The Supreme Court has held that Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 cannot be used to convict an accused for failing to explain a death until the prosecution first discharges its initial burden. The Court set aside the life sentence of a woman whom the Bombay High Court had convicted of murdering her daughter-in-law by setting her on fire.
A Bench of Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar restored the Sessions Court’s acquittal of the appellant, Kamalbai Waman Patil. The Bench said the High Court had relied on an uncorroborated dying declaration and convicted her on a charge that was never framed against her.
Background
The prosecution alleged that Sunitabai was ill-treated by her husband (A1), her father-in-law (A2), her mother-in-law, the appellant (A3), and her brother-in-law (A4). The alleged grounds were that she had no child from the marriage, and there were also dowry demands. On 10 April 2005, all four were alleged to have set her on fire in furtherance of their common intention. She died on 15 April 2005.
All four accused were charged under Sections 498A, 342, 406 and 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The Sessions Court acquitted all of them because the victim’s three dying declarations contradicted each other. One declaration, recorded by the Medical Officer in the medico-legal case papers (Exhibit-56), named the appellant as the person who set her on fire. The other two (Exhibits-44 and 48) said the father-in-law had done so.
In the State’s appeal, the High Court accepted Exhibit-56 and rejected the other two declarations. It upheld the acquittal of A1, A2 and A4. It convicted the appellant alone under Section 302 IPC and sentenced her to rigorous imprisonment for life with a fine of ₹25,000. The High Court also relied on the defence statement that only the appellant was at home with the victim when the incident happened.
Arguments
Counsel Dilip Taur, appearing for the appellant, argued that the High Court had accepted Exhibit-56 without any corroboration. He said that when reversing an acquittal, the material relied on had to be free from doubt. He relied on State of Punjab v. Parveen Kumar.
Counsel Raman Yadav, appearing for the State, supported the conviction. He argued that Exhibit-56 was voluntary and was backed by the seizures and the Chemical Analyser’s report. He also pointed out that the appellant was alone at home at the time. He relied on Jagbir Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Rajendra s/o Ramdas Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra.
Supreme Court on Section 106 Evidence Act
The High Court had treated the appellant’s failure to explain the burn injuries as a major factor against her. The Supreme Court rejected that reasoning. It observed:
“The provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 would come into play only after the prosecution discharges its initial burden pointing to the involvement of the concerned accused.”
The Bench added that “It is only when the prosecution has led evidence, which if believed would sustain a conviction that the absence of a plausible explanation by the accused could be a factor against such accused.” It relied on the three-Judge Bench decision in Anees v. State Govt. of NCT.
Conviction on a Charge Never Framed
The Court noted that all four accused were charged only under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. No independent charge under Section 302 was framed against any of them. Convicting the appellant alone on the basis of the defence statement, the Court said, “would amount to making out a new accusation with which the appellant was never charged.” It relied on Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra.
Dying Declaration Needed Corroboration
Applying the principles in Abhishek Sharma v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), the Court said the High Court should have looked for corroboration once it found the declarations inconsistent. It noted that Vishwas Desle had put out the fire, taken the victim to hospital and was present when Exhibit-56 was recorded, yet the prosecution never examined him. The Court held that “Exhibit-56 without any corroboration cannot be the sole basis to reverse the acquittal of the appellant and thereafter convict her alone.”
The Bench said the age gap was also relevant: the victim was about 30 years old and the appellant about 60. It further noted that the High Court had not heard the appellant on sentence, as Section 386(a) CrPC requires.
Outcome
The Court observed that “The presumption of innocence in favour of the appellant was in fact enhanced by her acquittal by the Sessions Court.” It quashed the High Court’s judgment of 28 September 2017 and acquitted the appellant. It directed that she be set free immediately if she is not required in any other case.
Case Title: Sau. Kamalbai Waman Patil v. The State of Maharashtra
Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. 118 of 2018
Bench: Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
Date: November 5, 2026
