bribe, which was later negotiated down to ₹3,000 along with an additional ₹500 penalty.
Based on the complaint, the Karnataka Lokayukta Police registered an FIR on June 3, 2023 under Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act against the Sub-Inspector, the constable, and a private individual.
High Court Quashed the FIR
The Police Sub-Inspector approached the Karnataka High Court seeking quashing of the FIR.
Allowing the petition, the High Court held that the basic ingredients of an offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act were absent. It found that there was no direct demand or acceptance of money by the officer and consequently quashed the FIR and all proceedings against him.
Supreme Court on Scope of Quashing Jurisdiction
Reversing the High Court’s decision, the Supreme Court reiterated that while considering a petition seeking quashing of an FIR, the court is only required to examine whether the allegations, if accepted at face value, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence.
The Bench observed that the High Court went beyond this limited exercise by examining the outcome of trap proceedings, the absence of recovery from the officer, the results of chemical tests, and findings recorded in departmental proceedings.
The Court observed:
“Rather than confining itself ascertaining as to whether any prima facie case has been made out of commission of offence on the basis of the contents of the FIR, the High Court proceeded to examine the outcome of the trap proceedings, the absence of personal recovery from Respondent No. 1, the result of the phenolphthalein test, and the findings of a departmental enquiry against some of the accused, all of which are matters of evidence to be evaluated at the stage of trial.”
The Bench held that by undertaking such an exercise, the High Court had effectively conducted a mini-trial, which is impermissible at the threshold stage.
Interpretation of Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act
A substantial part of the judgment is devoted to interpreting Section 7(a) and Explanation 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
The Court noted that the provision criminalises not only obtaining or accepting an undue advantage but also attempting to obtain one. Further, Explanation 2 makes it immaterial whether the undue advantage is sought directly or through a third party and whether it is intended for the public servant himself or for another person.
Analysing the statutory framework, the Court held:
“It is not necessary that the public servant who has been charged of the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act has to obtain the undue benefit for himself, but it also covers cases where he does the offensive act for obtaining undue advantages for ‘another person’.”
The Bench explained that the provision is broad enough to cover situations where a public servant remains in the background while using subordinates or intermediaries to obtain an undue advantage.
Prima Facie Case Made Out Against the Officer
Applying the law to the facts of the case, the Supreme Court held that the allegations in the complaint, if accepted as true, disclosed at least an attempt by the officer to obtain an undue advantage for his subordinates.
Referring to the allegation that the officer told the complainant to “do something” for other police personnel, the Court held:
“The specific allegation attributed to the Respondent No. 1 is him directing the Complainant that he should ‘do something for the other police officials’ or ‘make those boys happy’ which constitutes a veiled demand for illegal gratification or undue advantage for these persons who were closely associated with him officially.”
The Court noted that this alleged statement was immediately followed by a demand for money by a subordinate officer, which prima facie established a connection between the two events.
Rejecting the High Court’s reasoning, the Bench observed that the Prevention of Corruption Act does not require a direct personal demand by the public servant in every case and that an attempt to obtain an undue advantage through subordinates falls within the scope of the statute.
Earlier Decisions Distinguished
The respondent officer relied on the Supreme Court’s decisions in K. Shanthamma v. State of Telangana, Soundarajan v. State Represented by the Inspector of Police, and Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab to contend that proof of demand and acceptance is indispensable for an offence under Section 7.
The Supreme Court, however, held that all three judgments were rendered after full-fledged trials and dealt with the sufficiency of evidence required to sustain convictions.
The Bench clarified that the present case was at the pre-trial stage, where the only question was whether the allegations disclosed a prima facie offence warranting investigation and trial.
Departmental Enquiry and Mala Fide Allegations
The Court also rejected the reliance placed on a departmental enquiry that had exonerated certain subordinate officials.
It held that findings recorded in departmental proceedings against other individuals could not absolve the principal accused in a criminal case. Moreover, the enquiry report had not been before the High Court when it passed the impugned order.
Similarly, the Court declined to accept the contention that the complaint was motivated by previous hostility between the complainant and the police officer. It observed that allegations of mala fides and prior disputes are matters to be tested during trial and do not justify quashing an FIR when the allegations otherwise disclose a cognizable offence.
Decision
Holding that the allegations in the FIR prima facie disclosed the commission of an offence under Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Karnataka High Court’s judgment.
The Court restored the FIR and all proceedings arising from it and directed that the matter proceed in accordance with law. It clarified that its observations were confined to the issue of whether a prima facie case existed and would not influence the trial court’s determination of guilt or innocence.
Case Details
Case Title: The State by Lokayuktha Police v. Sri K. Rangayya & Anr.
Case No.: Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 5245 of 2025
Bench: Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh
Date: May 26, 2026
