The Supreme Court has ruled that no cognisable offence was committed by BJP leaders Anurag Thakur and Parvesh Verma in their 2020 speeches related to the anti-CAA protests at Shaheen Bagh. While the bench disagreed with the lower court’s reasoning regarding the necessity of prior sanction for filing an FIR, it upheld the ultimate conclusion that the content of the speeches did not warrant criminal proceedings.
The legal battle originated from complaints filed by CPI(M) leaders Brinda Karat and K.M. Tiwari. They alleged that on January 27, 2020, Anurag Thakur, then a Union Minister, made a hate speech at a rally in Rithala. They further claimed that on January 28, 2020, Parvesh Verma, a minister in the Delhi government, delivered inflammatory remarks.
The petitioners had initially approached a trial court seeking a direction for the police to register an FIR. On August 26, 2020, the trial court dismissed the complaint, citing the lack of requisite sanction from competent authorities. This was later upheld by the Delhi High Court in June 2022, which prompted the appeal to the apex court.
In its 125-page verdict delivered on April 29, a bench comprising Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta conducted an independent assessment of the materials, including the speeches and a status report dated February 26, 2020.
The Court observed that the statements were not directed against any specific community and did not incite violence or public disorder.
“Upon a careful consideration of the material placed on record… we are in agreement with the conclusion that no cognisable offence is made out,” the bench stated.
While the court described hate speech as “fundamentally antithetical” to the constitutional value of fraternity, it rejected the notion that there is a “legislative vacuum” requiring judicial intervention. The bench noted that the existing legal framework is adequate and that the doctrine of separation of powers prevents the judiciary from creating new offences.
A significant portion of the judgment addressed the legal requirement of “prior sanction” under Sections 196 and 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). The High Court had declined the FIR registration partly because such sanction had not been obtained.
The Supreme Court explicitly “disapproved” of this specific reasoning. The bench clarified that the requirement of sanction is a condition precedent only for “taking cognisance” by a court, not for the registration of an FIR or the initiation of an investigation.
The bench remarked:
“To hold otherwise would amount to introducing a restriction not envisaged by the legislature… The requirement of sanction… cannot be permitted to operate as a shield to prevent the very initiation of the investigative process where a cognisable offence is disclosed.”
The court emphasized that failure by authorities to perform statutory duties at the threshold stage defeats legislative intent and leaves citizens vulnerable to institutional inaction. However, since the bench found that the speeches themselves did not disclose a cognisable offence, it saw no ground to interfere with the dismissal of the petition.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court dismissed the pleas, affirming that the speeches did not meet the threshold for criminal prosecution, despite correcting the legal interpretation regarding the timing of administrative sanctions in criminal investigations.
