The Supreme Court has ruled that a Division Bench hearing an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent cannot interfere with a just and reasonable decision rendered by a Single Judge exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution merely because it holds a different perspective on the matter. A Bench comprising Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Shree Chandrashekhar set aside an order of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court that had overturned a writ court ruling and restored the penalty of removal from service imposed on an employee by Periyar University. Allowing the appeal filed by the employee, the apex court restored the writ court’s decision quashing the dismissal order on the ground that the domestic inquiry findings were perverse and based on “no evidence.”
Background of the Dispute
The appellant, R. Saravanan, was substantively appointed as Assistant Registrar at Periyar University on May 2, 2000, and was later serving as Deputy Registrar. Following a complaint regarding his assets received by the Department of Higher Education, directions were issued in 2008 and 2009 to conduct inquiries into allegations that he had amassed wealth disproportionate to his known sources of income.
After an initial Three-member Committee could not proceed due to alleged non-cooperation and hindrances, the University constituted a One-man Commission headed by a retired Judicial Officer on April 19, 2011, to inquire into the allegations. A memorandum containing 14 charges was served on the appellant. The Commission subsequently held Charge Nos. 1, 4, 10, 13, and 14 proved, while finding other charges not proved.
The Syndicate of the University accepted the findings and, vide communication dated July 26, 2013, removed the appellant from service with effect from July 27, 2013, relying primarily on three charges:
- Charge No. 1: Influencing authorities to grant affiliation to Ganga College of Education, where his wife was a Managing Trustee.
- Charge No. 4: Purchasing a house property at Periyar Nagar in his mother’s name without obtaining due permission from the University.
- Charge No. 10: Purchasing a Santro car valued at Rs. 4 lakhs beyond his regular source of income without requisite permission.
The appellant challenged the removal order before the Madras High Court in W.P. No. 23936 of 2013. A Single Judge bench (writ court) examined the inquiry report and held that the findings were perverse and unsupported by any material on record, thereby quashing the removal order. However, upon an intra-court appeal (W.A. No. 2329 of 2018) filed by Periyar University under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, the Division Bench re-appreciated the inquiry materials, held that the report was corroborated by documentary evidence, and restored the penalty of removal. The appellant then approached the Supreme Court.
Arguments of the Parties
The appellant contended that the One-man Commission had no authority in law to frame charges or hold a disciplinary proceeding, as it was set up merely to ascertain facts. It was further argued that the findings on Charge Nos. 1, 4, and 10 were speculative, imaginary, and unsupported by any incriminating material, with the Disciplinary Authority acting in breach of natural justice by dismissing him on hearsay and impermissible inferences.
On behalf of Periyar University, it was argued that the constitution of the One-man Commission headed by a retired Judicial Officer was legally permissible under Rule 17(g) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955. The University raised an objection that the writ petition was not maintainable as the appellant had failed to exhaust his statutory alternate remedy of appeal under Rule 19 of the Rules. Senior counsel for the University also contended that the writ court could not convert itself into an appellate court to review the correctness of departmental findings.
Analysis of the Court
The Supreme Court first addressed the procedural challenges to the inquiry, finding that the One-man Commission had conducted proceedings in accordance with statutory rules, examining 22 witnesses in the presence of the appellant and affording him ample opportunity to defend himself. The Court noted that technical procedural infractions do not vitiate proceedings unless actual prejudice is established, pointing out that a writ petition challenging the Commission’s constitution had already been dismissed as infructuous in 2017 without further challenge.
On the question of alternate statutory remedies, the Court observed that while the rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a sound principle of convenience, it does not bar the plenary powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly where extreme penalties are imposed without evidence:
“The award of punishment of dismissal or removal from service is the harshest measure of punishment and no less than death penalty for the Government servant. It has cascading effects and touches even the family of the employee. Such order of punishment entails forfeiture of all service-linked benefits accrued to the Government servant who is then rendered penniless. If such are the drastic consequences, the writ Court should not be a mute spectator. In appropriate cases, the writ Court is required to come out of the self-imposed bar and entertain the challenge laid to an order of punishment.”
Turning to the merits of the inquiry report, the Supreme Court held that the Inquiry Officer discharge a quasi-judicial function and must not assume the role of a prosecutor. Analyzing the specific findings, the Bench noted:
- On Charge No. 1, the Commission cited no evidence of influence, finding the charge proved solely because the appellant’s influence “could not be ruled out.”
- On Charge No. 4, the appellant was held to be the real owner of his mother’s house merely because he was a co-obligant paying EMIs on an HDFC loan and had not produced the title deed, wrongly reversing the burden of proof.
- On Charge No. 10, car loan repayments were held to be misconduct despite the absence of evidence demonstrating disproportionate assets.
The Court observed:
“What the inquiry report has unfolded is that the appellant has been pronounced guilty without evidence. What could be the worse kind of injustice to him than to hang him only on hearsay. There is a complete lack of essential evidence to record a finding of guilt against the appellant.”
Tracing the historical scope of certiorari through Constitution Bench precedents including Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, The Custodian of Evacuee v. Khan Saheb Abdul Shukoor, T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, and Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, the Court reiterated that while a writ court does not sit as a court of appeal to re-weigh evidence, a finding based on “no evidence” or impermissible conjecture amounts to an error of law apparent on the face of the record, fully amenable to writ jurisdiction.
Addressing the jurisdiction of the Division Bench under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, the Court acknowledged that while Letters Patent appeals permit examination of both facts and law—as held in Alapati Kasi Viswanatham v. A. Sivarama Krishnayya and Asha Devi v. Dukhi Sao—this appellate power carries inherent limitations. An appellate bench should not disturb a Single Judge’s exercise of discretion under Article 226 unless the findings are demonstrably erroneous or suffer from a glaring mistake.
The Supreme Court held:
“If the decision rendered by the writ Court in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution is in furtherance of justice, equity and good conscience and is not against public policy then the Letters Patent Bench constituted under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of Madras High Court or similar provisions of the Letters Patent of other High Courts cannot exercise its appellate jurisdiction under the Letters Patent to interfere with the writ Court’s decision. Simply put, the Letters Patent Bench can not interfere with the decision rendered by the writ Court which is otherwise just and reasonable.”
Decision
The Supreme Court concluded that the Division Bench had improperly re-appreciated the entire evidentiary record on mere conjectures and reversed a well-reasoned writ court decision without cogent grounds. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the Civil Appeal, set aside the Division Bench judgment dated August 29, 2019 in W.A. No. 2329 of 2018, and restored the writ court’s order in W.P. No. 23936 of 2013 quashing the appellant’s removal from service.
Case Title: R. Saravanan v. Periyar University Rep by its Registrar & Ors.
Case No.: Civil Appeal No. of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 4216 of 2020)
Bench: Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Shree Chandrashekhar
Date: October 16, 2026
