The High Court at Calcutta has dismissed an intra-court appeal filed by a tenant, affirming a previous judgment and decree that ordered his eviction. The Division Bench, comprising Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Supratim Bhattacharya, ruled that the issuance of monthly rent bills does not create a new tenancy independent of an existing lease deed unless there is cogent evidence of a fresh agreement between the parties.
Background of the Case
The litigation originated from an agreement captioned as “Leave and Licence” executed on April 1, 2004, between Nand Lal Rathi (the appellant/tenant) and M/s. A. T. Gooyee Enterprises (the respondent/landlord). While the respondent pleaded the document was a simple licence, the appellant successfully argued before a Single Judge that it was in effect a lease deed. The Single Judge subsequently held the appellant to be a tenant but proceeded to decree the respondent’s eviction suit. The appellant challenged this decree, primarily arguing that the original 2004 agreement had been superseded by an independent monthly tenancy.
Arguments of the Parties
The appellant raised three primary contentions:
- Identity of the Lessor: He argued that the lease was executed with “M/s A.T. Goyee Enterprises,” whereas rent receipts were issued by “M/s. A. T. Gooyee Enterprises.” He contended these were separate entities, resulting in a lack of privity of contract.
- Novation of Contract: He argued that the 2004 deed was “given a go-by” because the rent paid (Rs. 46,000 per month) differed from the rate in the original deed. He claimed the issuance of monthly rent bills established an independent monthly tenancy.
- Absence of Registration: Since the lease deed was unregistered, the appellant maintained the tenancy was a monthly one under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
The respondent submitted that the spellings “Goyee” and “Gooyee” were used interchangeably to refer to the same entity. Furthermore, they argued that a quit notice issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, had validly terminated the tenancy, regardless of whether it was governed by the deed or seen as an independent monthly arrangement.
Court’s Analysis
The Court observed that the appellant’s admissions in his written statement were fatal to his claim of an independent tenancy. He had admitted to entering possession and paying a security deposit of Rs. 2,70,000 on April 1, 2004—actions that precisely followed the stipulations of the 2004 deed.
The Bench observed:
“Thus, it is an admitted position that the jural relationship of lessor/lessee between the parties commenced in terms of the deed dated April 1, 2004, which does not leave any scope for the appellant to resile from such position at this stage by claiming that an independent tenancy was created.”
On the issue of novation, the Court clarified that a change in rent or the issuance of monthly bills does not automatically dissolve an existing lease structure. The Bench held:
“Contrary to the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant, a lease already in existence by virtue of a lease deed is not automatically novated and/or no new tenancy is created month to month merely by issuance of monthly rent bills.”
The Court further noted that to establish novation, the appellant had to prove a “consensus ad idem” (meeting of the minds) between the parties to create a fresh relationship, which was absent from the record.
Regarding the spelling of the landlord’s name, the Court found the variation “insignificant,” noting that the appellant himself had relied on documents using both spellings without prior objection.
The Decision
The Division Bench found that even if the tenancy were considered a monthly one due to the lack of registration of the 2004 deed, it had been validly terminated. The quit notice dated February 25, 2009, gave the tenant until March 31, 2009, to vacate—a period the Court found to be in “consonance with Section 106 of the 1882 Act.”
The Court concluded:
“Thus, even if there was a monthly tenancy between the parties in the absence of registration of the lease deed, the same was validly terminated within the contemplation of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 by the respondent.”
The appeal (APDT/4/2026) was dismissed on contest without any order as to costs, and the judgment and decree dated August 25, 2025, were affirmed.
Case Details:
- Case Title: Nand Lal Rathi vs. M/s. A. T. Gooyee Enterprises
- Case Number: APDT/4/2026 (IA No. GA/1/2026)
- Bench: Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Supratim Bhattacharya
- Date: March 25, 2026
