The Allahabad High Court, comprising a division bench of Justice Salil Kumar Rai and Justice Padam Narain Mishra, has set aside the conviction and life sentence of a man accused of murdering his elder brother with an axe, ruling that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence. Addressing the application of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the bench held that the provision cannot be used to shift the burden of proving innocence onto an accused simply because a crime occurred inside a house where other family members were also present. The Court allowed the appeal and directed the immediate release of the appellant, Chhotu Verma.
Case Background
According to the First Information Report (FIR) registered on July 27, 2016, the deceased, Chandan, was the eldest son of the informant PW-1 Lallu Verma. Chandan was married to Keskali, who allegedly entered into an illicit relationship with the appellant, Chandan’s younger brother Chhotu Verma. Following arguments, Chandan had sent his wife back to her parental home a week prior to the incident. The prosecution alleged that on July 27, 2016, around 3:00 A.M., Chhotu Verma murdered Chandan by assaulting him with an axe in a planned conspiracy with Keskali.
Following the investigation, a charge sheet was submitted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). During trial before the District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Banda, three material eye-witnesses and witnesses of fact—PW-1 Lallu Verma (father), PW-2 Kallu Verma (uncle), and PW-3 Mithun (younger brother)—turned hostile and did not support the prosecution case. Despite this, the trial court convicted Chhotu Verma on April 2, 2019, under Section 302 IPC, sentencing him to life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 10,000, while acquitting Keskali. Chhotu Verma subsequently appealed his conviction before the High Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Appearing for the appellant, Amicus Curiae Sri Vimlendu Tripathi argued that the conviction was unsustainable because all material witnesses of fact turned hostile and substantive ocular evidence was entirely absent. Counsel submitted that the alleged motive—an illicit relationship—was never proved. He further pointed out that PW-1 testified his thumb impression was taken on a blank paper, while CW-1 Kalka Prasad stated the written complaint (tehrir) was penned at the dictation of the police (daroga ji), depriving the FIR of substantive evidentiary value. Additionally, counsel argued that the alleged weapon was neither recovered at the appellant’s instance nor accompanied by a disclosure statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. He contended that the trial court erroneously invoked Section 106 of the Evidence Act when multiple family members were present in the house, and failed to put incriminating circumstances to the appellant during his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.).
Opposing the appeal, Additional Government Advocate Ms. Archana Singh argued that because the occurrence took place inside the house and the dead body was found there, the circumstances were specifically within the appellant’s knowledge, placing the burden on him to explain under Section 106. She submitted that the appellant was promptly named in the FIR, the weapon with human blood was recovered from the premises, and the hostility of witnesses, who may have been won over, did not dismantle the prosecution’s case.
The Court’s Analysis
Addressing the evidentiary value of the FIR, the Court held that a First Information Report is not substantive evidence and can only be used for corroboration or contradiction under the Evidence Act. Because PW-1 admitted that his thumb impression was obtained on blank paper and CW-1 stated he wrote the report on police dictation, naming the appellant in the FIR did not establish substantive proof of participation.
Evaluating the weapon recovery, the bench observed that Section 27 of the Evidence Act requires the prosecution to prove that the discovery was the direct consequence of information furnished by the accused while in custody. The Court found that the Investigating Officer’s testimony failed to establish any disclosure statement by the appellant; rather, the axe was produced by PW-3 Mithun. The bench observed:
“The mere fact that an axe was recovered from the house cannot, by itself, convert such seizure into a discovery within the meaning of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. For Section 27 to apply, the prosecution must establish a clear and proximate nexus between the information furnished by the accused and the fact discovered in consequence thereof.”
The bench added that the presence of human blood on the weapon could not cure this statutory defect.
On the trial court’s invocation of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the Court held that the provision cannot be used to bypass the prosecution’s duty to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing the Supreme Court judgment in Sadasiv Dhodhi Ram Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2025) INSC 93, the bench emphasized that foundational facts must first be proven by the prosecution before Section 106 can apply. Highlighting the presence of multiple family members in the house—including the deceased’s sister Sarita, who gave a statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C.—the Court ruled:
“Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act applies to a fact which is especially within the knowledge of a particular person. It does not authorise the Court to select one person from among several persons present in the house and cast upon him the entire burden of proving his innocence.”
Examining the Section 313 Cr.P.C. examination, the Court held that material incriminating circumstances—including the alleged motive, the recovery, and the adverse inference under Section 106—were not specifically, distinctly, and fairly put to the appellant, causing prejudice and vitiating their use as links in the circumstantial chain. The bench stated:
“The purpose of Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. is to enable the accused to furnish an explanation with respect to the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence. It would, therefore, be contrary to the statutory safeguard embodied in the provision to first rely upon an incriminating circumstance for recording a conviction and thereafter contend that the accused ought to have explained it.”
The Decision
The High Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the alleged motive, the weapon recovery, or an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence. Holding that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of doubt, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of conviction dated April 2, 2019, and acquitted Chhotu Verma of the charge under Section 302 IPC. The Court directed that he be released forthwith if not wanted in any other case, subject to compliance with Section 437A Cr.P.C. (Section 481 of BNSS).
Case Title: Chhotu Verma v. State of U.P.
Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. – 3972 of 2019
Bench: Justice Salil Kumar Rai and Justice Padam Narain Mishra
Date: September 24, 2026
