In a ruling under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, a division bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, comprising Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, held that a conclusive DNA report cannot be discarded merely on a general plea of a break in the chain of custody unless there is specific evidence demonstrating that the biological samples were tampered with, substituted, or contaminated. Dismissing a criminal appeal filed by a convict, the court affirmed his conviction and 20-year rigorous imprisonment sentence for penetrative sexual assault on his minor sister-in-law.
Background of the Case
The case initiated following a written complaint lodged on March 28, 2020, at Police Station Dondi by the victim’s father. The prosecution alleged that approximately five to six months prior, the appellant—the son-in-law of the complainant—induced his 14-year-old sister-in-law, a Class IX student, and forcibly established sexual intercourse with her, resulting in her pregnancy.
Upon completion of the investigation, Police Station Dondi filed a charge-sheet. The Additional District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track Special Court (FTSC) and Special Judge under the POCSO Act, Balod, convicted the appellant on December 12, 2023, under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. He was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 20 years and a fine of Rs. 2,000, with an additional one-year rigorous imprisonment in default of fine. The appellant challenged this conviction before the High Court under Section 415(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).
Arguments of the Parties
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the conviction was unsustainable because it rested primarily on the victim’s testimony, which was full of material inconsistencies. During cross-examination, the victim stated that she gave birth to a male child on June 23, 2020, named a third party from Punjab as the father, admitted to physical relations with him, and accepted the defense suggestion that the appellant had never committed any sexual act with her.
Regarding the victim’s age, counsel argued that her date of birth (May 23, 2005) recorded in the school Admission and Discharge Register was not proved according to law, as the Head Master (PW-5) was neither the author of the entry nor aware of its source. Moreover, the victim and her parents stated in oral evidence that her date of birth was May 23, 2000. Assailing the DNA Report (Ex. P/32), the appellant contended that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody for the biological samples, relying on the Supreme Court judgment in Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamil Nadu (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1439).
Opposing the appeal, the Deputy Government Advocate appearing for the State argued that the prosecution established the victim’s minority through the school Admission and Discharge Register. He contended that the testimony of the victim was duly corroborated by medical evidence, FSL reports, and the DNA Report (Ex. P/32), which conclusively established the biological paternity of the child born to the victim, and minor inconsistencies could not erode the core prosecution case.
Court’s Analysis and Legal Findings
On Age Determination
Examining the victim’s age, the High Court noted that while oral testimony regarding her date of birth contained discrepancies, documentary evidence carries greater evidentiary value. The court referred to the guiding principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 263, which governs age determination of a minor victim under Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007.
Under Jarnail Singh, school records take precedence over inconsistent oral testimony. The court observed that the school Admission and Discharge Register (Article A-C) produced by PW-5 recorded the victim’s date of birth as May 23, 2005. Furthermore, the victim’s father (PW-2) admitted in cross-examination that he had never applied to any competent authority for correction of her date of birth recorded in school records. Consequently, the High Court held that the victim was below 18 years of age on the date of the incident and was a “child” under Section 2(1)(d) of the POCSO Act.
On DNA Evidence and Chain of Custody
Addressing the scientific evidence, the court examined the DNA Report (Ex. P/32), which established that the maternal genetic markers of the newborn matched the victim and the paternal genetic markers matched the appellant. The Investigating Officer (PW-8) proved that blood samples were collected during investigation and forwarded through official channels to the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur.
Rejecting the defense’s challenge to the handling of samples, the bench observed: “Mere absence of a specific challenge regarding the manner of handling the samples, without any material indicating prejudice or tampering, would not be sufficient to discard an otherwise reliable scientific report.”
Distinguishing Kattavellai @ Devakar, the court noted that no material was brought on record to indicate tampering, substitution, or contamination of the biological samples. Reaffirming the reliability of DNA evidence, the bench relied on the Supreme Court ruling in Mukesh and Another v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Others (2017) 6 SCC 1, highlighting: “From the aforesaid authorities, it is quite clear that DNA report deserves to be accepted unless it is absolutely dented and for non-acceptance of the same, it is to be established that there had been no quality control or quality assurance. If the sampling is proper and if there is no evidence as to tampering of samples, the DNA test report is to be accepted.”
The High Court ruled that scientific proof of paternity shifts the evidentiary burden onto the accused: “Once it stands scientifically established that the appellant is the biological father of the child born to the victim, the burden shifts upon him to furnish a plausible explanation regarding the circumstances under which the victim conceived the child.” The court noted that the appellant offered no explanation other than a bald denial during his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
On Evaluation of Victim’s Evidence
Addressing discrepancies in the victim’s testimony, the High Court reviewed established jurisprudence on sex offense trials. The court cited the Supreme Court judgment in Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan (AIR 1952 SC 54), quoting Justice Vivian Bose: “The rule, which according to the cases has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the judge….”
The bench further referenced State of Punjab v. Gurmeet Singh (1996) 2 SCC 384, emphasizing that courts must handle sexual offense cases with sensitivity and avoid getting swayed by minor contradictions. The court also cited Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam (AIR 1998 SC 635), which held that a victim’s testimony stands almost on par with an injured witness, and Rai Sandeep @ Deenu v. State of NCT of Delhi (2012) 8 SCC 21 regarding the criteria for a “sterling witness”.
The High Court concluded that although oral inconsistencies existed regarding the identity of the biological father during cross-examination, the medical evidence and scientific DNA report provided independent, unassailable corroboration. Since the victim was a minor, her consent, if any, was legally immaterial.
Decision of the Court
Finding no perversity or material irregularity in the decision of the trial court, the High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction under Section 6 of the POCSO Act along with the sentence. The court directed that the appellant remain in jail to undergo the remaining part of his sentence, and disposed of his application for suspension of sentence (I.A. No. 2 of 2024) as infructuous.
Case Title: Suraj Dhamagaya vs. State of Chhattisgarh
Case No.: CRA No. 1796 of 2024
Bench: Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal
Date: July 30, 2026
