The Supreme Court of India has ruled that a Magistrate is not required to record pre-charge evidence under Section 244 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) when the alleged offence is exclusively triable by a Court of Session. A division bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh set aside a Punjab & Haryana High Court order that had remanded a complaint case to a Judicial Magistrate for recording such evidence. The apex court clarified that insisting on such a procedure at the pre-committal stage is contrary to the scheme of the CrPC and would unnecessarily delay trials.
Background of the Case
The dispute arose from a verbal and physical altercation on April 12, 2007, involving the appellant-complainant, Neeraj Gupta, and his father on one side, and the respondents on the other. During the incident, the appellant’s father collapsed, lost consciousness, and was declared dead upon arrival at the hospital. Initially, no First Information Report (FIR) was registered. The appellant subsequently submitted complaints to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Chandigarh, on April 16 and April 19, 2007, seeking the registration of an FIR.
On February 5, 2008, the appellant sought directions before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chandigarh, under Section 156(3) of the CrPC. The Magistrate accepted this application on February 19, 2008, initiating proceedings under Section 200 of the CrPC. Following the recording of certain evidence, summoning orders were issued on December 8, 2009, and the case was committed to the Sessions Court on May 3, 2010.
While the respondents challenged these orders in the High Court, the Sessions Court on April 5, 2011, framed charges solely against respondent no. 2, Narinder Bansal. Aggrieved by the discharge of respondent no. 1 (Pardeep Kumar Bansal) and respondent no. 3 (Gurmail Singh), the appellant filed a criminal revision before the High Court. Respondent no. 2 also filed a separate revision petition challenging the summoning and framing of charges.
The Punjab & Haryana High Court, via a common order dated September 2, 2019, remanded the entire matter back to the Judicial Magistrate, directing compliance with Section 244 of the CrPC. The High Court reasoned that even in cases triable by a Sessions Court, the Magistrate must examine pre-charge evidence other than pre-summoning evidence before passing a committal order if the case is based on a private complaint.
Arguments of the Parties and High Court’s Citations
Before the Supreme Court, the core issue was whether a Magistrate must record prosecution evidence in a private complaint when the offence involved—such as under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)—is strictly triable by the Court of Sessions.
The High Court had relied on three key precedents to support its reasoning: Ajoy Kumar Ghose v. State of Jharkhand, Sunil Mehta v. State of Gujarat, and Harinarayan G. Bajaj v. State of Maharashtra.
However, the Supreme Court observed that the High Court’s reliance on these cases was misplaced:
- In Ajoy Kumar Ghose, the offences under discussion were triable by a Magistrate, unlike the present case.
- In Harinarayan G. Bajaj, the controversy surrounded the interpretation of Section 319 of the CrPC regarding the rights of an additional accused to cross-examine witnesses, which was not an issue here.
- In Sunil Mehta, the offences (Section 406 read with Section 114 IPC) were squarely within the triable powers of a Magistrate.
Court’s Analysis on the Role of Committing Magistrates
The Supreme Court examined the statutory interplay between Section 200 (examination of complainant), Section 209 (commitment of case), and Section 244 (evidence for prosecution in warrant cases). It noted that Section 244 falls under Chapter XIX, which regulates trials of warrant cases by Magistrates, and does not apply to cases exclusively triable by a Court of Session.
The Bench pointed out that forcing a Magistrate to record evidence before committal would result in witnesses deposing multiple times on the same facts. The Court observed: “If the reasoning of the High Court is accepted, a number of witnesses would be required to depose about the same set of facts and circumstances, at least twice. This may not be of any particular use, nor mandate of law.”
To support its reasoning, the Supreme Court cited several landmark precedents. It referred to the Constitution Bench judgment in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, which detailed the limited administrative role of a Magistrate at the pre-trial stage: “At this pre-trial stage, the Magistrate is required to perform acts in the nature of administrative work rather than judicial such as ensuring compliance with Sections 207 and 208 CrPC, and committing the matter if it is exclusively triable by the Sessions Court. Therefore, it would be legitimate for us to conclude that the Magistrate at the stage of Sections 207 to 209 CrPC is forbidden, by express provision of Section 319 CrPC, to apply his mind to the merits of the case and determine as to whether any accused needs to be added or subtracted to face trial before the Court of Session.”
The Court also referenced Supdt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Ashutosh Ghosh, reinforcing that a committing Magistrate only needs to verify if the offence is exclusively triable by the Sessions Court without taking any evidence.
Furthermore, the Court analyzed the historical legislative shift from the old Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 to the 1973 Code. Referring to Sanjay Gandhi v. Union of India, the Court noted that the legislature consciously did away with pre-committal inquiries to prevent trials from being frustrated, describing the Magistrate’s role at this stage as a “narrow inspection hole.”
Citing the three-judge bench decision in State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, the Supreme Court highlighted that the old committal inquiry under Section 207-A of the 1898 Code was abolished based on the Law Commission’s 41st Report because it resulted in inordinate delays and served no useful purpose. Under the modern 1973 Code, evidence can only be taken after the Sessions Court frames charges.
This view was further supported by Rattiram v. State of M.P., where another three-judge bench emphasized that the role of the Magistrate has been completely restricted and transformed under Section 209, meaning that procedural lapses at the committal stage do not automatically result in a “failure of justice” unless actual prejudice is shown.
Supreme Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court’s directions were legally unsustainable: “Consequent upon the above discussion, we have no hesitation in holding that the High Court proceeded with an erroneous reading of the law and the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is required to be set aside. Ordered accordingly.”
Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the remand order. Since the appellant’s original grievance before the High Court was that the Sessions Court failed to frame charges against the other two accused, the apex court directed the High Court to hear the revision petitions filed by both the appellant and respondent no. 2 afresh.
Given that the charges against one of the respondents were framed back in 2011, the Supreme Court requested the High Court to decide both petitions as expeditiously as possible, and not later than nine months. The parties have been directed to appear before the High Court on July 16, 2026.
Case Title: NEERAJ GUPTA Versus PARDEEP KUMAR BANSAL & ORS.
Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. of 2026 (@ Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 776 of 2020)
Bench: Justice Sanjay Karol, Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh
Date: July 1, 2026
