The Supreme Court has dismissed a civil appeal challenging a Rajasthan High Court order which declined to entertain a writ petition filed by a litigant who failed to pursue the statutory alternative remedy of appeal under the Customs Act, 1962, within the prescribed limitation period.
The Division Bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Aravind Kumar held that when a specific statutory forum is available—particularly when that forum is the High Court itself in a different jurisdiction—writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be exercised to allow the statutory machinery to be bypassed.
Brief Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the High Court was justified in refusing to entertain a writ petition seeking a writ of certiorari when the appellant had failed to avail of the statutory remedy of appeal/reference under the Customs Act, 1962, within the limitation period. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s dismissal, ruling that a party cannot invoke writ jurisdiction to cure their own fault of not pursuing statutory remedies on time.
Background of the Case
The case stems from an incident on September 27, 1992, where silver weighing 252.177 kgs was seized on allegations of smuggling. On May 7, 1996, the Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise (Respondent No. 3) ordered the confiscation of the seized silver and imposed a penalty of Rs. 50,000 on the appellant, Rikhab Chand Jain.
The appellant challenged this order before the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT). In an order dated June 23, 2000, the CEGAT effectively dismissed the appeal regarding the confiscation but reduced the penalty amount to Rs. 30,000.
Under Section 130 (and Section 130A as it existed at the relevant time) of the Customs Act, 1962, the appellant had the right to file a reference application to the High Court within 180 days. However, the appellant did not challenge the CEGAT order within this period. Instead, on March 18, 2003—nearly three years later—he approached the Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench) via a writ petition challenging the orders of both the Commissioner and the CEGAT.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition on March 14, 2011, on the grounds that the appellant had omitted to pursue the alternative remedy and that the order of the CEGAT had attained finality regarding confiscation.
Observations and Analysis of the Court
1. On Alternative Remedy and Writ Jurisdiction The Supreme Court acknowledged the settled legal position that the availability of an alternative remedy does not strictly oust the jurisdiction of a writ court. However, the Court drew a distinction for cases where the alternative forum is the High Court itself.
The Bench observed:
“However, as in the present case, if the statutorily designated alternative forum happens to be the high court itself whose jurisdiction under Article 226 is invoked and not any ordinary statutory functionary/tribunal, refusal to entertain the petition should be the rule and entertaining it an exception.”
2. Reliance on Constitution Bench Precedents The Court referred to the Constitution Bench decision in Thansingh Nathmal v. A. Mazid, Superintendent of Taxes (AIR 1964 SC 1419), reiterating the principle that the High Court “normally will not permit, by entertaining a petition under article 226 of the Constitution, the machinery created under the statute to be by-passed.”
The Court also cited the majority view in A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani (AIR 1961 SC 1506), noting that if a petitioner has “disabled himself from availing himself of the statutory remedy by his own fault in not doing so within the prescribed time, he cannot certainly be permitted to urge that as a ground for the Court dealing with his petition under Article 226.”
3. Limitation and Delay Rejecting the appellant’s justification for the delay, the Court noted that the writ petition was filed well after the limitation period for seeking a reference had expired. The Court clarified that the Limitation Act, 1963, applies to the Customs Act in this context.
“We have not found any provision in the 1962 Act which either expressly or by necessary implication excluded the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963. As such, in terms of Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act, the High Court in its reference jurisdiction could have well been approached with a request to condone the delay…”
The Court termed the appellant’s strategy a “(mis)adventure”:
“In our considered opinion, the appellant having had a remedy before the High Court in a separate jurisdiction which was equally efficacious, he indulged in the (mis)adventure of invoking its writ jurisdiction which was rightly not entertained.”
4. On Pleadings and Merits The Supreme Court corrected a factual error in the High Court’s order, noting that the appellant had indeed challenged the confiscation order in his appeal memo before the CEGAT. However, the Court ultimately upheld the dismissal on merits due to a lack of specific pleadings in the writ petition.
The Court emphasized that merely listing grounds in a petition is insufficient to claim that a tribunal failed to consider them. There must be a specific averment on oath.
“Merely urging a ground, under the heading ‘GROUNDS’, which is in the nature of a submission before the High Court without anyone… taking responsibility of making a statement on oath by verifying it as true to his knowledge that a point was raised but not dealt with, would not be sufficient to persuade us to entertain any grievance on this score.”
“In order to have the court examine the objection of non-consideration raised as well as to succeed, there has to be a direct challenge that the authority whose order is being questioned did not deal with the point/ground much to the detriment of the party raising it.”
Decision
The Supreme Court upheld the impugned order of the Rajasthan High Court and dismissed the appeal.
Case Details:
- Case Name: Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India & Ors.
- Appeal Number: Civil Appeal No. 6719 of 2012
- Citation: 2025 INSC 1337
- Bench: Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Aravind Kumar
- Counsel for Appellant: Ms. Chitrangda Rastravara
- Counsel for Respondents: Mr. Raghavendra P. Shankar, Additional Solicitor General
