The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, presided over by Justice Manju Rani Chauhan, has dismissed a writ petition challenging the eligibility condition in an advertisement that limited consideration for 4,900 posts of Special Educators to candidates presently working on a contractual, daily-wage, or outsourcing basis. The Court ruled that under Article 226 of the Constitution, courts cannot rewrite recruitment criteria or dilute directions issued by the Supreme Court of India on equitable or compassionate grounds, holding that past experience cannot supplant a mandatory threshold condition of present engagement.
Background of the Case
The thirteen petitioners were engaged as Itinerant Teachers and Resource Teachers in District Maharajganj under the Integrated Education for Disabled Scheme between November 2005 and September 2011. The scheme, implemented through the Uttar Pradesh Education for All Project Board, facilitates the education of children with disabilities aged 6 to 14 years within mainstream school classrooms. All petitioners held graduate degrees and recognized special education credentials, including Diplomas in Special Education (Hearing Impairment), Diplomas in Hearing, Learning and Speech, or B.Ed. in Special Education, along with registrations on the Central Rehabilitation Register maintained by the Rehabilitation Council of India (RCI).
Their engagements were initially executed on an academic-session basis and successively renewed up to May 2019. In June 2019, the State Project Director issued a circular providing for renewals for the 2019–20 academic session. While Block Education Officers and the District Basic Education Officer (BSA), Maharajganj, submitted favorable performance certificates and renewal recommendations, the BSA renewed only 12 teachers on July 27, 2019, leaving out approximately 17 teachers, including the petitioners, on the ground that their services were not satisfactory.
The petitioners initially challenged this non-renewal in Writ-A No. 12972 of 2019, which was dismissed on July 8, 2025, relying on the Supreme Court ruling in Director, Institute of Management Development, U.P. v. Smt. Pushpa Srivastava, which established that contractual employees hold no right to continue beyond their contractual term. Special appeals were subsequently preferred, wherein a Division Bench directed the authorities to consider the petitioners’ claims for regular appointment under prevailing government policies. On June 15, 2026, the BSA Maharajganj rejected their representations.
In the meantime, the Supreme Court monitored the filling of vacant posts for Special Educators across the country in Rajneesh Kumar Pandey and Others v. Union of India and Others. By an order dated May 5, 2026, the Supreme Court directed Uttar Pradesh to advertise approximately 4,900 vacant posts in two Hindi dailies to invite applications from candidates who have been working as special teachers on a contract basis or through outsourcing agencies.
Pursuant to these directives and an administrative order dated June 2, 2026, the Secretary of the Uttar Pradesh Basic Education Board published an advertisement on June 13, 2026. However, General Instruction No. 2 of the advertisement made it mandatory for applicants to submit a contract letter or office order demonstrating present engagement on a contractual, daily-wage, or outsourced basis. Because the petitioners had not been working since May 2019, they were rendered ineligible, prompting them to approach the High Court seeking the quashing of Instruction No. 2, the rejection orders dated June 15, 2026, and a direction permitting them to participate in the screening process.
Arguments of the Parties
Appearing for the petitioners, learned counsel argued that excluding highly qualified and experienced Special Educators merely because they are currently unemployed defeats the underlying objective of providing trained educators to children with special needs. It was contended that the Supreme Court’s orders in Rajneesh Kumar Pandey aimed to build a robust framework for special education and that its order dated February 3, 2026, did away with restrictive cut-off dates.
The petitioners submitted that classifying candidates based on current employment status creates an artificial and unreasonable distinction in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Counsel argued that past experience of 8 to 9 years and active RCI registrations—valid up to 2028 or 2033—demonstrated their competence, and that being denied an opportunity to compete merely because of their current lack of engagement was manifestly arbitrary. Additionally, counsel pleaded for relief on compassionate and equitable grounds, framing their application as a plea for mercy.
