In a significant ruling addressing the State’s accountability towards advocates representing it, the High Court of Delhi, presided over by Justice Sachin Datta, held that the State cannot evade its liability to pay professional fees after accepting and benefiting from the services of a Senior Advocate before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court. Rejecting the State of Madhya Pradesh’s preliminary objection that a writ petition for advocate fees is not maintainable due to disputed questions of fact, the High Court partly allowed the petition filed by Senior Advocate and former Advocate General of Madhya Pradesh, Anoop George Chaudhari, directing the State to pay him ₹78,65,000 along with 9% interest per annum from the date of institution of the writ petition.
Background of the Case
In 2019, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India took up for final hearing a reference concerning the interpretation of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, in a batch of matters led by Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal & Ors. (IDA matter). Tagged with this batch was MP Housing Board v. Malwa IT Park Limited and Ors. (Housing Board matter), in which the State of Madhya Pradesh was arrayed as a respondent.
The petitioner, Anoop George Chaudhari, Senior Advocate and former Advocate General for the State of Madhya Pradesh, appeared before the Constitution Bench on behalf of the State. The record of proceedings before the Supreme Court reflected his appearance on fourteen dates of hearing between October and December 2019. On December 1, 2019, the petitioner submitted 35 consolidated fee bills amounting to ₹1,76,55,000 to the then Standing Counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh, Mr. Harsh Parashar, claiming ₹6,05,000 per appearance (including 10% clerkage) and ₹1,65,000 per conference across both matters.
On January 8, 2020, the Standing Counsel informed the petitioner in writing that the fee bills had been received and forwarded to the Principal Secretary (Law) and Principal Secretary (Revenue) for remittance “as raised.” However, no payment was released by the State Government. Consequently, in November 2021, the petitioner approached the Delhi High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking the release of his outstanding professional fees with penal interest.
Submissions of the Parties
Submissions by the Petitioner: Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the factum of his engagement and representation stood conclusively established by the official record of the Supreme Court, which recorded his appearance across fourteen dates under the block of the State’s Standing Counsel and Advocate-on-Record. Furthermore, the reported Constitution Bench judgment in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal & Ors., (2020) 8 SCC 129, specifically recorded his oral submissions on behalf of the State.
It was argued that the State never filed any modification or correction application before the Supreme Court to dispute his recorded appearance. The petitioner also highlighted that in a meeting convened on November 1, 2025 by the Advocate General, the then Chief Secretary of Madhya Pradesh, Mr. S.R. Mohanty, explicitly admitted that the petitioner was engaged on behalf of the State after another Senior Counsel was found unavailable, and stated that his bills should be processed at prevailing rates. The petitioner asserted that fee terms were communicated prior to the hearings, and the Standing Counsel’s unconditional forwarding letter constituted contemporaneous acceptance.
Submissions by the State of Madhya Pradesh: Appearing for the State of Madhya Pradesh, the learned Additional Solicitor General raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the writ petition, arguing that Article 226 cannot be invoked to enforce disputed monetary and contractual claims requiring evidence. Reliance was placed on rulings including Improvement Trust, Ropar v. S. Tejinder Singh Gujral, ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd., New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. A.K. Saxena, and the Supreme Court’s order in Vijay Kumar Shukla v. State of U.P.
On merits, the State contended that no formal appointment order or written instruction was issued by the Law and Legislative Affairs Department. It was argued that the petitioner appeared and argued effectively on only two dates, and that the fee schedule claimed was never sanctioned. The State also relied upon a state notification dated July 4, 2012, prescribing fee rates for Senior Panel Advocates at ₹5,000 per case per day, subject to a daily ceiling of ₹15,000.
Court’s Analysis and Observations
Justice Sachin Datta rejected the State’s challenge to the maintainability of the writ petition. Examining precedents such as ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd. and Popatrao Vyankatrao Patil v. State of Maharashtra, the Court noted that writ jurisdiction is not ousted merely because a party raises a factual dispute, especially when the core facts are established by official contemporaneous records.
