The High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, in a judgment delivered by Justice Bibhu Datta Guru, has held that prescribing evaluation benchmarks for promotions and postings falls strictly within the exclusive domain and discretion of the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC). Ruling on a writ petition filed by a Deputy Superintendent of Police who challenged her non-selection for posting as Additional Superintendent of Police, the Court held that while an eligible officer possesses a right to be considered for promotion, eligibility does not confer an indefeasible right to be posted. Finding no arbitrariness, bias, or procedural illegality in the criteria adopted by the selection committee, the High Court dismissed the challenge.
Background of the Case
The petitioner, Madhuri Dhirhi, a 2014-batch direct recruit Deputy Superintendent of Police (Dy SP) serving in the Senior Scale, approached the High Court seeking to quash a decision of the Departmental Promotion/Screening Committee dated December 10, 2025. Dhirhi, having completed eight years of qualifying service, fulfilled the eligibility requirements under Rule 23 read with Column (4) of Schedule-V of the Chhattisgarh Police Executive (Gazetted) Service Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2005 (Rules, 2005) for posting as Additional Superintendent of Police (Addl. S.P.).
However, during its screening meeting in December 2025, the DPC declared her “not fit” for posting. The DPC had established criteria requiring a minimum evaluation grading of “Good” and a aggregate minimum benchmark of 15 marks based on Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) over the preceding five years. Dhirhi had secured four “Very Good” gradings (carrying 3 marks each) and one “Good” grading (carrying 2 marks), aggregating 14 marks. Having fallen short of the 15-mark threshold, she was found unfit by the committee.
Arguments of the Parties
Senior Advocate Vivek Ranjan Tiwari, along with Advocate Atul Kumar Kesharwani appearing for the petitioner, contended that Dhirhi satisfied all statutory eligibility criteria prescribed under Rule 23 of the Rules, 2005. They argued that the DPC arbitrarily introduced a 15-mark benchmark under the head of “Good” without any statutory basis in the Rules, 2005, making the benchmark extraneous, arbitrary, and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Counsel submitted that requiring 15 marks across five years effectively demanded the equivalent of a “Very Good” grading for all five years. They further referred to a Madhya Pradesh Government circular dated September 5, 1974, which prescribed benchmark marks of 8 to 12 for “Good,” and noted that in preceding years (2014 to 2017), the DPC had set the minimum benchmark at 10 marks.
Government Advocate Vivek Verma, representing the State of Chhattisgarh and police authorities, opposed the petition and argued that fulfilling eligibility conditions confers only a right of consideration, not an automatic entitlement to a posting. The State submitted that the DPC, as an expert body, is fully competent to determine suitability based on service records and ACRs. It was argued that the 15-mark benchmark was adopted in accordance with the Chhattisgarh Public Services (Promotion) Rules, 2003 (Rules, 2003) and prevailing practice, and could not be termed arbitrary. Pursuant to the High Court’s order dated July 29, 2026, an affidavit filed by the Additional Director General of Police (Administration) affirmed that the 15-mark benchmark was determined objectively by the DPC after considering the nature, responsibilities, and requirements of the post of Addl. S.P., and was applied uniformly across all eligible officers.
Court’s Analysis
Examining Rule 23 of the Rules, 2005, Justice Bibhu Datta Guru noted that while an officer fulfilling eligibility criteria has a right of consideration, eligibility does not create a vested or indefeasible right to appointment or posting. The Court emphasized that the DPC is an expert body tasked with assessing candidate suitability by applying uniform and objective standards, and that courts exercising judicial review under Article 226 do not sit as appellate authorities over selection committee decisions.
The High Court laid down the primary legal principle regarding selection benchmarks:
“The fixation of benchmark falls within the exclusive domain and discretion of the DPC/ Selection Committee. Ordinarily, the same cannot be interfered with unless it is shown to be arbitrary, discriminatory or contrary to any statutory provision.”
In arriving at its conclusion, the Court examined and cited key rulings of the Supreme Court:
- In Union of India v. A.K. Narula (2007) 11 SCC 10, the Supreme Court observed:
- “The guidelines give a certain amount of play in the joints to DPC by providing that it need not be guided by the overall grading recorded in CRs, but may make its own assessment on the basis of the entries in CRs. DPC is required to make an overall assessment of the performance of each candidate separately, but by adopting the same standards, yardsticks and norms. It is only when the process of assessment is vitiated either on the ground of bias, mala fides or arbitrariness, that the selection calls for interference. Where DPC has proceeded in a fair, impartial and reasonable manner, by applying the same yardstick and norms to all candidates and there is no arbitrariness in the process of assessment by DPC, the court will not interfere.”
- In B. V. Sivaiah & Ors vs K. Addanki Babu and others (1998) 6 SCC 720, the apex court held:
- “We thus arrive at the conclusion that the criterion of ‘seniority-cum-merit’ in the matter of promotion postulates that given the minimum necessary merit requisite for efficiency of administration, the senior, even though less meritorious, shall have priority and a comparative assessment of merit is not required to be made. For assessing the minimum necessary merit, the competent authority can lay down the minimum standard that is required and also prescribe the mode of assessment of merit of the employee who is eligible for consideration for promotion. Such assessment can be made by assigning marks on the basis of appraisal of performance on the basis of service record and interview and prescribing the minimum marks which would entitle a person to be promoted on the basis of seniority-cum-merit.”
- In Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke v. B.S. Mahajan (1990) 1 SCC 305, the Supreme Court stated:
- “It will thus appear that apart from the fact that the High Court has rolled the cases of the two appointees in one, though their appointments are not assailable on the same grounds, the court has also found it necessary to sit in appeal over the decision of the Selection Committee and to embark upon deciding the relative merits of the candidates. It is needless to emphasise that it is not the function of the court to hear appeals over the decisions of the Selection Committees and to scrutinize the relative merits of the candidates. Whether a candidate is fit for a particular post or not has to be decided by the duly constituted Selection Committee which has the expertise on the subject. The court has no such expertise. The decision of the Selection Committee can be interfered with only on limited grounds, such as illegality or patent material irregularity in the constitution of the Committee or its procedure vitiating the selection or proved mala fides affecting the selection etc.”
Applying these precedents, the High Court observed that the DPC acted within its powers to prescribe a minimum standard for suitability. The Court held that the petitioner failed to show that the 15-mark benchmark was applied selectively, that similarly situated officers were treated differently, or that the process was tainted by bias or mala fides.
Decision of the Court
The High Court concluded that the DPC was competent to prescribe a reasonable minimum benchmark for assessing officer suitability. As the petitioner secured 14 marks against the required benchmark of 15 marks, her assessment as “not fit” was held to be lawful. Finding no merit in the petition, the High Court dismissed the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Case Title: Madhuri Dhirhi vs. State Of Chhattisgarh And Others
Case No.: WPS No. 4177 of 2026
Bench: Justice Bibhu Datta Guru
Date: August 25, 2026
