In a significant ruling on the determination of juvenility, the Supreme Court of India has held that a school certificate, where the date of birth was recorded merely on the oral representation of a parent, cannot be considered conclusive proof of age. The Court gave precedence to public records like the Family Register and a medical board’s opinion.
Setting aside orders from the Allahabad High Court and a trial court that had declared an accused in a murder case a juvenile, a bench of Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah ruled that the accused was a major at the time of the offence and must be tried accordingly. The Court emphasized that in cases involving grave offences, a “casual or cavalier approach” in determining juvenility is impermissible.
Background of the Case
The case originates from a First Information Report (FIR) lodged on August 31, 2011, by the appellant, Suresh. He alleged that his paternal uncle, Lillu Singh, and his son, Devi Singh (Respondent No. 2), forcibly entered his house. When confronted by the appellant’s brother, Rajesh, the father-son duo allegedly took Rajesh inside their house, where Lillu Singh held him while Devi Singh shot him with a country-made pistol, leading to his death. Consequently, a case was registered under Sections 452 (House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint) and 302 (Punishment for murder) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
During the proceedings before the Additional Sessions Judge in Kairana, Muzaffarnagar, Devi Singh filed an application claiming he was a juvenile. He asserted his date of birth was April 18, 1995, which would make him 16 years, 4 months, and 13 days old on the date of the incident. On May 19, 2015, the Trial Court accepted his plea and declared him a juvenile under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. This decision was upheld by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad on March 29, 2016, prompting the appellant to approach the Supreme Court.
Arguments of the Parties
The appellant argued that the lower courts erred by relying on a transfer certificate from Kaushik Modern Public School, a private institution where the accused was directly admitted to Class V. It was submitted that the school had recorded his date of birth based solely on his father’s oral statement, without any documentary proof. The appellant presented contradictory evidence, including a Family Register maintained under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, which recorded the accused’s birth year as 1991, and a 2012 Voters’ List that stated his age as 22. Furthermore, a medical report from the Chief Medical Officer, dated December 1, 2012, estimated his age to be 22 years, making him over 20 at the time of the incident.
The State of Uttar Pradesh supported the appellant, contending that the school certificate should not be the basis for juvenility when contradicted by the Family Register, Voters’ List, and a medical report.
Conversely, counsel for Respondent No. 2, Devi Singh, argued that the Trial Court’s decision was correct and based on consistent dates of birth recorded in transfer certificates from four schools he had attended. He relied on Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, which prescribes a hierarchy of documents for age determination, prioritizing the certificate from the school first attended in the absence of a matriculation certificate. He also informed the Court that he had already been released by the Juvenile Justice Board after completing the maximum prescribed punishment of three years.
Court’s Analysis and Reasoning
The Supreme Court, in its judgment authored by Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah, found the approach of the lower courts to be “not proper.” The bench observed that while the Juvenile Justice Act and its Rules are paramount, courts have the discretion to consider other relevant materials to ensure “the cause of justice has to prevail.”
The Court scrutinized the evidence and noted that all school certificates were based on the one issued by Kaushik Modern Public School. The Headmaster of that school had deposed that the birth date was entered based only on an “oral representation by Respondent No.2’s father.” The Court held that this testimony “discredits the certificate.”
The judgment further analyzed the evidentiary value of the school record under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It concluded that since the school was a private institution, its records do not qualify as ‘public documents’ under Section 74, and its Headmaster could not be considered a ‘public servant’.
In contrast, the Court gave weight to the contradictory evidence: the Family Register, which it termed a “statutory document, being a public record and a public document”; the entry in the Voters’ List; and the Medical Board’s report.
The bench heavily relied on its previous decision in Om Prakash v State of Rajasthan (2012), quoting, “when an accused commits a grave and heinous offence and thereafter attempts to take statutory shelter under the guise of being a minor, a casual or cavalier approach while recording as to whether an accused is a juvenile or not cannot be permitted as the courts are enjoined upon to perform their duties with the object of protecting the confidence of common man in the institution entrusted with the administration of justice.”
The Court concluded, “the certificate issued by Kaushik Modern Public School, Khurgaon could not have been taken as conclusive proof of date of birth of Respondent No.2, discarding Form (A) under Rule 2 of the Rules under the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947; the entry in the Voters’ List for the Legislative Assembly of the year 2012, and; the Medical Report.”
The Decision
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the High Court and the Trial Court. It held that Respondent No. 2, Devi Singh, was a major on the date of the alleged offence and is liable to be tried as such. The Trial Court has been directed to expedite the proceedings and conclude the trial by the end of July 2026.
The Court also set aside the order for his release from the Juvenile Justice Board and directed him to appear before the Trial Court within three weeks to seek bail. If convicted, the Court directed that he shall be given the benefit of set-off for the three years of detention already served.
