Section 22 Hindu Succession Act Applies to Agricultural Land Inherited by Class I Heirs: Supreme Court

In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court of India has ruled that Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which grants co-heirs a preferential right to acquire inherited property, applies fully to agricultural land. The division bench, comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice N. Kotiswar Singh, dismissed an appeal filed by original defendants who had sold their inherited agricultural land to an outsider without first offering it to their sibling co-heir. The ruling clarifies that the preferential right of pre-emption under Section 22 is an inseparable incident of Hindu succession, thereby resolving conflicting views among various High Courts and affirming Parliament’s legislative competence to govern succession over agricultural land.

Background of the Case

The dispute arose among the children of Nanhu, who inherited agricultural land in Karnal, Haryana, as Class I legal heirs. On December 28, 2011, defendant numbers 1 to 7, either directly or through their legal heirs, collectively sold their respective shares of the inherited land to a third party, Mrs. Poonam.

Prior to the execution of the sale deed, on December 8, 2011, the plaintiff, Puran Singh, filed a suit (Petition No. 35 of 2013) before the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Karnal. He challenged the proposed alienation by invoking his preferential right of acquisition under Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (HSA).

The Civil Court dismissed the plaintiff’s suit on March 7, 2019, relying on the Supreme Court’s Constitution Bench judgment in Atam Prakash v. State of Haryana, which had struck down Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 as unconstitutional. The Civil Court reasoned that Section 22 of the HSA was pari materia to the Punjab Act’s provision and should likewise not be enforced.

However, the First Appellate Court (District Judge, Karnal) reversed this decision, relying on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Babu Ram v. Santokh Singh, which explicitly held that the right of pre-emption under Section 22 of the HSA applies to agricultural land. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana subsequently dismissed the second appeal, finding that no substantial question of law arose. The original defendants then moved the Supreme Court.

Arguments of the Parties

The appellants (original defendants) contended before the Supreme Court that:

1. The suit under Section 22 of the HSA was not maintainable because all relevant parties were not joined.
2. The sale deed transferring the property to the third party was never challenged.
3. Once the sale was completed, the plaintiff’s only recourse was to file a regular civil suit.
4. No right of appeal lies against an adjudication under Section 22 of the HSA.
5. The precedent in Babu Ram was incorrect because the court failed to consider Entry 6 of List III (Concurrent List) and Entries 14 and 18 of List II (State List) of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.

Conversely, the respondent (plaintiff) argued that:

1. The issue of non-joinder was not raised before the High Court and must be raised at the earliest opportunity.
2. The prayer covered the entire land, making it a complete pre-emption claim rather than a partial one.
3. Since the petition under Section 22 of the HSA was filed on December 8, 2011—prior to the execution of the sale deed on December 28, 2011—there was no legal requirement to challenge the subsequent sale deed.
4. Pre-emption rights can be enforced even after a transfer is complete.
5. The Atam Prakash judgment was inapplicable, whereas Babu Ram settled the question conclusively.
6. Under Entry 5 of List III read with Article 254 of the Constitution, the Central Legislature has complete autonomy to legislate on the succession of agricultural lands, relying on West U.P. Sugar Mills Assn. v. State of U.P. and M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India.

Mr. Indrajit Mahanty, appearing as amicus curiae, submitted that there is no conflict between Atam Prakash and Babu Ram. He clarified that Section 22 of the HSA is a neutral, succession-based provision enacted under Entry 5 of List III, conferring a limited preferential right among co-heirs.

The Court’s Analysis

The Supreme Court examined the characteristics of the right of pre-emption, noting that it originated in Mohammedan law (particularly in areas like Bihar and Gujarat) and was subsequently adopted into customs for convenience (Audh Behari Singh v. Gajadhar Jaipuria). The Court observed that pre-emption is a right of substitution rather than re-purchase (Gobind Dayal v. Inayatullah), and acts as a legal servitude running alongside inherited land (Audh Behari Singh v. Gajadhar Jaipuria). It also noted, citing Radhakishan Laxminarayan Toshniwal v. Shridhar Ramchandra Alshi and Jagad Bandhu Chatterjee v. Nilima Rani, that pre-emption is a weak right that can be forfeited through positive acts of acquiescence.

The Court referred to the four-judge Bench decision in Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh, which summarized that the primary right of pre-emption is not a right to the thing sold, but a right to the offer of a thing about to be sold.

The Court then addressed the asserted conflict between Atam Prakash and Babu Ram. In Atam Prakash, the Constitution Bench had struck down Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, observing:

“The right of pre-emption based on consanguinity is a relic of the feudal past. It is totally inconsistent with the constitutional scheme. It is inconsistent with modern ideas. The reasons which justified its recognition quarter of a century ago, namely, the preservation of the integrity of rural society, the unity of family life and the agnatic theory of succession are today irrelevant.”

Justice Sanjay Karol clarified that these observations in Atam Prakash targeted consanguinity as the primary defect, not the overall concept of pre-emption. The Court ruled that because the constitutional validity of Section 22 of the HSA was never challenged, courts cannot refuse to enforce it.

Furthermore, the Court held that Section 15 of the Punjab Act and Section 22 of the HSA are not pari materia. While the Punjab Act granted broad pre-emption rights based on blood relations, co-ownership, and tenancy, Section 22 of the HSA strictly limits its application to Class-I heirs. Referring to Ahmedabad (P) Primary Teachers’ Assn. v. Administrative Officer, the Court ruled that importing observations from one case to invalidate an entirely different and unchallenged statute would lead to “judicially created anarchy.”

The Court also rejected the appellants’ argument regarding legislative competence under the Seventh Schedule. While Entry 18 of List II deals with “transfer and alienation of agricultural land,” the Court maintained that when sibling co-heirs inherit property, Section 22 of the HSA applies via Entry 5 of List III, which governs “intestacy and succession.”

In his concurring opinion, Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh emphasized that Section 22 of the HSA is fundamentally a matter of succession:

“The right of pre-emption as conferred under Section 22 of the HSA is, in its pith and substance, an incident of succession and nothing more.”

Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh highlighted that when the Constitution was drafted, the exclusionary clause “save as regards agricultural land” present in the Government of India Act, 1935, was deliberately omitted from Entry 5 of List III. Thus, Parliament’s competence to legislate on succession to agricultural land is complete, as established in Vaijanath v. Guramma.

On the argument that Section 22 of the HSA violates Entry 6 of List III (which covers transfer of property other than agricultural land), the concurring judgment explained:

“The preferential right and the succession right are two limbs of the same legislative design dealing with succession amongst the Hindus under the Act. They cannot be read apart and must be read together. This cannot be termed as transfer simpliciter, but essentially arising out of succession, that too confined to Class I heirs only.”

The Court also addressed the contention that the sale deed was not challenged. Since the plaintiff filed the petition on December 8, 2011—prior to the execution of the sale deed on December 28, 2011—the plaintiff had acted while the transaction was “about to happen.” Therefore, there was no requirement to challenge the subsequent sale deed.

Decision of the Court

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the findings of both the First Appellate Court and the High Court. The Court ordered no costs, and all pending applications were closed.

Case Title: Mahinder & Others v. Puran Singh
Case No.: Civil Appeal No. of 2026 (@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 29289 of 2025)
Bench: Justice Sanjay Karol, Justice N Kotiswar Singh
Date: July 14, 2026