The Allahabad High Court has held that highly serious sexual harassment allegations under the POSH Act cannot be dismissed at the threshold simply due to delay without considering the specific reasons for such delay. Justice Saurabh Shyam Shamshery set aside a 2017 punishment order of ‘Censure’ and academic restrictions imposed on Dr. Tapas Kumar Das, an astrophysics professor at the Harish Chandra Research Institute (HCRI), Allahabad. The Court ruled that while the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) conducted a procedurally defective inquiry, the serious complaints could not be rejected outright as time-barred without a reasoned evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the delay.
Background of the Case
The petitioner, Dr. Tapas Kumar Das, an Associate Professor-G of Astrophysics at HCRI, Allahabad, was subjected to an inquiry by the institute’s ICC under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act). The inquiry was initiated following multiple complaints from female Ph.D. students who studied under him.
The complaints alleged sexual harassment at the workplace, including physical contact, unwelcome advances, and sexually coloured remarks. The ICC concluded its inquiry on August 17, 2016, finding Dr. Das guilty. The committee’s summary described him as a “serial harasser and repeat offender” who used his position of power to harass young, vulnerable students over a prolonged period between 2013 and 2016. Among the findings, the committee noted that Dr. Das had admitted to sending an email link containing pornography or erotica to one of the complainants, which he later denied in his written response.
The ICC recommended various disciplinary actions, including stopping his increments and promotions, suspension, and shifting him to an office with glass walls to ensure visibility. Subsequently, the Governing Council of HCRI passed an order on July 9, 2017, imposing a penalty of ‘Censure’ and barring him from taking female students, post-doctoral fellows (PDFs), or Research Assistants (RAs) to work with him. Dr. Das challenged this order in the High Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Senior Advocate Ritzu Ghoshal, representing the petitioner, argued that the POSH Act is a Special Act whose provisions must be strictly followed. Under Section 9 of the Act, a complaint must be made within three months of the incident, or within three months of the last incident in a series of events, with a maximum extension of three months if sufficient cause is shown. He argued that the complaints against Dr. Das were undated, vague, and pertained to incidents between 2013 and 2016, making them patently time-barred.
The petitioner relied on the Supreme Court judgment in X vs. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti and others (2025) to contend that complaints patently barred by limitation should be rejected at the very first instance. Furthermore, the petitioner argued that the ICC violated Section 11 of the POSH Act and Rule 7 of the POSH Rules by failing to record victim statements, provide copies of those statements, allow cross-examination, or offer an opportunity for an oral hearing.
In response, Senior Advocate Rahul Agarwal, representing HCRI, was unable to show from the record that victim statements were recorded or that Dr. Das was granted an oral hearing. He submitted that if the Court found procedural defects, the matter should be remitted back to the ICC to recommence from the stage of the petitioner’s reply.
However, on the issue of delay, the respondents argued that the rigor of the limitation period under Section 9 should be relaxed given the protective objective of the POSH Act, which seeks to secure a safe work environment for women. Citing the serious nature of the allegations—including physical grabbing and late-night coercion—and referencing X vs. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti, the respondents maintained that delay should not be used as a technical shield to ignore systemic misconduct.
The Court’s Analysis
The High Court began by examining the purpose of the POSH Act, noting it was enacted following the landmark directions in Vishaka and others vs. State of Rajasthan and others (1997) to protect women’s fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution.
Evaluating the inquiry process, the Court found that the basic procedures of natural justice and the requirements under Section 11 and Rule 7 were completely bypassed. The Court observed:
The Court finds that manner of inquiry, as referred above, was not followed by ICC.
The Court pointed out that there was no record of victim statements being recorded before the ICC, nor was any copy of such statements provided to the petitioner. No opportunity for cross-examination or oral hearing was afforded. Consequently, the Court held:
Therefore, the Court finds that procedure adopted by ICC was defective. Accordingly, its outcome, i.e., inquiry report as well as order passed by Council and Institute cannot sustain.
However, on the issue of limitation and whether the complaints should be dismissed outright due to delay, the Court took a protective stance. Reviewing the highly serious allegations of physical grabbing and late-night coercion, the Court noted that these acts clearly fell under the definition of “sexual harassment” in Section 2(n) of the Act.
The Court recognized that victims of sexual harassment in academic or professional settings often cannot complain immediately due to vulnerability and fear of career repercussions. Pointing to the principles in X vs. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti, the Court noted:
…in certain circumstances delay may not be considered adverse to the extent that complaints may be rejected at threshold as it would not be in consonance of object of POSH Act and that normally such complaints are not made immediately, specially when complainants were working under delinquent as it would affect their respective future.
Thus, the Court concluded that the complaints could not be thrown out on technical limitations without a proper, reasoned inquiry into the causes of the delay:
In aforesaid circumstances, the Court finds that complaints cannot be rejected at threshold without specific consideration.
The Decision
The High Court allowed the writ petition in part, setting aside the impugned punishment order dated July 9, 2017.
The Court directed the ICC to consider all complaints afresh, specifically focusing on the timeline of the allegations, the exact dates, and any explanations provided by the complainants for the delay. The ICC must pass a reasoned decision within eight weeks from the date of the judgment on whether the complaints should be rejected at the threshold as time-barred or proceeded with.
The Court clarified that the petitioner’s right to participate in the inquiry will only arise if the ICC decides to proceed further and conducts a formal inquiry in accordance with the POSH Act and Rules.
Case Title: Dr. Tapas Kumar Das v. Harish Chandra Research Institute And 3 Others
Case No.: WRIT – A No. 12736 of 2018
Bench: Justice Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
Date: May 07, 2026
