The Supreme Court has held that a Magistrate cannot take cognizance of a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) if it is filed beyond the limitation period, unless the delay is first condoned. Setting aside a Karnataka High Court order, the Apex Court quashed a complaint where cognizance was taken before considering the application for condonation of delay.
The Supreme Court allowed an appeal filed by S. Nagesh against the order of the Karnataka High Court which had refused to quash criminal proceedings initiated by Shobha S. Aradhya. The core legal issue was whether a Magistrate could take cognizance of a complaint filed after the prescribed limitation period without first condoning the delay. The Supreme Court ruled that the satisfaction regarding sufficient cause for delay “must therefore precede the act of taking cognizance,” and quashed the complaint.
Background of the Case
The case originated from a financial transaction where the respondent, Shobha S. Aradhya, alleged that she had lent ₹5,40,000 to the appellant, S. Nagesh. A cheque dated July 10, 2013, issued by the appellant for repayment, was dishonoured on July 17, 2013, due to “insufficiency of funds.”
The respondent issued a legal notice on August 13, 2013. Subsequently, she filed a complaint on October 9, 2013, seeking punishment for the appellant under Section 138 of the NI Act.
The Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on October 9, 2013, the very day the complaint was filed. Later, on May 23, 2014, a successor Magistrate noted a delay of two days in filing the complaint but observed that his predecessor had already taken cognizance. The court granted liberty to the accused to contest the delay at the time of the trial.
It was only on October 30, 2018—five years later—that the Magistrate formally allowed an application for condonation of delay, accepting the complainant’s plea that she was suffering from viral fever.
The appellant challenged the proceedings before the Karnataka High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). The High Court rejected the petition on June 28, 2024, holding that the delay was bonafide and that taking cognizance prior to condonation was merely a “curable irregularity.”
Arguments of the Parties
Before the Supreme Court, the appellant contended that the Magistrate acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance on October 9, 2013, as the complaint was time-barred. He argued that the procedure adopted was “totally opposed to the scheme of the NI Act.” The appellant relied on the law laid down by a 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra and another (2014).
The respondent, in written submissions, admitted that the complaint was filed on October 9, 2013, and cognizance was taken the same day. However, it was argued that the subsequent order dated October 30, 2018, condoning the delay, validated the cognizance taken earlier.
Court’s Analysis
The Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice Alok Aradhe examined the proviso to Section 142(1)(b) of the NI Act, which empowers the Court to take cognizance of a complaint after the prescribed period if the complainant satisfies the Court that they had sufficient cause for the delay.
The Court observed that the language of the proviso is clear and unambiguous. The Bench stated:
“It is manifest from the clear and unambiguous language of the above proviso that the power conferred upon the Court to take cognisance of a belated complaint is subject to the complainant first satisfying the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making the complaint within time.”
The Court firmly held that the act of condoning delay must come before taking cognizance:
“The satisfaction in that regard, resulting in condonation of the delay, must therefore precede the act of taking cognizance. Ordinarily, a proceeding instituted with limitation-linked delay before a Court of law does not actually figure as a regular matter on its file until that delay is condoned.”
Drawing a parallel with civil law, the Court cited Order XLI Rules 3A and 5(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, noting that a similar position exists for belated civil appeals.
The Supreme Court criticized the High Court’s approach, stating:
“Therefore, the approach of the High Court in treating this crucial aspect as a mere interchangeable exercise, i.e., either to first condone the delay or to first take cognisance, is not in keeping with the mandate of the aforestated proviso.”
The Court also noted that the respondent was “herself responsible for this imbroglio as she had made a categorical statement in her complaint that it was filed within time, when it was not.”
Decision
The Supreme Court held that the Magistrate erred in taking cognizance of the complaint even before the delay of two days was condoned. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s order refusing to quash the proceedings.
The Bench ordered:
“The appeal is accordingly allowed. In consequence, the complaint in PCR No. 3144 of 2013, which was converted as CC No. 1439 of 2014 on the file of the learned I Additional I Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mysore, shall stand quashed.”
Case Details
Case Title: S. Nagesh v. Shobha S. Aradhya
Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. of 2026 (@SLP (Crl.) No. 18127 of 2024)
Coram: Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice Alok Aradhe
