The Supreme Court of India, in a significant judgment on September 12, 2025, dismissed the anticipatory bail applications of two retired Maharashtra revenue officials accused of facilitating a fraudulent land transfer using forged documents. While upholding the Bombay High Court’s decision to deny pre-arrest bail, a bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan expressed grave concern over judicial delays and issued a series of binding directions to all High Courts to ensure bail and anticipatory bail applications are decided expeditiously, preferably within two months.
The case involves allegations of cheating, forgery, and criminal conspiracy under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, related to a property transaction that occurred in 1996.
Background of the Case
The matter originated from an F.I.R. (No. 30/2019) registered on January 26, 2019, at Arnala Sagari Police Station, Palghar, based on a complaint by Mr. Vikas Narsingh Vartak. The complainant alleged that a parcel of land in Village Agashi, jointly owned by his deceased father, his uncles (the Vartaks), and the Shah family, was illegally sold.
According to the complaint, Powers of Attorney were purportedly executed on May 13, 1996, in the names of Narsingh Govind Vartak (who died in 1978) and his brothers, as well as the Shahs, who had also passed away between 1969 and 1990. On the strength of these fraudulent documents, a sale deed was executed on May 18, 1996, in favour of Mr. Mahesh Yashwant Bhoir (Accused No. 1) for a sum of Rs. 8 lakhs.
The appellants in the Supreme Court, Mr. Anna Waman Bhalerao and another, were serving as Circle Officer and Talathi, respectively, in the Revenue Department at the time. They were arraigned as Accused Nos. 5 and 6 for allegedly certifying the mutation entries (Nos. 15177 and 15180) based on the forged sale deed, thereby facilitating the illegal property transfer. These mutation entries were, however, cancelled by an order of the Sub-Divisional Officer on September 30, 1998, following a revision application.
After their applications for anticipatory bail were rejected by the Additional Sessions Judge, Vasai, and subsequently by the Bombay High Court in a common judgment dated July 4, 2025, the appellants approached the Supreme Court.
Arguments of the Parties
The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants argued that they were public servants who had since retired and were not named in the original FIR. It was contended that they acted purely in their official capacity, certifying mutation entries based on a registered sale deed that was, on its face, valid. They asserted having no role in the creation of the forged documents, no knowledge of the forgery, and no receipt of personal gain.
The appellants’ counsel submitted that the essential ingredients of cheating and forgery were absent, as there was no fraudulent intent. At most, their actions could be described as a “procedural lapse.” They heavily emphasised the “extraordinary delay of over 20 years” in lodging the FIR, arguing it gravely prejudiced their right to a fair investigation. Further, they contended that since the entire case rests on documentary evidence, custodial interrogation was unnecessary.
The State, as noted in the judgment, had argued before the High Court that the appellants ignored their statutory obligations under Section 15(2) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, facilitating the fraudulent transaction. The prosecution also alleged that despite enjoying interim protection since 2019, the appellants failed to cooperate with the investigation.
Court’s Analysis and Rejection of Bail
The Supreme Court, after hearing the submissions, found no reason to interfere with the High Court’s judgment. The bench observed that the sale deed was “prima facie vitiated,” having been executed on the strength of documents purportedly from deceased persons.
The Court held that the appellants’ alleged conduct could not be “brushed aside as a mere procedural lapse.” While acknowledging that the question of criminal intent is a matter for trial, the bench stressed the need to balance individual liberty with the legitimate requirements of investigation.
Addressing the significant delay in filing the FIR, the Court made a crucial observation: “Although there has been a long delay in the initiation of proceedings, the gravity of the allegations, the alleged abuse of official position, and the prima facie findings of the High Court that custodial interrogation is necessary, cannot be diluted merely on the ground of delay.”
The judgment further noted that even in cases based on documentary evidence, “custodial interrogation may be essential to trace the chain of transactions, ascertain complicity, and prevent further suppression or tampering of records.” The Court also took into account the allegation that the appellants had not extended due cooperation to the investigation despite enjoying interim protection for nearly six years.
While dismissing the appeals, the Court clarified that the appellants are at liberty to apply for regular bail, which should be considered on its own merits without being influenced by the observations in the present judgment.
Directions on Expeditious Disposal of Bail Matters
A significant portion of the judgment was dedicated to the “inordinate delay” in the disposal of the appellants’ anticipatory bail applications, which remained pending before the High Court for several years. The Court stated, “applications affecting personal liberty – particularly bail and anticipatory bail – ought not to be kept pending indefinitely.” It described the practice of deferring decisions as allowing a “sword of Damocles to hang over the applicant’s head.”
Citing a series of its own precedents, including Satendra Kumar Antil Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, the Court underscored that protracted pendency of bail matters amounts to a denial of justice and is contrary to the constitutional ethos of Articles 14 and 21.
To remedy this, the Supreme Court issued the following directions for compliance by all High Courts:
a) High Courts shall ensure that applications for bail and anticipatory bail are disposed of expeditiously, preferably within two months from the filing date.
b) High Courts must issue necessary administrative directions to subordinate courts to prioritise matters involving personal liberty.
c) Investigating agencies are expected to conclude investigations in long-pending cases with promptitude.
d) High Courts must devise mechanisms to avoid the accumulation of pending bail applications, as “such pendency directly impinges upon the fundamental right to liberty.”
The Court directed its Registrar (Judicial) to circulate the judgment to all High Courts for immediate compliance and administrative action.
