The Supreme Court of India has set aside the concurrent findings of a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) and the Calcutta High Court, ruling that motor accident claim proceedings must be decided on the touchstone of preponderance of probability rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt.
A division bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta observed that hyper-technical approaches and minor documentary discrepancies cannot be used to defeat substantive relief under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (the Act). Exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court bypassed the restrictive framework of the old Section 163A Second Schedule to award a “just compensation” of ₹14,90,000/- to the legal representatives of the deceased claimant, who suffered 100% permanent traumatic disability (paraplegia) in a 2004 accident.
Background of the Case
On May 21, 2004, at around 5:00 p.m., the original claimant, Raj Kumar Das, got down from a rickshaw near Mondalpara Bus Stop when he was allegedly knocked down by a lorry bearing registration number WB-41-3999. He lost consciousness, sustained serious injuries, and was subsequently diagnosed with traumatic paraplegia, which led to permanent disablement. Before the accident, he was employed as a labourer in a brick field.
On February 9, 2005, Das instituted a claim case (MACC No. 49/2005, later renumbered as MACC 163/2007) before the MACT under Section 163A of the Act, seeking compensation of ₹3,50,000/-.
On September 11, 2007, the Tribunal dismissed the claim petition, holding that the claimant had failed to prove the injuries were a result of the alleged accident. The claimant challenged this dismissal before the High Court at Calcutta (FMA No. 1056/2009).
On September 27, 2022, the High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Tribunal’s order, stating that the discrepancies in the record were glaring and the factum of the accident was not proved. During the pendency of the subsequent proceedings, the original claimant passed away and was substituted by his legal representatives.
The Court’s Analysis on Standard of Proof and Discrepancies
The Supreme Court observed that the lower courts had denied the claim by relying heavily on minor discrepancies in documentation to hold that the involvement of the offending vehicle remained unproved. Addressing the standard of proof, the Court stated:
“At the outset, we would like to reiterate that the nature of proceedings under the Act are summary in nature, with an aim to provide expeditious justice. It is a settled position of law that a claim petition is to be decided on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. Further in a claim under Section 163A, the enquiry is narrower still, for negligence is not required to be proved, and it is sufficient that the injury is reasonably connected with the motor vehicle in question.”
The Court added that discrepancies not going to the root of the matter cannot defeat a welfare claim. It cited its earlier decision in Mathew Alexander v. Mohammed Shafi & Anr. (2023), which noted that a “holistic view of the evidence has to be taken” and “strict proof of an accident caused by a particular vehicle in a particular manner need not be established by the claimants,” a position also affirmed in Dulcina Fernandes vs. Joaquim Xavier Cruz (2013).
The Supreme Court systematically evaluated and dismissed the discrepancies relied upon by the MACT and the High Court:
1. The MRI Report Entry (“Fall from Lorry”)
Both the Tribunal and the High Court relied on an entry in the claimant’s MRI report that recorded “fall from lorry” to deny the accident. However, the claimant consistently deposed that he was struck by the lorry after getting down from the rickshaw, which aligned with the FIR and the chargesheet.
On this issue, the Court observed:
“It is a regular practice that medical history recorded at the time of emergency treatment is ordinarily based on information supplied by attendants and its only function is to facilitate the diagnosis. Such a narration of facts cannot be treated as a precise reconstruction of the mechanics of the accident. The FIR, chargesheet and the original claimant’s own testimony indicate that he was hit by the lorry after he had got down from the rickshaw. The isolated wording in the history column cannot displace the cumulative evidentiary record.”
2. Delay in Lodging the FIR
The accident occurred on May 21, 2004, while the FIR was registered on August 8, 2004. The Court noted that in cases of grievous injury, securing medical treatment takes precedence over legal formalities.
Citing Ravi v. Badrinarayan (2011), the Court held that the delay could not be a ground to doubt the claim, especially since the claimant was continuously hospitalized and treated until September 17, 2004, and the subsequent police investigation culminated in a chargesheet attributing negligent driving to the lorry.
3. Discrepancy in the Vehicle Registration Number
While the claimant in his oral testimony recalled the vehicle registration number as WB-41-2999, the FIR, chargesheet, and claim petition uniformly recorded it as WB-41-3999. The Court ruled:
“An isolated error in the oral testimony, particularly where the original claimant is asked to recall events after having suffered serious injuries, cannot outweigh contemporaneous documentary consistency.”
4. Hospital Receipts and Treatment Narration
The High Court had noted that certain medical bills did not fully correspond with the sequence of treatment. The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, stating that minor inconsistencies in dates or individual receipts do not render the claim unreliable so long as the records consistently indicate treatment for traumatic paraplegia.
5. Absence of Independent Eyewitnesses
The Court rejected the lower courts’ objection that no independent eyewitnesses were examined. Citing Sunita and others v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and others (2020), the Court reiterated that the approach in accident claims is “not to find fault with non-examination of some ‘best’ eyewitness… but to analyse the evidence already on record to ascertain whether that is sufficient to answer the matters in issue on the touchstone of preponderance of probability.”
Just Compensation and the Invocation of Article 142
The Supreme Court pointed out that because the claimant suffered permanent paralysis and lost his earning capacity completely, denying the claim would “undermine the very protective purpose which the statute provides for.” It emphasized that victims are rarely in a position to give a coherent narrative or procure perfect documentation while undergoing intensive treatment.
Though the petition was filed under the “no-fault liability” framework of Section 163A, the Court observed that strict calculation under the Second Schedule as it stood at the relevant time would not adequately compensate a victim who suffered 100% permanent disability. Citing U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Trilok Chandra (1996) and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017), the Court highlighted the recognized defects in the old Schedule.
The Court noted:
“Therefore, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, we deem it appropriate to determine compensation by drawing guidance from the principles evolved by this Court in claims arising under Section 166 of the Act.”
The Court explicitly clarified that this course was adopted keeping in view the “peculiar facts of the present case and shall not be treated as a precedent.”
Compensation Calculation
Applying the assessment principles from Sarla Verma & Ors. v. DTC & Anr. (2009) and Pranay Sethi (2017), based on the claimant’s age (37 years) and monthly income (₹2,500/-), the Court structured the compensation as follows:
| Head | Calculation | Amount (in Rs.) |
| Income | 2,500 | |
| Future Prospects | 40% of 2,500 | 1,000 |
| Annual Income | 3,500 x 12 | 42,000 |
| Multiplier | 42,000 x 15 | 6,30,000 |
| Loss of Earning Capacity | 6,30,000 x 100% | 6,30,000 |
| Mental agony, pain and suffering | 2,00,000 | |
| Loss of amenities | 1,00,000 | |
| Attendant charges | 3,60,000 | |
| Transportation and Medical Expenses (including future) | 2,00,000 | |
| Total | 14,90,000 |
The appellants’ computation claiming ₹36,90,000/- was not adopted by the Court.
The Decision
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments of the MACT and the Calcutta High Court. The respondent-insurer (National Insurance Co. Ltd.) was directed to deposit the sum of ₹14,90,000/- (Rupees Fourteen Lakhs Ninety Thousand only) together with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim, within three months. Upon deposit, the amount is to be immediately released to the legal representatives of the original claimant.
Case Details
- Case Title: Raj Kumar Das (D) Thr. LRs. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.
- Case No.: Civil Appeal No. of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 3585 of 2023)
- Bench: Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta
- Date: May 25, 2026
