In a significant ruling with wide-ranging implications for land dispute litigation, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that appeals against the orders of Special Tribunals under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, are not maintainable before the High Court. A division bench, comprising Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari and Justice Maheswara Rao Kuncheam, concluded that the statutory right of appeal perishes with the abolition of the designated appellate forum—the Special Court—and this jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the High Court through a government order or an administrative resolution. The Court clarified that the appropriate remedy for an aggrieved party is to approach the High Court under its writ jurisdiction.
Background of the Case
The judgment was delivered in a large batch of Land Grabbing Appeals (LGAs) that shared a common question of law regarding their maintainability. These appeals arose from orders passed by various Special Tribunals, which are District Judge-level courts constituted under the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (the Act).
Under Section 7A(3) of the Act, an appeal from a Special Tribunal’s decision lies before a “Special Court.” This Special Court was a distinct body constituted under Section 7 of the Act, typically chaired by a retired High Court Judge. However, the State Government, exercising its power under Section 7(4) of the Act, abolished the Special Court via G.O.Ms.No.420, dated September 2, 2016.
Crucially, the same government order directed that all pending appeals and new appeals (at the SR stage) be transferred to the High Court for disposal. Subsequently, the Administrative Committee of the then-common High Court for Andhra Pradesh and Telangana passed a resolution on October 20, 2016, directing the transfer of these appeals to the High Court. This led to two sets of appeals being filed: those transferred from the abolished Special Court and those filed directly in the High Court after its abolition. The central issue before the division bench was whether the High Court could legally hear these appeals.
Arguments of the Parties
The appellants’ counsel argued that Section 7A(3) of the Act provides a substantive right of appeal. They contended that since the designated appellate forum (the Special Court) was abolished, the High Court, being the superior court, should hear the appeals to ensure the statutory right is not defeated. They heavily relied on the government order and the High Court’s administrative resolution that explicitly provided for the transfer of these appeals to the High Court.
Opposing this, the learned Advocate General for the State and counsel for the respondents submitted that the High Court is not the appellate court specified in the Act of 1982. They argued that a government order cannot amend a statute or create a new appellate forum, which is purely a legislative function. Therefore, the transfer of appeals did not legally vest the High Court with the jurisdiction to hear them under the Act.
Court’s Analysis and Findings
The High Court meticulously analyzed the statutory framework and legal principles governing the right of appeal and jurisdiction. The bench framed the core issue as “the maintainability of the Land Grabbing Appeals before the High Court under the Act 1982.”
The Court began by reiterating established legal principles, stating, “The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right.” However, it distinguished this from the forum of appeal, noting that the “Right to Forum is not an accrued right.”
The judgment emphasized that Section 7A(3) of the Act is unequivocal in stating that an appeal from a Special Tribunal lies “to the Special Court.” The High Court is not defined as a Special Court under the Act. The Court then addressed the critical consequence of abolishing the appellate forum. It cited the Supreme Court’s decision in H. P. State Electricity Regulatory Commission v. H. P. SEB, which laid down the principle that “if the court to which an appeal lies is altogether abolished without any forum constituted in its place for the disposal of pending matters or for lodgment of the appeals, vested right perishes.”
Applying this principle, the bench found that the abolition of the Special Court via G.O.Ms.No.420 extinguished the statutory forum for appeal. While the State Government had the power under Section 7(4) to abolish the court, it did not have the legislative competence to create a new appellate forum by executive fiat. The Court held that the portion of the G.O. transferring appeals to the High Court was an overreach of executive power. The judgment stated, “The G.O.Ms.No.420, dated 02.09.2016… to the extent it provided for the High Court as the Appellate Court… is beyond the statutory powers conferred on the State Government and to that extent, the Government Order is in transgression of the executive powers of the State and in excess of the power conferred by the Act 1982.”
Similarly, the Court ruled that its own Administrative Committee’s resolution could not confer jurisdiction where none existed in the statute. It observed, “By the said resolution, the power could not be conferred on itself, contrary to the statutory provisions.” The Court underscored the doctrine of separation of powers, noting that creating an appellate forum is a legislative function that cannot be usurped by the executive or judiciary on the administrative side.
The Final Decision
Based on its analysis, the High Court concluded that the Land Grabbing Appeals were not maintainable. The bench summarized its findings as follows:
- The right of appeal under the Act was to the Special Court, not the High Court.
- The abolition of the Special Court, without a legislative amendment creating an alternative forum, caused the vested right of appeal under the Act to perish.
- The Government Order and the High Court’s administrative resolution could not supplant the statute to create a new appellate forum.
The Court therefore dismissed all the appeals as not maintainable. However, recognizing that the appellants had been pursuing their remedy in a forum created by a government order, the bench provided a window to prevent injustice. It granted the appellants a period of three months from the date of the judgment (August 28, 2025) to file writ petitions under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the orders of the Special Tribunals. Any interim orders that were in place in the appeals will continue for this three-month period. The Court made it clear that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the individual cases.
