The High Court of Delhi has set aside the conviction and sentence of a man for rape, holding that the prosecution failed to prove “beyond reasonable doubt” that the prosecutrix was below the statutory age of consent, which was 16 years at the time of the incident in 2005.
Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma, in a judgment delivered on October 27, 2025, acquitted the appellant, Udaipal, of charges under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The court found that the prosecution’s entire case regarding the victim’s age rested on a school certificate (Ex. PW-2/C) which “cannot be regarded as reliable proof of age,” especially as the original school admission register and the affidavit supporting the date of birth entry were never produced before the Trial Court.
The appeal (CRL.A. 155/2007) was filed by Udaipal challenging the judgment of conviction dated 22.05.2006 and the order on sentence dated 27.05.2006, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi, which had sentenced him to five years of rigorous imprisonment.
Background of the Case
According to the prosecution, the case originated from FIR No. 426/2005, registered at Police Station Mayur Vihar. The prosecutrix, a minor, went missing from her house on 11.11.2005. A missing report was lodged on 14.11.2005, and the FIR was registered on 29.11.2005.
During the investigation, the police apprehended the appellant Udaipal and recovered the prosecutrix from his jhuggi (hut) in Faridabad, Haryana.
In her statements to the Investigating Officer (I.O.) and the learned Magistrate, the prosecutrix stated that “she had gone with the appellant of her own” on 11.11.2005, had married him, and “thereafter lived with him as his wife.”
The prosecution obtained documentary proof of her age from school records, which reflected her date of birth as 15.04.1994, making her 11 years and 7 months old on the date of her disappearance.
The Trial Court framed charges under Sections 363 (kidnapping), 366 (kidnapping to compel marriage), and 376 (rape) of the IPC. The Trial Court ultimately acquitted the appellant of kidnapping, noting the prosecutrix “had voluntarily left the custody… and had gone with the appellant on her own.” However, since sexual intercourse was admitted and the Trial Court accepted the school record age, it convicted the appellant under Section 376 of IPC.
Arguments Before the High Court
The appellant’s counsel, Mr. Rajesh Kumar Passey, argued that the prosecutrix’s mausa (maternal uncle by marriage), Mahipal (PW-2), wanted to marry her to another person, but she was in love with the appellant.
The defence highlighted that the prosecutrix herself (examined as PW-1) deposed on oath that her date of birth was 05.04.1988 (making her over 17 at the time) and that the school record of 15.04.1994 was incorrect. She stated that PW-2 had “deliberately got her age recorded as lower than her actual age.”
The appellant argued that the school certificate (Ex. PW-2/C) was unreliable as it was based solely on an affidavit submitted by PW-2, who had no personal knowledge of her birth. Crucially, “neither the original school admission registers nor the said affidavit were produced or proved before the Trial Court.” The defence also pointed to the failure of the I.O. (PW-9) to conduct a bone ossification test or record the statement of the prosecutrix’s father regarding her age.
Mr. Naresh Kumar Chahar, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State, argued that the Trial Court’s judgment was well-reasoned. He contended that sexual relations were admitted and it was “duly proved” that the prosecutrix was 11 years and 7 months old, making her consent “legally irrelevant as per Section 375 of IPC.”
High Court’s Analysis and Findings
Dr. Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma noted that the “principal issue” before the Court was whether the prosecution proved the prosecutrix was below the age of consent. The Court emphasized a critical point: “the alleged offence was committed in the year 2005, when the age of consent under Section 375 of IPC was 16 years, and not 18 years as amended later in 2013.”
The Court observed that the prosecutrix had given inconsistent statements about her age: 14 years (during medical examination), 16 years (before the Magistrate), and 17-18 years (in her court testimony).
The judgment heavily criticized the prosecution’s reliance on the school records. The Headmistress (PW-5) admitted the school certificate (Ex. PW-2/C) was prepared on 14.11.2005 (after the girl went missing). PW-5 also admitted that the date of birth was recorded based on an affidavit by PW-2, not a municipal or birth certificate.
Furthermore, PW-5 failed to produce the original school register in court, despite seeking time to do so. The High Court noted PW-5’s admission that PW-2 “had got recorded date of birth of the prosecutrix by approximation.”
The Court found that the prosecution’s evidence did not meet the standards of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The judgment states: “what appears to have been overlooked is that neither the original school admission register nor its certified copy had ever been placed before the Court. The only document produced was a certificate Ex. PW-2/C… Such a certificate by itself does not meet the standard of proof required for admissibility under Section 35 of the Evidence Act…”
The High Court distinguished the precedents relied upon by the Trial Court (Harpal Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan), noting that in those cases, the “original school records had been duly exhibited in evidence, which is not the case here.”
Instead, the Court cited Manak Chand v. State of Haryana (2023), where the Supreme Court held that in cases of age contradictions and where school entries are not based on parental statements, the evidence cannot be relied upon, “especially in the absence of any ossification test.” The Court also noted the ruling in Satpal Singh v. State of Haryana (2010) that “where the primary school register itself had not been produced and proved, the age allegedly mentioned in the said document could not be accepted as conclusive.”
The judgment also highlighted significant investigative lapses. The I.O. (PW-9) admitted he “had not verified the original school records” and “had neither verified the age of the prosecutrix from her father nor recorded his statement.” This was despite the father being present during the medical examination (MLC) where the prosecutrix’s age was recorded as 14 years—inconsistent with the prosecution’s claim of 11 years.
No bone ossification test was conducted, even though the MLC noted the prosecutrix’s “secondary sexual characters… were well developed.” The Court, citing Manak Chand, observed that a bone ossification test “ought to have been conducted in order to reach some reliable conclusion as to the age of the prosecutrix.”
The Decision
Concluding the analysis, Dr. Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma stated: “From the overall analysis of the evidence, it is clear that the I.O. had not made proper inquiries regarding the age of the prosecutrix… Most importantly, neither the original school register nor the affidavit tendered by the PW-2… nor their certified copies had been produced before the Trial Court.”
The Court held: “Considering that the incident took place in 2005, when the statutory age of consent was 16 years, and in light of the absence of conclusive evidence to prove that the prosecutrix was below 16 years at that time, especially when the prosecutrix herself claims that she was above the said age, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to prove the age of prosecutrix beyond reasonable doubt.”
Allowing the appeal, the Court ruled, “this Court holds that the conviction of the appellant under Section 376 of IPC cannot be sustained as he deserves to be extended the benefit of doubt.” The impugned judgment and order on sentence were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted of all charges.