On the other hand, the respondents, represented by the Additional Chief Standing Counsel and counsel for the education authorities, submitted that the advertisement strictly adhered to the Supreme Court’s specific directives dated March 7, 2025, and May 5, 2026, as well as the State Government Orders. They argued that the impetus was deliberately placed on teachers who were currently working and actively imparting education. Since the petitioners had admittedly not worked since 2019 and their earlier challenge against non-renewal had already been dismissed, they could not claim eligibility or seek an indirect revival of discontinued contractual services.
Legal Analysis of the Court
Examining the statutory and constitutional framework, the Court observed that the appointment of Special Educators is directly tied to the fundamental rights of children requiring specialized assistance:
“The appointment of Special Educators is intended to secure meaningful and substantive equality in education for children with special needs. Their specialised expertise enables them to address individual learning requirements, adopt appropriate pedagogic strategies and facilitate the child’s effective participation and holistic development.”
Addressing the scope of judicial review under Article 226, the Court held that it possesses no authority to modify recruitment conditions framed in accordance with Supreme Court directives:
“This Court, in exercise of its power of judicial review, cannot substitute the expression ‘presently working’, as employed in the impugned advertisement, with the expression ‘having worked in the past.’ Such an exercise would amount to rewriting the eligibility criteria prescribed by the competent authority and would, therefore, transgress the permissible limits of judicial review.”
Evaluating the challenge under Articles 14 and 16, the Court applied the established tests of reasonable classification laid down in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar and Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar. The Court noted:
“The constitutional guarantee of equal opportunity in public employment does not confer an unconditional right upon every otherwise qualified person to participate in every recruitment process. Equality operates amongst persons falling within the class legitimately identified for consideration.”
The Court explained that the classification was not a generic division between the employed and unemployed, but flowed directly from the Supreme Court’s mandate in Rajneesh Kumar Pandey to screen and absorb the existing pool of contractual teachers who have been actively serving:
“More importantly, the Court cannot lose sight of the beneficiary of the entire statutory and administrative framework-the child with special needs. The validity of the impugned condition cannot be tested merely from the perspective of whether it affords an opportunity of employment to the petitioners. Its true measure is whether it advances the object for which the posts have been sanctioned and the selection process undertaken.”
Citing the Constitution Bench rulings in Tej Prakash Pathak and Others v. Rajasthan High Court and Others and Secretary, State of Karnataka and others v. Uma Devi and others (3), alongside State of M.P. v. Raghuveer Singh Yadav and State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari, the Court affirmed that temporary engagement confers no vested right to regular appointment and that eligibility criteria fixed at the start of recruitment cannot be altered. Relying on Dr. M.V. Nair v. Union of India and Maharashtra Public Service Commission v. Sandeep Shriram Warade, the bench reiterated that determining qualifications is the employer’s prerogative, and threshold eligibility cannot be bypassed by considerations of past experience or sympathy:
“The writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to convert a claim for equitable indulgence into an enforceable right, nor can past engagement be permitted to supplant a condition of eligibility which governs the selection.”
The Court also dealt with the petitioners’ interim participation in the screening process secured via an ad-interim order dated June 24, 2026. Citing Secretary, Union Public Service Commission v. S. Krishna Chaitanya and Abhimanyoo Ram v. State of U.P., the Court observed:
“An interim order is necessarily interlocutory in character and cannot have the effect of conferring upon the beneficiary a right which is dependent upon the final adjudication of the proceedings.”
The Decision
The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that General Instruction No. 2 suffers from no constitutional or legal infirmity. The Court ruled that because the petitioners were not in service at the relevant time, they fell outside the eligible class identified under the Supreme Court’s directions, and their participation under the Court’s interim order conferred no enforceable right to selection or appointment. No order was made as to costs.
Case Title: Rakesh Kumar and 12 others v. State of U.P. and 4 others
Case No.: Writ – A No. 9303 of 2026
Bench: Justice Manju Rani Chauhan
Date: September 11, 2026
