A Division Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana, comprising Justice P. Sam Koshy and Justice Narsing Rao Nandikonda, has set aside the compulsory retirement imposed on a probationary Junior Civil Judge, holding that while discourteous conduct towards police personnel constitutes misconduct, the extreme penalty of compulsory retirement is shockingly disproportionate in the absence of any allegation of corruption, lack of integrity, moral turpitude, or personal gain. Partly allowing the writ petition, the Bench directed the judicial officer’s reinstatement to his original post without back wages under the principle of “no work, no pay,” with seniority reckoned from the date of reinstatement and directions to complete the balance training.
Background of the Case
The petitioner joined the Andhra Pradesh Judicial Service as a Junior Civil Judge under direct recruitment pursuant to G.O.Ms.No.5 dated 12.01.2013 (as amended by G.O.Ms.No.6). After undergoing the first phase of basic training in the 18th Batch at the A.P. Judicial Academy from 18.03.2013 to 17.09.2013, he was posted as II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Gurazala, Guntur District.
During his tenure at Gurazala, the petitioner issued judicial orders and show-cause notices to police officials regarding lapses in investigation and dereliction of statutory duties under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. According to the petitioner, these judicial actions generated animosity towards him from local police personnel.
On 18.03.2014, at about 9:00 a.m., while the petitioner was travelling to court after availing leave, his official vehicle was intercepted at the Pondugula check-post by police personnel implementing the Model Code of Conduct for elections. The petitioner alleged he was humiliated and subsequently submitted representations to the Principal District Judge, Guntur, and the High Court. Shortly thereafter, on 23.03.2014, the High Court transferred him to Chintapalli, Visakhapatnam District.
Following preliminary inquiry reports submitted by the Principal District Judge, Guntur, the High Court issued a show-cause notice and framed six Articles of Charge against the petitioner in ROC No.523/2014-Vigilance Cell:
- Articles of Charge Nos. 1 and 2: Alleged that on 18.03.2014 at Pondugula check-post, the petitioner reacted angrily and rudely when his car was stopped, threatened a police constable, summoned the Sub-Inspector and the constable to appear before his court at 10:30 a.m., kept them waiting at the corner of the courtroom for more than two hours, shouted at them, threatened to take cognizance under the SC/ST Act, and directed his attender to inform the Sub-Jail Superintendent to send escort police to remand them.
- Articles of Charge Nos. 3, 4, and 5: Alleged that in connection with an incident on 15.03.2014 at the Tummalacheruvu toll plaza over a two-minute delay in exempting toll fee, the petitioner caused toll plaza personnel to be produced before his court on 18.03.2014, wrongfully restrained them in court until 12:00 noon, directed local police to illegally detain them at the police station until 6:45 p.m., and subsequently had them brought to his residence where he scolded them and detained them until 9:00 p.m.
- Article of Charge No. 6: Alleged that on 15.03.2014, despite obtaining permission to leave headquarters only after office hours, the petitioner left headquarters at 3:00 p.m. without intimating higher authorities, in violation of High Court circular instructions.
A regular departmental enquiry was conducted under the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1991. The Inquiry Officer submitted a report dated 08.08.2016 holding Articles of Charge Nos. 1 and 2 proved, while Articles of Charge Nos. 3 to 6 were held not proved.
The High Court, acting as the disciplinary authority, disagreed tentatively with the findings on Charges 3 to 6 and issued a disagreement notice on 06.03.2017. Rejecting the petitioner’s objections, the disciplinary authority recommended compulsory retirement. Consequently, the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued G.O.Ms.No.2 dated 04.01.2018 imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement under Rule 9(8) of the A.P. Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1991, communicated vide proceedings dated 05.01.2018. The petitioner challenged the enquiry report, disagreement findings, and the compulsory retirement order under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Arguments of the Parties
Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that:
- The disciplinary proceedings were vitiated for being initiated in violation of Circular Orders in ROC No.325/76-B.Special dated 06.08.1977 governing complaints against judicial officers and guidelines of the Supreme Court in D.O. No.CJI/CC/CYMPL/2017/2246 dated 16.03.2017.
- The complaints lodged by police officials were motivated, retaliatory, and borne out of animosity because the petitioner had issued judicial notices and warrants against them for dereliction of duty.
- The Inquiry Officer erred in relying on police personnel testimonies for Charges 1 and 2 without independent corroboration, while failing to apply the same evidentiary standard used to exonerate him on Charges 3 to 6.
- The disciplinary authority lacked any independent or tangible material to overturn the Inquiry Officer’s findings on Charges 3 to 6 without assigning cogent reasons or ordering a de novo enquiry.
- The punishment was shockingly disproportionate as the proven allegations related only to isolated acts of indiscretion during his initial probation, without any charge of corruption, dishonesty, moral turpitude, or personal gain.
