RANCHI: In a significant ruling on matrimonial jurisprudence under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, a Division Bench of the High Court of Jharkhand comprising Justice Sujit Narayan Prasad and Justice Sanjay Prasad held that the absence of a formal First Information Report (FIR) cannot be treated as a ground to discredit a wife’s testimony regarding cruelty. The High Court set aside the dismissal order of the Family Court, Jamshedpur, and dissolved the marriage between the parties on grounds of cruelty and desertion, observing that when a wife is forced to leave her matrimonial home under compelling circumstances created by marital abuse, her departure cannot be construed in law as voluntary abandonment or desertion.
Background of the Case
The marriage between the parties was solemnized and registered on October 20, 2010, before the Marriage Officer at the Sub-Registry Office, Jamshedpur, and was also performed according to Hindu rites and customs. Following the marriage, the appellant-wife resided at her matrimonial home. Two children—a daughter born in January 2012 and a son born in October 2015—were born from the wedlock.
According to the appellant, after the birth of their son and the subsequent demise of her father-in-law in 2015, the respondent-husband became a habitual drunkard, stopped working, and routinely subjected her to domestic violence, verbal abuse, and physical assault. The appellant endured the conduct in hopes of reform, but the situation deteriorated. On March 15, 2018, the appellant and her two minor children were driven out of the matrimonial home.
Taking shelter at her parental home, the appellant secured employment as a nurse in a private hospital to support herself and educate her children. She eventually instituted Original Suit No. 59 of 2024 before the Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court No. 1, Jamshedpur, seeking dissolution of marriage under Section 27(1)(b) (desertion) and Section 27(1)(d) (cruelty) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. Despite notices sent through registered post and published in local newspapers, the respondent chose not to appear, and the proceedings were conducted ex parte.
However, by an order dated February 9, 2026, the Family Court dismissed the suit ex parte, holding that the allegations of cruelty were not proved because no criminal case had been registered against the husband. Aggrieved by the dismissal, the appellant filed a first appeal before the High Court under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984.
Arguments of the Parties
Appearing for the appellant, counsel argued that the Family Court fundamentally misconstrued the statutory definitions of cruelty and desertion. It was submitted that the respondent had effectively admitted the claims by failing to appear and contest the suit despite valid service. Counsel pointed out that the appellant had formally reported the respondent’s physical assaults and torture to the Golmuri Police Station in February 2024, yet the respondent refused to alter his conduct.
Counsel further urged that it was the respondent who had driven the appellant and the children out, abandoning them without maintenance. It was pointed out that the trial court recorded contradictory findings: while acknowledging that the respondent made no effort to resume cohabitation since March 2018 and exhibited animus deserendi, it paradoxically refused to find him guilty of desertion.
The respondent-husband did not appear before the High Court despite summons being personally received and served via speed post, leading the appeal to be heard ex parte.
The Court’s Analysis
Addressing the scope of appellate jurisdiction under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, the High Court observed that a first appeal is a rehearing of the matter on both law and facts, citing the Supreme Court ruling in Jagdish Singh v. Madhuri Devi. The Bench noted that civil proceedings are governed by the standard of preponderance of probabilities under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, and reiterated from A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur that proof beyond reasonable doubt is restricted to criminal trials and does not apply to delicate matrimonial disputes.
Discussing judicial perversity with reference to Arulvelu v. State and Damodar Lal v. Sohan Devi, the Court noted that a finding reached by ignoring material evidence or acting irrationally amounts to perversity, warranting appellate intervention.
Examining the ground of cruelty under Section 27(1)(d) of the Special Marriage Act—read in pari materia with Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955—the Court surveyed landmark decisions:
- Dr. N.G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane, establishing that cruelty must generate a reasonable apprehension that living together is harmful or injurious.
- Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, emphasizing that cruelty has no rigid definition and encompasses conduct adversely affecting matrimonial obligations.
- V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat, Vijay Kumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijay Kumar Bhate, and Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, affirming that sustained conduct causing severe mental pain and anguish qualifies as cruelty.
- Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal, K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa, Ravi Kumar v. Julmidevi, Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit, and Manish Tyagi v. Deepak Kumar, holding that mental cruelty does not require cohabitation under one roof, nor does it necessitate physical violence; prolonged neglect, indifference, or abnormal behavior suffices.
The High Court held that the Family Court erred in rejecting the appellant’s testimony simply because an FIR was not registered:
“This Court is of the considered view that, in matrimonial disputes, when either party adduces evidence to substantiate the element of cruelty particularly the wife the mere fact of non-institution of a formal First Information Report cannot, by itself, be treated as a ground to discredit such testimony. The appellant-wife, even if she did not lodge a formal FIR, has nonetheless explained the torture and assault suffered at the hands of the respondent-husband. The pertinent question that arises is why she would voluntarily choose to live alone and endure the rigours of solitude and financial hardship, unless compelled by the cruelty meted out to her.”
Addressing the ground of desertion under Section 27(1)(b) of the Act, the Bench referred to authoritative texts including Rayden on Divorce and Halsbury’s Laws of England, as well as the Supreme Court rulings in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena and Debananda Tamuli v. Kakumoni Kataky. The Court noted that desertion requires the factum of separation accompanied by animus deserendi (the intention to end cohabitation permanently) without reasonable cause.
The Bench stressed that the person who physically leaves the home is not necessarily the deserting party if such departure was forced:
“In the aforesaid circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the departure of the appellant-wife from the matrimonial home cannot be construed as a wilful abandonment of the respondent-husband. Rather, it was a compelled act necessitated by the cruelty inflicted upon her, thereby amounting itself to cruelty in law.”
The Court observed that the respondent’s intentional abstention from both the trial court and the High Court demonstrated a total disregard for the judicial process and a lack of desire to preserve the marital bond, rendering the marriage a “mere dead wood incapable of revival.”
The Decision
Finding the Family Court’s decision perverse for ignoring material evidence, the High Court quashed and set aside the judgment dated February 9, 2026, and the decree dated February 16, 2026. The original suit was allowed, and the marriage between the parties was dissolved.
The Bench clarified that the inheritance rights of the two minor children remain intact. Although the appellant did not seek maintenance for herself, the Court held that this does not bar her from claiming maintenance for her minor children, granting her the liberty to approach the appropriate forum for their financial support and education expenses.
Case No.: F.A. No. 247 of 2026
Bench: Justice Sujit Narayan Prasad and Justice Sanjay Prasad
Date: October 9, 2026
