The Delhi High Court, presided over by Justice Sanjeev Narula, has ruled that subsequent marriage, parenthood, and mutual compromise cannot retrospectively validate sexual intercourse with a minor or extinguish statutory criminal liability under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO). Dismissing a petition filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) seeking to quash criminal proceedings, the Court held that the legislative age threshold designed to protect children cannot be overridden by later family developments or personal consent.
Background of the Case
The criminal proceedings commenced on April 6, 2024, when the victim’s mother lodged a missing person complaint at Police Station Roop Nagar, Delhi, suspecting her daughter had been enticed away. An FIR was registered under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). When she left home, the victim—born on September 14, 2007—was nearly 16 years and 7 months old, while the petitioner, born on January 31, 2004, was 20 years of age.
The victim was traced in October 2024. A medical examination conducted at Hindu Rao Hospital on October 10, 2024, confirmed a pregnancy of 28 weeks and 3 days. In her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) the following day, she stated that she had left voluntarily without coercion, travelled with the petitioner to Hyderabad, Darbhanga, and Nepal, and participated in a marriage ceremony at Darbhanga, though she expressed a desire at that stage to reside with her mother.
She later left her mother’s home again. On August 20, 2025, the petitioner was arrested in Darbhanga, where the victim was residing with him and their infant son, born in December 2024. The victim attained majority on September 14, 2025. Two days later, during the petitioner’s bail hearing, she did not oppose his release and expressed her desire to live with him. The Special Court granted bail, noting her account and the petitioner’s clean antecedents. The parties formally solemnised their marriage on September 29, 2025, after both attained the legal age of marriage, and executed a compromise deed in May 2026. Following the investigation, a chargesheet was filed invoking Section 5(j)(ii) read with Section 6 of POCSO, and the case was listed for consideration of charge.
Submissions of the Parties
Before the High Court, the victim appeared in person and supported the quashing plea, confirming her date of birth and stating that she accompanied the petitioner willingly, harboured no grievances, and lived with him and their child as a family. Her mother stated that she initially approached the police because her daughter was missing, but had now accepted the marriage and did not wish to pursue the prosecution.
Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the relationship was consensual throughout, the victim had consistently denied coercion, and she had stated that she misstated her age to the petitioner. Accepting paternity for the purposes of the petition, counsel argued that continuing the prosecution would expose the young family to severe uncertainty and hardship without serving any useful purpose. The petitioner placed reliance on the Supreme Court decisions in State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, Ramgopal & Anr. v. State of M.P., and K. Kirubakaran v. State of Tamil Nadu.
Opposing the petition, Additional Public Prosecutor Tarang Srivastav, appearing for the State, highlighted the victim’s undisputed minority at the time of the alleged offence, the medical evidence of pregnancy, and the materials gathered during the investigation, contending that the subsequent developments did not justify terminating the prosecution.
Court’s Analysis and Key Observations
Justice Narula acknowledged the sincerity of the victim’s stance and accepted her account of a voluntary relationship for the purposes of the petition, noting that her denial of coercion dated back to the initial investigation and that the marriage was not a mere tactic to avoid prosecution. However, the Court underscored that willingness does not alter statutory criminal liability:
“Section 2(1)(d) of POCSO defines a child as a person below 18 years of age. Under Section 3, absence of consent is not an ingredient of penetrative sexual assault upon a child. Clause sixthly of Section 375 IPC likewise covers sexual intercourse with a girl below eighteen, with or without her consent. Willingness may explain the relationship; it does not take the alleged act outside the statute.”
Addressing the uniform protection established by Parliament, the Court observed:
“The law does not assume that all children possess the same understanding or maturity. The Parliament nevertheless chose a uniform age threshold, rather than an inquiry in each case into whether a particular child understood enough to dispense with its protection. A court cannot substitute its assessment of a child’s maturity for that legislative choice.”
The Court held that the absence of grooming, deception, or overt force does not provide a legal answer to an allegation of sexual intercourse with a child, observing:
“An enduring relationship cannot retrospectively supply legal consent.”
Rejecting the argument that the victim was “nearly eighteen,” the Court noted that she was about 17 months short of majority when she left home. Referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, which invited the Union Government to consider a “Romeo-Juliet” clause for adolescent relationships, the Court clarified that such observations do not introduce an exception into the existing statute, which remains strictly a legislative prerogative.
Examining the legal impact of the marriage, the Court noted that Section 3 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (PCMA) does not authorise sexual intercourse with a child. Citing the Supreme Court judgments in Independent Thought v. UOI & Anr. and Society for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., the Court observed:
“Marriage does not remove the protection which the law affords a child.”
Evaluating its inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS, the High Court distinguished Laxmi Narayan and Ramgopal, stating that offences involving sexual acts against children are not private or matrimonial disputes. It referred to In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, where the Supreme Court held that romantic relationships cannot alter statutory ingredients under POCSO and that courts cannot commit violence against the law.
The Court further distinguished past rulings where proceedings had been terminated:
- In Ayyub Malik & Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr., there was a factual dispute regarding the woman’s age alongside nearly six years of marriage, unlike the present case where minority and pregnancy during childhood are undisputed on record.
- In Mahesh Mukund Patel v. State of U.P. & Ors., the woman was established to be an adult at the time of the alleged offence.
- In Harmeet Singh v. State of GNCT Delhi & Anr., where a Coordinate Bench quashed proceedings, the victim was older (about 17 years and 2 months) and the State had explicitly expressed no objection.
- The Court aligned its reasoning with Delhi High Court decisions in Prince Kumar Sharma & Ors. v. State NCT of Delhi & Anr. and Mohd. Dilsad @ Adil v. State & Ors., holding that subsequent marriage and parenthood cannot erase the statutory ingredients of an offence committed during minority.
Addressing the petitioner’s reliance on K. Kirubakaran v. State of Tamil Nadu and In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents (2025), the High Court pointed out that relief in those cases was granted by the Supreme Court under its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, with express directions that they should not be treated as precedents. Relying on Indian Bank v. ABS Marine Products (P) Ltd., the Court held that Article 142 orders cannot be imported to create a general rule under Section 528 BNSS.
Summarising the foundational legal principle, the Court observed:
“To end the prosecution on the grounds advanced would allow subsequent marriage, parenthood and family acceptance to outweigh the protection afforded to her when she was a child. That protection cannot depend simply on whether a relationship survives or eventually receives approval.”
Decision
The High Court dismissed the quashing petition, concluding that the prosecution was not shown to be manifestly false, malicious, or an abuse of the judicial process. The Court clarified that all observations were strictly confined to the prayer for quashing, directing the Special Court to consider the charges, evidence, and legal defences independently and uninfluenced by the order.
The Court maintained that the dismissal does not disturb the bail already granted to the petitioner, noting that the petitioner remains at liberty to approach the Supreme Court to place the family’s exceptional circumstances before it under Article 142.
Case No.: CRL.M.C. 4917/2026
Bench: Justice Sanjeev Narula
Date: October 1, 2026
