The Supreme Court of India, in a bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice N. Kotiswar Singh, set aside four orders of the High Court of Karnataka that had quashed six First Information Reports (FIRs) registered against police officials under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The apex court held that the absence of proof regarding the demand or recovery of illegal gratification at the initial stage cannot form the basis for quashing an FIR under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), as such matters are issues of evidence to be evaluated during trial or considered at the stage of discharge.
Background of the Case
The case originates from six FIRs registered against respondents, including Mr. Prabhu Shankar, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Central Crime Branch (CCB), Bengaluru, and Mr. Niranjan Kumar C., Police Inspector, CCB, Bengaluru. The offences were registered under Sections 7(a), 13(1)(a) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act), and Section 384 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
The details of the FIRs and connected proceedings are:
- Crime No. 17/2020 (dated 21.05.2020), registered under Sections 7(a), 13(1)(a) read with 13(2) of the PC Act, on a complaint by Dy. SP, ACB.
- Crime No. 15/2020 (dated 21.05.2020), registered under Sections 7(a), 13(1)(a) read with 13(2) of the PC Act, on a complaint by Dy. SP, ACB.
- Crime No. 16/2020 (dated 21.05.2020), registered under Sections 7(a), 13(1)(a) read with 13(2) of the PC Act, on a complaint by Dy. SP, ACB.
- Crime No. 23/2020 (dated 24.06.2020), registered under Sections 7(a), 13(1)(a) read with 13(2) of the PC Act, on a complaint by Anwar Mohd. Fahim.
- Crime No. 63/2020 (dated 12.05.2020), registered under Section 384 read with Section 34 IPC, on a complaint by Shaji George Thomas.
- Crime No. 64/2020 (dated 12.05.2020), registered under Section 384 read with Section 34 IPC, on a complaint by Adil Azeez.
The accused police officers moved criminal petitions before the High Court of Karnataka under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of these FIRs. On September 8, 2021, the High Court allowed the petitions and quashed the FIRs primarily on grounds of lack of prima facie material, unexplained delay, allegations of malafides, absence of direct demand and acceptance, and holding that certain FIRs amounted to second FIRs for the same offence.
Arguments of the Parties
Appearing for the State of Karnataka, Additional Advocate General Mr. Prateek Chadha submitted that each FIR disclosed a cognizable offence and did not fall within any exception laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal. He argued that the High Court’s findings of malice were unsupported by material on record, and that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC by conducting a mini-trial and evaluating evidence at the investigation stage rather than confining itself to whether the FIR contents disclosed an offence.
Conversely, counsel for respondent No. 1 (Prabhu Shankar) submitted that the High Court rightly quashed the FIRs due to material inconsistencies and contradictions. It was further argued that respondent No. 1 had been exonerated in a departmental enquiry on the same set of allegations, and that the criminal proceedings were not a pursuit of justice but a result of political pressure and departmental infighting arising out of the respondent’s investigation into illegal cigarette distribution during the lockdown period. Respondent No. 2 (Niranjan Kumar C.) did not enter an appearance despite service.
Court’s Analysis and Legal Precedents
The Supreme Court observed that the High Court had traversed beyond the permissible contours of Section 482 CrPC. The Court emphasized that while delay in lodging an FIR and absence of direct demand or recovery of money are factors that must be established through evidence during trial or considered for discharge, they cannot form the basis for quashing an FIR at the threshold.
Reiterating the established law on quashing jurisdiction, the Supreme Court relied on its decision in State v. K. Rangayya, highlighting:
“The power to quash an FIR vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “CrPC”) is an extraordinary and discretionary power, which must be exercised sparingly and with great circumspection. This Court has consistently held that at the stage of considering a petition for quashing an FIR, the Court is not required to examine the merits of the allegations or to evaluate the evidence that may ultimately be led at trial. The sole and limited inquiry at this threshold stage is whether the allegations set out in the FIR, taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety as true, prima facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence against the accused. It is not permissible for the Court to conduct what amounts to a mini-trial by sifting through the evidence, assessing probabilities, or weighing the credibility of witnesses, for these are functions exclusively reserved for the court of trial.”
Addressing the issue of indirect demand or solicitation, the Court reaffirmed from State v. K. Rangayya that “actual exchange of a bribe is not an essential requirement to be prosecuted under this law” and that an attempt to obtain an undue advantage, directly or through intermediaries, is equally punishable under Section 7 read with Explanation 2 of the PC Act. The Court found the High Court’s reasoning—that money was not paid directly to respondent No. 1—unsustainable at the stage of prima facie evaluation.
On the question of delay, the Court cited Punit Beriwala v. State of NCT of Delhi and Ors. (which referenced Skoda Auto Volkswagen (India) Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh), noting:
“It is settled law that delay in registration of the FIR for offences punishable with imprisonment of more than three years cannot be the basis of interdicting a criminal investigation. The delay will assume importance only when the complainant fails to give a plausible explanation and whether the explanation is plausible or not, has to be decided by the Trial Court only after recording the evidence.”
Regarding the High Court’s observation that certain FIRs constituted impermissible “second FIRs,” the Supreme Court referred to State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore, noting that:
“The FIR prior in point of time refers to a particular incident and the action taken therein is limited. The second FIR pertains to the larger issue of widespread corruption in the concerned department and, therefore, is much larger in its scope than the previous FIR. Quashing of the FIR would nip the investigation into such corruption, in the bud. The same would be against the interest of society.”
Concluding its analysis, the bench reiterated the guidance laid down in State of Chhattisgarh v. Aman Kumar Singh:
“Since there exists no magic wand as in fairy tales, a swish of which could wipe out greed, the constitutional courts owe a duty to the people of the nation to show zero tolerance to corruption and come down heavily against the perpetrators of the crime while at the same time saving those innocent public servants, who unfortunately get entangled by men of dubious conduct acting from behind the screen with ulterior motives and/or to achieve vested interests.”
The Court further reiterated:
“…it would be eminently desirable if the High Courts maintain a hands-off approach and not quash a first information report pertaining to “corruption” cases, specially at the stage of investigation, even though certain elements of strong-arm tactics of the ruling dispensation might be discernible… While we do not intend to fetter the High Courts from intervening in appropriate cases, it is only just and proper to remind the courts to be careful, circumspect and cautious in quashing first information reports resting on mala fide of the nature alleged herein.”
Decision
Holding that the High Court’s impugned orders could not be sustained in law, the Supreme Court allowed all seven appeals and set aside the common judgment and orders dated September 8, 2021. The Court clarified that the respondents remain free to pursue their legal remedies in accordance with law, which shall be decided uninfluenced by the observations made in this judgment.
Case Title: State of Karnataka & Anr. v. Prabhu Shankar & Anr.
Case No.: Criminal Appeal No.(s) of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No(s). 1522 of 2022) with connected matters
Bench: Justice Sanjay Karol, Justice N. Kotiswar Singh
Date: July 30, 2026