Counsel relied on Supreme Court rulings in Krishna Prasad Verma (D) Thr. Lrs. v. State of Bihar, Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana, and Nirbhay Singh Sulya v. State of Madhya Pradesh (citing Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra), as well as decisions of the Delhi High Court in Aman Pratap Singh v. Government of NCT of Delhi and the Telangana High Court in M. Srinivas Chary v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Kumari G. Govinda Lakshmi v. Government of Telangana.
Learned Government Pleader and learned Standing Counsel for the High Court opposed the writ petition, contending that:
- The departmental enquiry was conducted in strict adherence to the A.P. Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1991, examining comprehensive documentary evidence and the oral testimony of nine witnesses.
- The disciplinary authority was fully empowered to disagree with the Inquiry Officer’s findings after giving due notice to the delinquent officer.
- The petitioner’s rude, high-handed, and discourteous conduct towards public servants performing election duties and private individuals brought disrepute to the judicial service, amounting to grave misconduct under Rule 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, fully warranting compulsory retirement.
Court’s Analysis
The Court examined the findings on the charges and evaluated the proportionality of the punishment.
Regarding Articles of Charge Nos. 3 to 6, the Court noted that the Inquiry Officer had analyzed the oral and documentary evidence before concluding they were not established. The Bench found that the disciplinary authority failed to indicate any independent material or assign cogent reasons to warrant reversing those findings, observing:
“In the absence of any additional material or cogent reasons warranting a different conclusion, the disciplinary authority could not have merely substituted its own opinion for that of the Inquiry Officer. Consequently, the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority holding Articles of Charge Nos.3 to 6 proved cannot be sustained and are liable to be set aside.”
Regarding Articles of Charge Nos. 1 and 2, the Bench held that the findings were supported by legal evidence on record, including the testimonies of official witnesses, preliminary inquiry statements, and contemporaneous records, revealing no perversity or procedural illegality warranting interference under Article 226.
Turning to the conduct of judicial officers, the Court stressed that judicial office is a position of high public trust that extends beyond courtroom hours:
“A Judicial Officer occupies a position of high public trust and is expected to maintain the highest standards of dignity, restraint and propriety, not only while discharging judicial functions on the Bench but also in his conduct outside the Court. The office of a Judicial Officer does not cease with Court hours. The standards of conduct expected of a member of the judicial service extend beyond the courtroom and govern his conduct at all times. A Judicial Officer is, in that sense, a Judicial Officer throughout and not merely during Court working hours.”
The Court cited the Restatement of Values of Judicial Life (1997):
“Every Judge must, at all times, be conscious that he is under the public gaze. There should be no act or omission by him which is unbecoming of the high office he occupies or of the public esteem in which that office is held.”
Referring to Daya Shankar v. High Court of Allahabad and All India Judges Association v. Union of India, the Bench highlighted that judges hold a unique constitutional position requiring constant rectitude and restraint. Addressing societal transformations, the Court firmly rejected any dilution in judicial decorum:
“There can never be any dilution in the standards of courtesy, civility, patience, restraint, tolerance, forgiveness, impartiality and dignified conduct expected of a Judicial Officer. On the contrary, these virtues assume even greater significance in an increasingly complex and dynamic society.”
Examining the proportionality of the penalty, the Bench pointed out that the petitioner was an early-stage probationer and that the established misconduct was devoid of corrupt motives:
“The allegations do not involve any charge of corruption, lack of integrity, moral turpitude, abuse of judicial office for personal gain, or any dishonest motive. There is also no allegation that the petitioner had, at any other point of his service, indulged in any conduct affecting his integrity or impartiality as a Judicial Officer.”
The Court held that the extreme punishment of compulsory retirement was unduly harsh:
“Having regard to the nature of the misconduct proved, the absence of any allegation touching the petitioner’s integrity or honesty and the stage of service at which the incident occurred, this Court is of the considered opinion that the punishment imposed is unduly harsh and shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct established.”
Decision of the Court
The High Court partly allowed the writ petition and set aside G.O.Ms.No.2 dated 04.01.2018 and the consequential proceedings dated 05.01.2018 imposing compulsory retirement.
The Bench directed the immediate reinstatement of the petitioner to his original post. On the issue of consequential relief, the Court ruled:
“As the petitioner has already lost the major portion of his service from 05.01.2018 to till date and posting back to his original post without any consequential benefits, we are of the considered opinion that making the petitioner staying away from the post and reinstating him to his original post itself can be treated as punishment for the charges proved. However, having regard to the fact that the petitioner did not discharge duties during the period commencing from the date of compulsory retirement till the date of reinstatement, this Court is of the view that the principle of “no work, no pay” would apply.”
The petitioner was held disentitled to back wages or consequential monetary benefits for the period out of service. His seniority was directed to be fixed from the date of reinstatement, with a further direction to complete his balance training.
Case No.: Writ Petition No. 12901 of 2018
Bench: Justice P. Sam Koshy and Justice Narsing Rao Nandikonda
Date: 18.08.2026