The Court observed that the rule of self-restraint does not apply to manufactured disputes:
“The principle which emerges is not that the existence of a factual dispute ousts writ jurisdiction, but that the writ court will decline to embark upon an adjudication which genuinely requires trial. Where, however, the material facts stand established by contemporaneous official records and by the admissions of the respondent’s own functionaries, there is no factual controversy of the kind which requires evidence, and the rule of self-restraint is not attracted.”
Addressing the State’s reliance on Improvement Trust, Ropar, the Court held that the principle that there is no separate law for advocates operates both ways:
“That observation cuts both ways i.e., an advocate is neither entitled to a special dispensation, nor liable to be subjected to a special disability.”
The Court deprecated the State’s shifting, mutually destructive defences—initially blaming statutory bodies, then denying any record of appearance despite Supreme Court order sheets, and belatedly asserting an absence of formal authorization:
“The position which emerges is that the State accepted, and obtained the benefit of the petitioner’s professional services. It permitted his appearance to be given, through its own Advocate-on-Record and alongside its own Standing Counsel, on fourteen dates before the Constitution Bench; it permitted him to address the Bench; it took the benefit of the judgment which records his submissions; and it never sought correction of any of the fourteen order sheets or of the reported judgment.”
Citing the doctrine of approbate and reprobate enunciated in R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir and State of Punjab v. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu, the Court observed:
“The State is expected to be a model litigant. Its defence in these proceedings has instead exemplified bureaucratic passing of the buck, with each department and instrumentality disclaiming responsibility and pointing to another, while the admitted beneficiary of the petitioner’s services declines to pay. Such conduct deserves to be strongly deprecated.”
Relying on Ravi Prakash Mehrotra v. Delhi Development Authority, Pabitra Roychaudhuri v. Commissioner of VAT, State of U.P. v. Gopal K. Verma, and the Kerala High Court’s ruling in Mathew B. Kurian v. National Council for Teacher Education, the Court underlined that counsel should not be forced to sue their own clients for legitimate dues:
“The fee of counsel is at once a matter of honour and a matter of legal right. The existence of a legal remedy does not dilute the obligation of honour; it supplies the means by which, in the last resort, that obligation may be vindicated.”
“This Court is constrained to observe that the public authorities, such as the DDA, are not expected to act in a dishonourable and unscrupulous manner in their dealings with their own Advocates by seeking to evade payment of fees and emoluments. Such conduct, not only brings disrepute to the public authority concerned but also strikes at the very foundation of the rule of law, since the sanctity of the lawyer-client relationship constitutes the most fundamental aspect thereof.”
Decision and Quantum of Fees
On determining the quantum payable, the Court held that the rate of ₹6,05,000 per appearance was disclosed during the ongoing hearings, forwarded for remittance “as raised” without demur, and remained undisputed for years. Furthermore, the 2012 notification for panel advocates was inapplicable to a designated Senior Advocate specially engaged for a Constitution Bench.
However, the Court disallowed duplicate appearance bills raised separately for the tagged Housing Board matter heard concurrently before the same bench, and rejected the conference fee claims due to lack of authentic contemporaneous records.
Accounting for thirteen verified dates of appearance where bills were raised (excluding October 15, 2019, where appearance was not on record, and December 11, 2019, where no fee bill was raised), the Court calculated the total entitlement at ₹6,05,000 for 13 dates, totaling ₹78,65,000.
The High Court directed the State of Madhya Pradesh to pay the sum of ₹78,65,000 along with simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing of the writ petition until realization, within a period of six weeks.
Case Title: Anoop George Chaudhari v. State of Madhya Pradesh
Case No.: W.P.(C) 13196/2021, CM APPL. 72314/2025, CM APPL. 23670/2026, CM APPL. 23681/2026
Bench: Justice Sachin Datta
Date: 31.08.2026
