In a significant ruling interpreting Section 21(2)(m) of the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021, the Allahabad High Court, presided over by Justice Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, has held that the statutory ground of premises being “required by landlord” is not confined to the landlord’s own personal physical occupation and can encompass the genuine requirement of setting up or carrying on the business of an immediate family member, such as a son, provided a legitimate nexus is established. Dismissing two petitions under Article 227 filed by tenants challenging eviction orders, the Court clarified that physical occupation by the landlord is not an indispensable requirement under the first limb of the provision, while granting the tenants six months to vacate the premises upon filing an undertaking and clearing outstanding dues.
Factual Background
The decision arose from two connected petitions raising common questions of law under Section 21(2)(m) of the Act of 2021.
In the first matter (Sandeep v. Vinod Kumar Chhabra), the tenant occupied Shop No. 97-B, Wakil Road, New Mandi, Muzaffarnagar. The landlord instituted eviction proceedings under Section 21(2) alleging default in rent payment, material alterations, termination of tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and requirement of the premises for establishing the business/office of his son. While the Rent Authority, Muzaffarnagar, initially rejected the eviction application on February 13, 2025, the District Judge/Rent Tribunal, Muzaffarnagar, partly allowed the landlord’s appeal on May 13, 2026, ordering eviction.
In the second matter (Keshav Bhalla v. Prescribe Authority / Rent Authority and another), the tenant was in occupation of a shop at Mohalla Badhpur, Farrukhabad, running a tempo repair business named M/s Anil Auto Repairs, originally let out to his late father over four decades prior. The landlord, Akhilesh Chandra Gangwar, filed an eviction application under Section 21(2) alleging default and requiring the shop for his unemployed son to start a business. The Rent Authority/Additional District Magistrate, Farrukhabad, allowed the application on February 22, 2025, and the Rent Tribunal/Additional District Judge affirmed the eviction on April 10, 2026. Both tenants approached the High Court invoking supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
Arguments of the Parties
Counsel appearing for the tenant-petitioners argued that Section 21(2)(m) strictly contemplates the requirement of the landlord himself and does not recognize the requirement of a son as an independent ground for eviction. They submitted that the authorities below impermissibly enlarged the statutory ground, ignored the tenant’s sole source of livelihood, failed to properly evaluate the availability of alternative vacant shops owned by the landlords, and did not examine comparative hardship. It was also urged that under the new statutory framework, the term “occupation by landlord” cannot be expanded to include family members where the Legislature omitted the words “member of his family” that existed under the repealed Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.
Opposing the petitions, counsel for the respondent-landlords submitted that the expression “occupation by landlord” cannot be restricted to actual physical user by the landlord in his individual capacity. They placed primary reliance on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore, alongside Kailash Chand v. Dharam Dass, Ajit Singh v. Jit Ram, Dwarka Prasad v. Niranjan, Mehmooda Gulshan v. Javaid Hussain Mungloo, and Murlidhar Aggarwal v. Mahendra Pratap Kakan, contending that settled rent jurisprudence recognizes that the requirement of a dependent family member to establish a business constitutes the landlord’s own requirement. They emphasized that possession and juridical control continue to remain with the landlord, and that Section 21(2)(m) does not mandate personal, exclusive, or physical occupation.
Assisting the Court on statutory interpretation, the Additional Advocate General for the State highlighted that the Act of 2021 consciously departed from the 1972 Act by eliminating requirements such as “bona fide” and “comparative hardship,” as recognized in Shyam Pal v. B.S. Enterprises. Relying on the Full Bench decision in Ram Surat Mishra v. State of U.P., the State urged that the Hindi text and the syntactical placement of the comma before the disjunctive “or” in the enacted English version demonstrate two distinct contingencies: first, premises required in existing form; and second, premises required after demolition and new construction for occupation by the landlord. The State also cited Bajrangi v. State of U.P., Dr. M.K. Salpekar v. Sunil Kumar Shamsunder Chaudhari, Sama Alana Abdulla v. State of Gujarat, Nanalal Goverdhanlal and Co. v. Samratbai Lilachand Shah, Varsha Agrawal v. Rent Tribunal, and Shafikurrman v. Special Judge to argue that the landlord’s requirement extends to settling his son in business.
