The High Court of Andhra Pradesh has held that an order of preventive detention classifying a person as a “Goonda” is rendered invalid if it takes into consideration an irrelevant offence that does not fall under the statutory definition, ruling that a single vicious ground is sufficient to vitiate the entire detention. A Division Bench comprising Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari and Justice Alapati Giridhar allowed the writ petition, setting aside the preventive detention order as well as its subsequent confirmation, and directed the immediate release of the detenu.
Background of the Case
The petitioner, Regulla Ramana, approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the issuance of a writ for the release of the detenu, Regulla Karthik. The petition challenged the preventive detention order dated November 20, 2025, passed by the Collector & District Magistrate under Section 3(1) and Section 3(2) read with Section 2(g) of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot-leggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land-Grabbers Act, 1986 (Act, 1986), along with the subsequent confirmation order dated January 19, 2026.
The detaining authority had clamped the preventive detention order on the detenu based on six grounds corresponding to six criminal cases registered against him.
Arguments of the Parties
Appearing for the petitioner, learned counsel Sri Kadiyam Neelakanteswara Rao submitted that out of the six grounds relied upon by the detaining authority, the crime mentioned under ground No. 3 did not fall under Chapters XVI, XVII, or XXII of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Consequently, with respect to ground No. 3, the detenu could not be classified as a “Goonda” under Section 2(g) of the Act, 1986.
The petitioner’s counsel argued that even though the offences under ground Nos. 1, 2, and 4 to 6 fell under the provisions of the Act, 1986, the inclusion and consideration of ground No. 3 vitiated the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority by taking into account irrelevant material. To substantiate his contentions, counsel placed reliance on the decision in M. Hemalatha v. the State of Andhra Pradesh (W.P. No. 21828 of 2025).
On the other hand, learned Assistant Government Pleader Sri Akula Venkata Sai Jagadeesh, representing the respondents, contended that the detention order could be sustained on the remaining grounds—namely ground Nos. 1, 2, and 4 to 6. He, however, could not dispute that the criminal case detailed in ground No. 3 did not fall within Chapters XVI, XVII, or XXII of the IPC.
Court’s Analysis and Key Observations
Upon examining the statutory provisions and the record, the Bench referred to Section 2(g) of the Act, 1986, which defines a “goonda” as:
“2(g) ‘goonda’ means a person, who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter or Chapters XVI, XVII or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code.”
The Court observed that the offence cited under ground No. 3 pertained to the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act. As this offence does not fall under Chapters XVI, XVII, or XXII of the IPC, the Bench noted that the detenu could not be categorized as a “goonda” for the purpose of Section 3 read with Section 2(g) of the Act, 1986 based on ground No. 3.
The Bench reiterated the legal position established in M. Hemalatha v. the State of Andhra Pradesh, where a coordinate bench had held that when a person is detained as a “Goonda,” taking into account an offence under the A.P. Excise Act amounted to relying on irrelevant material, thereby invalidating the order. The Bench reproduced key extracts from that ruling, which observed:
“7. Admittedly, the detaining authority has passed the order of preventive detention which is impugned in this writ petition while considering the detenu as a ‘Goonda’. Goonda is defined under Section 2(g) of the Act. It is only when a person is found to have committed repeatedly the offences punishable under the Chapters of the Indian Penal Code mentioned in the Section be termed as ‘Goonda’. If a person is found to have committed the offences punishable under the A.P.Excise Act, he will not come within the definition of ‘Goonda’ as defined under Section 2(g) of the Act. If a person is found to have committed the offences punishable under the A.P.Excise Act, he is considered to be a ‘Bootlegger’ under the Act. Law is well settled that while passing an order of preventive detention considering a person as a ‘Goonda’ relating to commission of the offences punishable under Indian Penal Code if the offence committed by him under the A.P.Excise Act which relating to bootlegging activity is also taken into consideration, then it amounts to taking irrelevant material also into consideration for passing an order of preventive detention and it makes the order of preventive detention invalid and the impugned order will be vitiated on that ground and the same is liable to be set aside.”
The reproduced decision also cited S. Prasad Reddy v. Collector and District Magistrate, Anantapur {2005(3) ALT 487}, Thallapuneni Venkateswarlu v. Collector and District Magistrate, Cuddapah {2004 (5) ALT 250}, and the Supreme Court ruling in Khaja Bilala Ahmed v. State of Telangana and others {(2020) 13 SCC 632}, which affirmed that subjective satisfaction cannot rest on invalid or irrelevant grounds.
Applying these precedents, Justice Tilhari recorded:
“The law is well settled that if the order of preventive detention has been passed under the Act, 1986 taking a person as ‘Goonda’ while considering some other offence(s) committed by that person, for which he does not fall under the provisions Section 2(g) of the Act, 1986, so as to be called ‘goonda’, the order of preventive detention would be invalid.”
The Bench rejected the submission of the Assistant Government Pleader that the order could survive on the remaining valid grounds. Citing the Supreme Court ruling in Shiv Parsad Bhatnagar vs. State of M.P and another (1981) 2 SCC 456, the Court highlighted that:
“the single vicious ground is sufficient to vitiate an order of detention.”
The Court distinguished the statutory framework of the Act, 1986 from statutes like the PITNDPS Act, remarking:
“Under the Act, 1986, there is no provision like Section 6 of the PITNDPS Act, which specifically provides that the order of preventive detention passed under PITNDPS Act if passed on two or more grounds shall be valid even if it cannot stand on same grounds. The same shall not apply to the present case. A single vicious ground is sufficient to set aside the preventive detention order under the Act, 1986.”
Decision
Holding that the detention order suffered from the consideration of irrelevant material, the High Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the detention order dated November 20, 2025, along with the confirmation order dated January 19, 2026. The Court directed that the detenu be set at liberty immediately, provided he is not required to be detained in connection with any other pending case. No order was made as to costs.
Case Title: Regulla Ramana v. The State of Andhra Pradesh and 3 others
Case No.: Writ Petition No. 10656 of 2026
Bench: Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari and Justice Alapati Giridhar
Date: 09.09.2026
