The Supreme Court of India, comprising a Bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu, has ruled that omitting the State as a formal party respondent renders a writ petition fundamentally defective when substantive financial or administrative relief is sought against the public exchequer. Setting aside a direction issued by the Bombay High Court to absorb a terminated lecturer from an unaided college into the surplus teacher cadre, the Court clarified that surplus absorption policies apply exclusively to grant-in-aid institutions and that impleading an officer or department cannot substitute impleadment of the State itself. However, exercising its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to prevent a travesty of justice, the Bench directed the State of Maharashtra to pay the superannuated lecturer a consolidated sum of Rs. 10,00,000 in full and final settlement.
Background of the Case
The first respondent, Sudhir, was appointed as a Lecturer in the Commerce Faculty of a college administered by a registered society during the 1990–1991 academic session. The institution had been granted permission to operate strictly on a “no grant-in-aid” basis. Following previous disputes involving terminations and reinstatements, the management placed Sudhir under suspension and initiated a departmental enquiry. Consequent to the enquiry and after obtaining requisite permission from the university, the management terminated his services on August 17, 1999. Contemporaneously, the university also permitted the management to close down the Commerce Faculty from the 1999–2000 academic session due to a lack of students.
Sudhir approached the University and College Tribunal at Nagpur challenging his termination, but the Tribunal dismissed his appeal on April 24, 2000. Aggrieved, he filed a writ petition before the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court. On October 7, 2015, the High Court set aside the Tribunal’s order and quashed the termination. In paragraph 26 (iv) of its judgment, the High Court directed the Joint Director of Higher Education, Nagpur, to include Sudhir’s name in the list of surplus lecturers/teachers and absorb him into another college. The High Court additionally directed the college management to pay Sudhir Rs. 10,00,000 as compensation in lieu of arrears. The Joint Director filed a review application against the absorption directive, which the High Court dismissed on January 12, 2016. The State of Maharashtra subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted leave on March 11, 2016, and stayed the absorption direction.
Submissions of the Parties
Before the Supreme Court, the State of Maharashtra contended that the college functioned entirely on an unaided, “no grant-in-aid” basis. Relying upon a Government Resolution dated March 24, 1994, and a subsequent corrigendum dated March 21, 1997, the State submitted that the policy for absorbing surplus lecturers and teachers was restricted exclusively to grant-in-aid colleges, meaning the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in directing Sudhir’s absorption.
In response, counsel for Sudhir argued that under Section 79(4) of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994, the mandate to absorb surplus teachers extends to all “affiliated colleges” without making a distinction between aided and unaided institutions, thereby rendering the 1997 corrigendum non-est in law. Sudhir also claimed parity by citing the absorption of another lecturer, late Bhaurao s/o Pundlikrao Kadav. Addressing the procedural issue, Sudhir maintained that the writ petition was competent because the State was represented through the Joint Director and had contested the matter on merits through an Assistant Government Pleader.
The Court’s Analysis
The Supreme Court observed that the controversy rested on a fundamental procedural defect that went to the root of the proceedings: the non-impleadment of the State of Maharashtra. While Sudhir instituted his writ petition in 2000, it was only in March 2015—nearly fifteen years later—that he moved an application to implead the Joint Director, without ever formally impleading the State eo nomine.
Rejecting the argument that representation through a departmental officer sufficed, the Court reaffirmed settled law:
“The impleadment of an officer or a department, without formally arraying the State as a juristic entity under Article 300 of the Constitution, renders the petition fundamentally defective when substantive relief is sought against the public exchequer.”
The Bench reiterated that:
“An officer or a department of the State cannot be equated with the State itself for the purposes of fastening sovereign or financial liability.”
In reaching this conclusion, the Court examined prior precedents:
- In Ranjeet Mal v. General Manager, Northern Railway (1977), a three-judge Bench ruled that an employee seeking to enforce an order setting aside removal cannot merely implead the General Manager, as the Union of India is a necessary party against whom the order must be enforced.
- In Jagtu v. Suraj Mal (2010), reading Section 79 and Order 27 Rule 1 alongside Order 1 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court held that where a declaration of rights concerns State-owned land, the State is an indispensable party, without which the suit is not maintainable.
- In Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab (2014), the Court deprecated the practice of granting relief against the public exchequer without formally impleading the State, clarifying that any decree erroneously passed does not bind the State.
Turning to the substantive merits, the Court found that Sudhir’s appointment in an unaided college placed him outside the executive surplus absorption policy under the 1997 corrigendum, which he had never challenged. His plea for parity was also turned down, with the Court reiterating from Chaman Lal that:
“Article 14 of the Constitution does not envisage negative equality. If an illegal or irregular benefit has been conferred upon a similarly situated person inadvertently or by mistake, it does not confer any legal right on others to claim the same relief to perpetuate an illegality.”
Balancing Equities and the Decision
While holding that the High Court erred in directing absorption, the Supreme Court addressed the peculiar equitable circumstances of the dispute. Sudhir had remained out of employment since 1999 and reached the age of superannuation on November 30, 2025, during the pendency of the appeal. Due to the Supreme Court’s interim stay, he was unable to benefit from the High Court’s reinstatement order, having accepted the Rs. 10,00,000 compensation from the management under the expectation of absorption.
The Bench observed:
“While the appellant is correct in its submission that the legal mandate for absorption does not apply to a ‘no grant-in-aid’ college, leaving Sudhir destitute at this advanced stage of his life would result in a travesty of justice.”
The Court also noted that the State shared responsibility for failing to raise the non-impleadment objection at the earliest instance. Although a calculation chart submitted by the State revealed staggering arrears of salary had Sudhir served until his superannuation, the Bench opted to mould the relief under Article 142 of the Constitution to achieve complete justice.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals by setting aside paragraph 26 (iv) of the High Court’s judgment, while directing the State of Maharashtra to pay Sudhir a consolidated sum of Rs. 10,00,000 within eight weeks in full and final settlement of all claims. The compensation already disbursed by the management was left undisturbed, and the Court clarified that this relief was granted under the unique facts of the case and shall not serve as a precedent.
Case Details
Case Title: State of Maharashtra vs. Sudhir s/o Motiramji Hiwarkar & Ors.
Case No.: Civil Appeal Nos. 2963-2964 of 2016
Bench: Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu
Date: October 13, 2026