The Court’s Analysis
Examining the legislative history, grammar, and statutory scheme, the High Court observed that Section 21(2)(m) contemplates two separately structured alternatives separated by the disjunctive “or” and punctuated with a comma in the enacted text: premises required in their existing form, or after demolition and new construction for the purpose of occupation by the landlord.
Addressing the grammatical construction, the Court referenced the ‘Rule of the Last Antecedent’ as recognized in standard treatises by Sutherland, Scalia and Garner (Reading Law), and Justice G.P. Singh (Principles of Statutory Interpretation), as well as comparative and domestic decisions including O’Connor v. Oakhurst Dairy, Barnhart v. Thomas, Surendra Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, Mohd. Shabir v. State of Maharashtra, Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, Rex v. Casement, and Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose. The Court observed that while punctuation is a subordinate aid, its placement reinforces that the qualifying phrase “for the purpose of its occupation by landlord” is structurally and more naturally referable to the second contingency of demolition and reconstruction.
Turning to the substantive meaning of “required by landlord” under the first limb, the Court observed:
“It would, therefore, not be appropriate to read the words ‘required by landlord’ as necessarily synonymous with ‘required for the landlord’s own personal physical occupation’. Such a construction would introduce into the first limb a qualification which the Legislature has not expressed there, while the Legislature has, in the second contingency, expressly used words referring to occupation by the landlord.”
Rejecting rigid interpretations from both sides, the Court laid down:
“The Court, therefore, does not accept either of the two extreme constructions advanced before it. The first, that the words ‘required by landlord’ necessarily mean that the landlord himself must physically occupy the premises, would add a qualification not found in the first limb of the provision. The second, that the requirement of a son or any other family member automatically constitutes the requirement of the landlord, would deprive the expression ‘by landlord’ of its limiting content. The proper construction lies between these two extremes and gives effect both to the statutory language and to the controlled principle of nexus recognised in the authorities.”
The Court held that the test formulated in Joginder Pal applies to determine whether the asserted requirement bears a legitimate nexus with the landlord’s own interest:
“The relationship between the landlord and the proposed user, the nature and purpose of the proposed use, the circumstances in which the requirement has arisen, the degree of dependence or interrelationship, and the genuineness and intrinsic tenability of the claim are relevant considerations in determining that question.”
The Court further observed:
“Accordingly, where premises in their existing form are sought for establishing or carrying on the business or occupation of the landlord’s son, such requirement cannot be rejected at the threshold merely because the son, rather than the landlord personally, is the proposed user. The relevant question is whether, on the facts and material placed before the competent authority, the requirement can properly be regarded as the landlord’s own requirement within the meaning of Section 21(2)(m).”
Summarizing the legal position, the Court ruled:
“Consequently, a genuine requirement intended to establish or carry on the residential or business activities of an immediate family member, including a son, may fall within the first limb where, on the facts, it can properly be regarded as the landlord’s requirement.”
Applying these principles to the facts, the Court noted that both landlords had specifically pleaded their sons’ requirement to establish business interests, and the competent authorities had rendered concurrent or well-reasoned findings of fact in their favor. The Court reiterated that supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 does not permit re-appreciation of evidence or substitution of views unless findings are perverse, arbitrary, or without jurisdiction. Furthermore, considerations of alternative accommodation and comparative hardship cannot be judicially imported as independent mandatory conditions under the 2021 Act when the Legislature chose not to enact them.
Decision and Directions
The High Court dismissed both petitions, holding that the challenge to the eviction orders lacked merit.
However, upon the alternative prayer made by counsel for the tenants, and with no objection from the landlords, the Court granted the tenants six months’ time to vacate and hand over peaceful possession of the premises, subject to strict conditions:
- Filing an undertaking before the Rent Authority within two weeks undertaking to vacate and hand over peaceful possession on or before March 23, 2027, along with depositing all rent arrears within two weeks.
- Depositing Rs. 4,000 per month towards use and occupation charges on or before the 7th of each succeeding month, commencing October 2026, until possession is handed over.
- In case of any default, the protection shall automatically vacate, leaving landlords free to execute eviction orders in accordance with law.
Case Title: Keshav Bhalla v. Prescribe Authority /Rent Authority (Additional District Magistrate) and another
Case No.: Matters Under Article 227 No. 8450 of 2026
Bench: Justice Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
