The Supreme Court of India has set aside the conviction and 10-year rigorous imprisonment sentence handed to an accused under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, holding that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A Bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta ruled that the evidence brought on record fell woefully short of the legal standard, citing the complete failure of the victim and eyewitness to identify the accused in court, material omissions and unexplained delay in lodging the First Information Report (FIR), and the withholding of a pivotal witness.
Background of the Case
The prosecution alleged that on May 28, 2015, the appellant, Charming Rupon, sexually assaulted his 11-year-old niece, a child suffering from a 40% intellectual disability, at her residence in East Jaintia Hills District, Meghalaya. According to the prosecution, the victim’s mother (PW-1) had left the house in the afternoon to drop her brother’s child, allegedly noticing the accused plucking mulberry leaves in the adjoining garden.
After the incident, the victim went to stay overnight at the home of her cousin (PW-2). Although PW-2 allegedly informed the mother the following morning about the disclosure of assault, the mother did not take immediate action, stating that the child had not affirmed the accusation when questioned. The matter was reported to the police only on June 8, 2015—ten days after the alleged incident—after the victim purportedly disclosed the occurrence to her school teacher, Ms. Princely.
Following investigation, charges were framed under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. On December 7, 2021, the Special Judge (POCSO), East Jaintia Hills District, Khliehriat, convicted the accused and sentenced him to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 1 lakh. The High Court of Meghalaya dismissed his criminal appeal on March 29, 2022, prompting the appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Appearing for the appellant, Senior Advocate Gaurav Agrawal contended that the courts below committed a grave error in appreciating the evidence. He highlighted that the prosecution failed to satisfactorily explain the 10-day delay in lodging the FIR. Counsel pointed out that the school teacher, whose conversation allegedly triggered the police complaint, was withheld from the witness box without any explanation.
Mr. Agrawal further argued that the prosecution failed to prove identity. Both the victim (PW-4) and her cousin (PW-2) completely failed to identify the appellant in the dock and admitted that his name had been supplied to them by the victim’s mother (PW-1). Crucially, the victim admitted in cross-examination that she had been instructed by the Special Public Prosecutor on what to state before the court, demonstrating clear tutoring. He also noted sharp contradictions regarding the appellant’s relationship with the family, the lack of medical cross-examination, and the failure of the courts below to consider the defence’s credible plea of alibi supported by four witnesses and documentary evidence.
Opposing the appeal, Advocate General Amit Kumar, representing the State of Meghalaya, argued that the conviction was well-founded. He submitted that the statements of the victim and her cousin recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) lent substantial corroboration. He contended that the victim’s 40% intellectual disability and the passage of two years before her deposition in 2017 explained her inability to identify the appellant in court. The Advocate General also invoked Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, asserting that because the mother saw the appellant in the adjoining garden immediately prior to the incident while the child was alone, the burden shifted to the accused to explain the circumstances.
The Court’s Analysis
Re-appreciating the evidence, the Supreme Court emphasized the foundational premise of criminal law:
“However, in a criminal case, the prosecution is required to prove the charges by leading evidence which is free from doubt and establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.”
Examining the testimony of the mother (PW-1), the Bench observed that her conduct was unnatural. The court noted that a mother informed of such an allegation regarding a mentally challenged child would naturally be expected to inspect the child physically and seek prompt medical or police aid. Furthermore, the theory that the accused was seen in the garden was conspicuously absent from the belated FIR.
Addressing the impact of material omissions in an FIR, the Supreme Court relied on its previous ruling in Amar Nath Jha v. Nand Kishore Singh, quoting:
“Although we accept that the FIR need not be an encyclopaedia of the crime, but absence of certain essential facts, which were conspicuously missing in the present FIR, point towards suspicion that the crime itself may be staged.”
The Bench also cited Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of M.P., reiterating:
“We think that omissions of such important facts, affecting the probabilities of the case, are relevant under Section 11 of the Evidence Act in judging the veracity of the prosecution case”
Applying these principles, the court rejected the State’s argument under Section 106 of the Evidence Act as farfetched, noting that merely seeing the accused plucking leaves in an adjoining garden does not establish that the accused and the victim were “last seen together.”
On the issue of identity, the Bench noted that both star witnesses failed to identify the appellant in the courtroom dock. In her cross-examination, the victim admitted:
“Before coming to the Court room today I had met the Special Prosecutor. The Special Prosecutor had told me what to say before this Court today… I have forgotten his face. My mother told me the name of the Accused… I cannot remember now the face of the person who came to my house and raped me as it happened quite sometime back. After the incident, I have never seen the person again, and I am not able to identify him now.”
Similarly, PW-2 admitted in cross-examination and re-examination:
“I do not know the accused person and cannot recollect his face now. The name of the Accused was told to me by PW1… As I do not know the Accused person it was PW1 who told me the name.”
The Bench noted that despite these answers, neither the prosecutor nor the trial court attempted to confront the witnesses with their Section 164 CrPC statements. Furthermore, the medical evidence could not be read against the accused because the trial court failed to provide an effective opportunity for the defence counsel to cross-examine both medical jurists (PW-3 and PW-8).
The court also drew an adverse inference against the prosecution for withholding the school teacher, Ms. Princely. Relying on the three-judge bench decision in Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing, the Bench observed:
“Though the prosecution is not obliged to examine each and every witness cited during investigation, it is unquestionably under a duty to examine those witnesses whose evidence goes to the root of the matter and is essential to elicit the truth. Where a material witness, capable of throwing light on the genesis of the occurrence is withheld without any plausible explanation, the Court would be justified in drawing adverse inference against the prosecution, particularly when such witness occupies a pivotal position in the chain of events.”
Lastly, the Bench found that the accused had established a credible plea of alibi by entering the witness box, examining three independent witnesses, and introducing documentary evidence, which the lower courts had unjustifiably discarded.
Decision of the Court
The Supreme Court concluded that the cumulative weight of the unnatural conduct of the mother, the 10-day delay in the FIR, the total failure of dock identification, admissions of tutoring, conflicting claims regarding family relations, non-examination of the teacher, and the credible plea of alibi rendered the prosecution’s case wholly unsafe to sustain.
Setting aside the judgments of the Special Court and the Meghalaya High Court, the Supreme Court acquitted Charming Rupon of all charges by granting him the benefit of doubt and directed his immediate release from custody.
Case Title: Charming Rupon v. State of Meghalaya
Case No.: Criminal Appeal No(s). of 2026 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 11881 of 2022)
Bench: Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta
Date: October 09, 2026
