In a significant ruling clarifying the scope of condonation of delay under rent control laws, the Delhi High Court, presided over by Justice Amit Sharma, has held that a tenant cannot seek the exclusion of time spent prosecuting an appeal against a review dismissal before a Rent Control Tribunal to condone delay in challenging the original eviction decree. Dismissing the tenant’s application for condonation of delay under Section 5 read with Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the Court clarified that an original eviction order and a subsequent order dismissing its review are separate and distinct. Consequently, prosecuting an appeal against a review dismissal does not constitute pursuing a proceeding “for the same relief” as assailing the original eviction decree.
Background of the Case
The dispute arose from an eviction petition initiated under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, by the late landlady, Smt. Sushila Devi Jain, through her special power of attorney holder and son, Devender Kumar Jain. Smt. Sushila Devi Jain claimed ownership of the demised premises—Shop bearing Private No. 2, Premises No. 12/3, Yusuf Sarai, Main Market, New Delhi—after the demise of her husband, Om Prakash Jain. The premises had been let out to the father of the tenant, Rajinder Kumar Gupta, who later became the occupant.
The eviction petition was grounded on the bonafide requirement to settle her 26-year-old grandson, Shubham Jain, a BBA and Chartered Accountant graduate, who required space to establish his own independent practice. On July 6, 2020, the Rent Controller, Sh. Sushant Changotra, allowed the eviction petition, holding that the landlady successfully proved all ingredients of the law.
Subsequently, on July 25, 2020, the tenant filed a review application under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) before the Rent Controller on the grounds of new evidence and developments. During the pendency of the review application, Smt. Sushila Devi Jain passed away on May 18, 2021, leading to the impleadment of her son, Devender Kumar Jain, as her legal representative. The Rent Controller, Ms. Neha Priya, eventually dismissed the review application on September 25, 2025.
Parallelly, execution proceedings were initiated in April 2021. Against the review dismissal order, the tenant preferred an appeal under Section 38 of the Delhi Rent Control Act before the Rent Control Tribunal on December 4, 2025. However, on the very first date of hearing, the Tribunal raised objections regarding the maintainability of the appeal. After multiple adjournments, the tenant withdrew this appeal on March 27, 2026, with liberty to seek appropriate legal remedies. The tenant then filed the revision petition under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act in the High Court on March 24, 2026, alongside an application seeking condonation of a 388-day delay in challenging the original eviction order of July 6, 2020.
Arguments of the Parties
Senior Advocate Uttam Datt, appearing for the petitioner-tenant, argued that there was no deliberate delay in challenging the eviction judgment of July 6, 2020. He submitted that in view of the Supreme Court’s ruling in In Re- Cognizance on Extension of Limitation, the period of limitation was extended due to COVID-19 restrictions, making the three-year limitation period under Article 137 of the Limitation Act start from March 1, 2022, and end on February 28, 2025.
He further argued that since the review application was filed within the limitation period and remained pending until its dismissal on September 25, 2025, the tenant had been diligently pursuing his remedies. The tenant also claimed that the time spent in the subsequent appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal was under a bona fide mistake of law based on legal advice, thereby entitling him to exclusion of this period under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The petitioner cited judgments such as Nira Garg v. Om Prakash Grover, Bata India Limited v. Smt. Sarla Sharma, Mohd. Arshad v. Syed Mohd Yahaya Nizami, and Supreme Court rulings in Karnataka State Electronics Developments Corporation Ltd and DSR Steel Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan to assert that the petition is maintainable and the delay should be condoned.
Conversely, Senior Advocate Rajesh Yadav, representing the respondent-landlord, contended that the tenant was abusing the judicial process by employing dilatory tactics. He submitted that the tenant had been enjoying the premises without paying market rent after the expiry of six months from the eviction decree, and had deliberately dragged out the review and execution proceedings by raising frivolous objections. He pointed out that the Rent Control Tribunal had explicitly put the tenant on notice regarding the non-maintainability of the appeal on the very first day, December 4, 2025. Despite this, the tenant persisted with the appeal and delayed its withdrawal until March 27, 2026. Relying on precedents like Rabinder Nath Samuel, Dawson v. Sivakasi and HT Media Limited v. Barinlink International, the respondent argued that the tenant was not entitled to any benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act due to a lack of good faith and diligence.
The Court’s Analysis
The Delhi High Court examined the limitation framework, noting that under the precedent of Jai Prakash v. Jean Conea, the limitation period to file a revision petition under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act is three years as per Article 137 of the Limitation Act.
Applying the Supreme Court’s extension of limitation orders during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court noted that the limitation period to challenge the July 6, 2020 judgment would commence on March 1, 2022, and expire on February 28, 2025. However, since the tenant had filed a review application that was pending until September 25, 2025, the Court observed that the period during which the review was pending could be excluded. Under the law established by the Supreme Court in DSR Steel Pvt. Ltd.:
“In such a contingency there is no question of any merger and anyone aggrieved by the decree or order of the Tribunal or court shall have to challenge within the time stipulated by law, the original decree and not the order dismissing the review petition. Time taken by a party in diligently pursing the remedy by way of review may in appropriate cases be excluded from consideration while condoning the delay in the filing of the appeal, but such exclusion or condonation would not imply that there is a merger of the original decree and the order dismissing the review petition.”
The Court explained that even after giving the tenant the benefit of the period during which the review was pending, the tenant was required to challenge the original eviction decree immediately after the dismissal of the review petition on September 25, 2025. However, the tenant failed to do so and instead filed an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal.
To avail of the benefit of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, which allows the exclusion of time spent before a wrong forum, the Court noted:
“To bring the case of the petitioner within Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the proceedings were prosecuted ‘for the same relief’ and in ‘good faith’.”
The Court held that the relief sought in the appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal (which challenged the review dismissal of September 25, 2025) was entirely distinct from the relief of setting aside the original eviction judgment of July 6, 2020. Emphasizing this distinction, the Court observed:
“The judgment dated 06.07.2020 and order dated 25.09.2025 are two distinct and separate orders. The reliefs sought in prayer ‘(b)’ of the instant petition is with respect to judgment dated 06.07.2020 and not order dated 25.09.2025…”
Further, relying on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Yeswant Deorao Deshmukh v. Walchand Ramchand Kothari, the Court pointed out that Section 14 benefit cannot be given where the relief sought in the two proceedings is of a different nature:
“Not only is the relief of a different nature in the two proceedings but the procedure is also widely divergent.”
The Court also highlighted that the tenant was explicitly put on notice regarding the non-maintainability of the appeal on the first date of hearing before the Tribunal, yet chose to prolong the proceedings before withdrawing it. Consequently, the Court found no justification for the tenant’s failure to challenge the eviction judgment of July 6, 2020, immediately after the review petition was dismissed.
The Decision
Based on its findings, the Delhi High Court dismissed the tenant’s application for condonation of delay (CM APPL. 21311/2026). As a result, the revision petition, to the extent that it challenged the original eviction judgment dated July 6, 2020 (prayer ‘b’), was held to be time-barred.
However, the Court directed that the revision petition with respect to the remaining prayers—specifically, prayer ‘c’ seeking to set aside the review dismissal order of September 25, 2025, and prayer ‘d’ seeking to set aside the execution order of March 14, 2026—be listed before the Roster Bench on August 24, 2026, for further hearing on its merits.
Case Details
Case Title: Rajinder Kumar Gupta v. Sushila Devi Jain (Since Deceased) Through Her LR Sh. Devender Kumar Jain .
Case No.: RC.REV. 101/2026 & CM APPL. 21311/2026
Bench: Justice Amit Sharma
Date: July 6, 2026
