In a significant ruling clarifying the boundaries of constitutional writ jurisdiction in employment matters, the Allahabad High Court, presided over by Justice Manju Rani Chauhan, held that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable to challenge the termination of service of a teacher by a private, unaided educational trust where the dispute is founded solely upon a contract of service and involves no public law element. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the petition on the ground of maintainability alone.
Background of the Case
The petitioner, Nootan Rai, approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the termination of her services by the management of a private educational trust. When the matter came up before the court, learned counsel appearing for the respondent educational institution raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition against a private, unaided body. The petitioner sought and was granted time to file a supplementary affidavit placing relevant documents on record to counter the preliminary objection.
Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioner
Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. P.K.S. Paliwal, submitted that the writ petition was maintainable against the private management. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on paragraph 19 of the decision in Manoj Kumar, Principal (Terminated) v. State of U.P. and others (Writ Petition No. 39866 of 2006), where it was observed that a writ under Article 226 lies against a private body discharging public duties or obligations of a public nature, as well as bodies obligated to discharge statutory functions.
The petitioner also relied upon the Supreme Court’s decisions in VST Industries Limited v. VST Industries Workers’ Union (2001) 1 SCC 298 and Andi Mukta Sadguru Shri Muktaji Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and others v. V.R. Rudani and others (1989) 2 SCC 691 to contend that a writ of mandamus can be issued against a private trust. Lastly, reliance was placed on paragraph 34 of the Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Uttam Chand Rawat v. State of U.P. and 7 others (Writ-A No. 9814 of 2020) to argue that the petition was maintainable.
Arguments on Behalf of the Respondents
Opposing the petition, learned counsel representing the respondents argued that the reliance placed on Andi Mukta Sadguru was misplaced. It was submitted that in Andi Mukta, the institution was receiving financial aid from the Government, whereas the trust-institution in the present case is wholly unaided and does not receive any grant or assistance. Moreover, Andi Mukta concerned claims for arrears of salary and terminal benefits rather than the enforcement of a contractual service obligation or a challenge to termination. Citing paragraphs 12, 13, and 14 of that decision, respondents emphasized that disputes concerning termination are essentially governed by terms of contract.
Counsel further distinguished Manoj Kumar, pointing out that the institution in that case was recognized under the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, and its teachers were governed by statutory service conditions under a Government Order dated August 10, 2001. In contrast, the respondent institution here is a private unaided educational body neither established nor recognized under any statute to discharge statutory duties; it receives no government aid and provides free education to village children merely as a voluntary measure.
The respondents also placed reliance on the Full Bench decision in Uttam Chand Rawat, contending that it laid down a twin-test: the body must discharge a public function, and the action challenged must fall within the domain of public law rather than private common law or contract.
Furthermore, the respondents cited the Supreme Court’s rulings in:
- St. Mary’s Education Society and another v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava and others (2022 SCC OnLine SC 1091), which held that actions taken solely within the confines of an ordinary contract of service lacking statutory backing cannot be challenged under Article 226.
- Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma (2024 SCC OnLine SC 1683), holding that a purely private employment dispute between a private educational institution and its employees is not maintainable under writ jurisdiction.
- Dilip Kumar Pandey v. Union of India (2025 LiveLaw (SC) 629), affirming that an alleged breach of contract does not touch any public law element, and a private school cannot be said to discharge a public duty in connection with the employment of teachers.
The Court’s Analysis and Observations
Examining the rival submissions and precedents, the Court observed that while the jurisdiction under Article 226 is not confined exclusively to statutory authorities or instrumentalities of the State, the nature of the duty sought to be enforced is paramount. Justice Manju Rani Chauhan noted:
“The juridical complexion of the respondent, therefore, is not by itself conclusive; what assumes primacy is the nature of the duty sought to be enforced and the character of the lis brought before the Court.”
Addressing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the Court noted that VST Industries Ltd. underscores that the mere existence of an activity possessing some element of public significance does not convert every obligation of a private body into a public duty. The Court reiterated that the Full Bench in Uttam Chand Rawat, as well as the Supreme Court in St. Mary’s Education Society and Army Welfare Education Society, made a clear distinction between the public importance of education and the private nature of service contracts:
“The fact that education is undoubtedly an activity of considerable public importance does not, by itself, invest every aspect of the employer-employee relationship within a private educational institution with a public law character. The relationship between the management and its teaching staff, in the absence of a statutory framework governing the conditions of service, ordinarily remains contractual in nature.”
The Court emphasized that this principle applies even more forcefully where the institution is a private trust managed by private individuals, receives no financial aid or grant from the Government, and its employees’ service conditions are not regulated by any statute:
“In the present case, the challenge is directed against the termination of the petitioner from service. The lis, therefore, is essentially between the petitioner and the private management in their respective capacities as employee and employer. No statutory right is shown to have been infringed; nor has any statutory duty of the respondent-trust, possessing a public law character, been demonstrated as having been breached. The grievance substantially concerns the legality and propriety of the termination of a contractual engagement. Such a dispute necessarily falls within the domain of private law unless the petitioner is able to establish that the relationship is regulated by a statutory provision or that the impugned action is intrinsically connected with the discharge of a public duty.”
Drawing the clear boundary between the general amenability of an institution to writ jurisdiction and the maintainability of a specific claim, the Court observed:
“The distinction, therefore, is between the amenability of a private body to writ jurisdiction and the maintainability of a particular claim against such body. The former may arise where the private body discharges a public duty; the latter necessarily depends upon the nature of the right asserted and the obligation sought to be enforced. A private institution may, in a given case, be amenable to Article 226, yet a particular dispute arising purely out of a contract of service may nevertheless remain outside the writ jurisdiction.”
The Court concluded:
“Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned termination does not disclose any enforceable public law obligation on the part of the respondent-trust. The controversy is essentially contractual and private in character. The extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot, therefore, be employed as a substitute for an ordinary remedy for adjudication of a private service dispute.”
Decision
Holding that the dispute arose purely out of a private contractual relationship between the petitioner and the respondent-institution, the High Court held that the writ petition was not maintainable. The petition was dismissed on the ground of maintainability alone.
Case Title: Nootan Rai Versus Union of India and 2 others
Case No.: WRIT – A No. 10421 of 2026
Bench: Justice Manju Rani Chauhan
Date: September 23, 2026
