The Allahabad High Court has dismissed a writ petition filed by a live-in couple seeking police protection, observing that the court cannot grant protection in a manner that facilitates a relationship which serves as a substitute for a marriage that is presently impermissible under the statutory framework. The Court noted that since the male petitioner was 19 years old, he is classified as a “child” for the purposes of marriage under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006.
Background of the Case
The petition was filed by a couple asserting they were residing together in a live-in relationship. Petitioner No. 1 is a 20-year-old woman from the Muslim community, while Petitioner No. 2 is a 19-year-old male from a Scheduled Caste Hindu family.
The petitioners alleged that the woman’s father was threatening them and pressuring them to sever their relationship. They sought directions to restrain family members from interfering in their cohabitation and to ensure the protection of their life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. They admitted that they could not solemnize marriage under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, as the male petitioner had not completed the required age of 21 years.
Arguments of the Parties
The counsel for the petitioners argued that since both parties are majors (above 18), they have the right to live with a person of their choice with or without marriage. Reliance was placed on previous court orders where protection was granted to live-in couples.
Conversely, the Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State opposed the prayer, citing the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Special Marriage Act, 1954, and the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006. It was contended that the legislature treats a male below 21 as lacking legal capacity for marriage. The State argued that “statutory policy concerning age, maturity and legal capacity cannot be neutralised through a broad invocation of Article 21” and that permitting such arrangements would defeat legislative intent.
Court’s Analysis and Observations
Justice Garima Prashad examined the statutory framework and framed the core issue as whether the Court could grant protection to a live-in relationship where the male is statutorily classified as a “child” (below 21) for marriage purposes.
Statutory Incapacity and Legislative Intent The Court observed that the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (2006 Act) creates a “marriage-specific incapacity.” The Court noted:
“A male may be an adult under the law of majority upon completing eighteen years of age, but the Parliament has still chosen to treat him as a ‘child’ for marriage until the age of twenty-one. This distinction reflects a conscious legislative judgment that marriage requires a higher level of maturity than many other civil acts.”
Doctrine of Indirect Actions The Court held that a live-in relationship is, in substance, a relationship in the nature of marriage. Justice Garima Prashad remarked:
“If such a relationship is consciously adopted because the law withholds the right to marry until a later age, then a court order protecting its continuance does not remain a bare protection order. It begins to operate as an indirect sanction for a presently impermissible marriage-like arrangement.”
The Court applied the doctrine that “what cannot be done directly cannot be permitted to be done indirectly,” stating that judicial support cannot be extended to a functional equivalent of a prohibited marriage simply because it is described as a live-in relationship.
Parental Responsibility vs. Interference Regarding interference by family, the Court held that while parents cannot resort to violence or illegal confinement, they cannot be restrained from taking “lawful steps” under the 2006 Act, such as approaching the Child Marriage Prohibition Officer.
Analysis of Precedents
The Court distinguished several Supreme Court rulings:
- Nandakumar v. State of Kerala (2018): Restrains unlawful interference with liberty but does not require courts to defeat statutory laws on marriage capacity.
- Lata Singh v. State of U.P. (2006): Applies to couples who are “legally competent adults for marriage.”
- Indra Sarma v. V.K. V. Sarma (2013): Clarified that a relationship colliding with express statutory restrictions cannot be automatically elevated to a protected quasi-marital arrangement.
The Decision
The Court answered the issue by holding that writ jurisdiction cannot be used to confer legitimacy upon a relationship that substitutes for an impermissible marriage. While individuals remain entitled to protection against actual harm or illegal detention under Article 21, the Court found the petitioners’ allegations in this case to be “vague and omnibus,” unsupported by specific incidents or police complaints.
The Court concluded:
“The writ jurisdiction of this Court cannot be invoked to dilute or circumvent the operation of the statute.”
The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Case Details:
- Case Title: Shajiya Parveen and another vs. State of U.P. and 3 others
- Case No.: WRIT-C No. 469 of 2026
- Bench: Justice Garima Prashad
- Date: May 4, 2026
