The High Court of Andhra Pradesh, in a judgment pronounced on October 8, 2025, has held that a General Power of Attorney (GPA)-cum-Sale Agreement does not create any right, title, or interest in an immovable property that would allow a person to resist the execution of a decree for specific performance obtained by a party holding a prior, valid agreement of sale over the same property.
A division bench comprising Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari and Justice Maheswara Rao Kuncheam dismissed a first appeal filed by claim petitioners who were obstructing the delivery of possession to a decree-holder. The Court affirmed the order of the VIII Additional District Judge, Prakasam at Ongole, which had rejected the petitioners’ claim under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).
Background of the Case
The legal dispute originated from a suit for specific performance (O.S.No.16 of 2016) filed by the 1st respondent, Kampa Bhaskara Rao (the original plaintiff), against the 2nd respondent (the original defendant). The suit was based on an agreement of sale dated July 1, 2006. The suit was decreed ex-parte on April 12, 2017, and the decree attained finality.

Following the decree, the plaintiff deposited the balance sale consideration as directed. When the defendant failed to execute the sale deed, the plaintiff filed an execution petition (E.P.No.59 of 2017), and the trial court executed a registered sale deed in his favour on February 21, 2018.
Subsequently, the plaintiff filed another execution petition (E.P.No.111 of 2019) seeking delivery of possession of the property. At this stage, the appellants (Konkanala Suryaprakasha Rao and another) filed a claim petition (E.A.No.42 of 2019) under Order 21 Rule 97 of the CPC, resisting the delivery of possession.
The appellants claimed that the original defendant had alienated the property to them on January 17, 2007, through a registered GPA-cum-Sale Agreement for a consideration of Rs. 15,00,000, which they had paid in full. They asserted that they were put in possession of the property and had been running a Bar and Restaurant on the premises. They alleged that the plaintiff’s sale agreement of 2006 was ante-dated and that the decree was collusive.
The trial court, after examining the evidence, dismissed the appellants’ claim petition on August 5, 2024, leading to the present appeal before the High Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Sri P. Rajasekhar, counsel for the appellants, argued that the GPA-cum-Sale Agreement dated January 17, 2007, validly transferred title to them. He contended that the Supreme Court’s judgment in Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited v. State of Haryana (2012), which held that GPA sales do not convey title, was prospective and did not apply to their transaction, which was executed before the judgment was delivered.
Opposing the appeal, Sri K. V. Vijay Kumar, counsel for the decree-holders, submitted that their agreement of sale (July 1, 2006) was prior in time to the appellants’ GPA. He argued that a GPA does not transfer title and that since a valid decree for specific performance had been passed and a sale deed executed by the court, they were entitled to possession.
Court’s Analysis and Findings
The High Court framed the primary issue as whether the appellants were entitled to an adjudication of their right, title, and interest in the property so as to resist the execution of the decree.
The bench first established that the plaintiff’s agreement of sale, dated July 1, 2006, was prior in time to the appellants’ GPA of January 17, 2007. The court noted there was nothing on record to prove the appellants’ allegation that the plaintiff’s agreement was ante-dated.
The court then extensively analyzed the legal position on GPA transactions, referring to the Supreme Court’s judgment in Suraj Lamp. Justice Tilhari, writing for the bench, reiterated the principle laid down in Suraj Lamp: “a transfer of immovable property by way of sale can only be by a deed of conveyance (sale deed). In the absence of a deed of conveyance (duly stamped and registered as required by law), no right, title or interest in an immovable property can be transferred.”
The court further noted, “A power of attorney is not an instrument of transfer in regard to any right, title or interest in an immovable property.”
Addressing the appellants’ argument that the Suraj Lamp judgment was prospective, the High Court clarified that the Supreme Court had merely “reiterated the well-settled legal position that SA/GPA/will transactions are not ‘transfers’ or ‘sales’ and that such transactions cannot be treated as completed transfers or conveyances.” The court held that the judgment did not lay down a new proposition of law to be applied only prospectively. While the Suraj Lamp judgment saved certain transactions from disturbance (such as those already acted upon by municipal authorities for mutation), it did not validate a GPA as a document of title, especially against a prior agreement that had culminated in a court-decreed sale.
The court observed that even if the appellants’ GPA were treated as an agreement of sale, it is settled law under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, that an agreement of sale “does not of itself create any interest in or charge on such property.”
Decision of the Court
The High Court concluded that the appellants held no legal right to obstruct the delivery of possession to the decree-holder. The court summed up its conclusion on the matter as follows:
“On Point-A, we hold that the Special General Power of Attorney dated 17.01.2007 in favour of the 1st appellant does not confer or create any right, title and interest in favour of the 1st appellant, nor based thereon the lease in favour of the 2nd appellant by the 1st appellant confers any right to the 2nd appellant, so as to object to the execution of the decree in favour of the 1st respondent/decree holder for delivery of possession of the E.P.schedule property or to resist/obstruct delivery of possession.”
Finding no reason to interfere with the lower court’s order, the High Court dismissed the appeal, confirming the decree-holder’s right to take possession of the property. No order was made as to costs.