The High Court of Delhi, in a judgment pronounced on November 12, 2025, set aside the conviction of a man under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), acquitting him of rape charges. Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri, hearing the appeal (CRL.A. 637/2016), found that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutrix’s consent for the physical relationship was “vitiated by misconception of fact” based on a false promise of marriage.
The appellant had challenged a Sessions Court judgment dated May 4, 2016, which convicted him, and an order on sentence dated May 14, 2016, which sentenced him to seven years of rigorous imprisonment.
Background of the Case and Trial Court Findings
The case stems from FIR No. 214/2012, registered at P.S. Sunlight Colony. The prosecution’s case, as recorded by the Trial Court, was based on a complaint filed by the prosecutrix on June 4, 2012.
According to the complaint, the prosecutrix knew the appellant as he had been a tenant in her house since November 2011. He allegedly proposed marriage, which she accepted. The complaint stated that on February 9, 2012, the appellant took her to a guest house in Sarai Kale Khan and “committed sexual intercourse with her against her wishes,” assuring her he would marry her. This was allegedly repeated 4-5 times at the guest house and in his Maruti van. When she later asked him to marry her, he refused.
The Sessions Court framed charges under Sections 376/420 IPC. The appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The prosecution examined 10 witnesses.
Case at Trial and Testimonies
The prosecution’s case relied on the testimonies of the prosecutrix, her maternal uncle, and her mother.
- The Prosecutrix: Deposed that the appellant proposed marriage in January 2012. She stated that on February 9, 2012, he picked her up from the Preet Vihar Metro Station and took her to Honey Guest House, where he “committed sexual intercourse with her despite her resistance,” repeating his promise to marry. She alleged he continued this on the same assurance multiple times until May 2012, when he refused marriage, citing a lack of money.
- The Maternal Uncle: Testified that the prosecutrix’s mother informed him on May 22, 2012, that the appellant was refusing to marry her daughter after establishing physical relations. He claimed he spoke to the appellant, who cited lack of money. He offered financial help and sent Rs. 10,000, but the appellant still refused. In his cross-examination, however, the uncle “denied the suggestion that the appellant had admitted any physical relationship in his presence.”
- The Mother: Deposed that when she confronted the appellant, he replied that he had “only used her daughter and was no longer concerned with her.”
- Medical and Forensic Evidence: The medical examination (MLC) of the prosecutrix noted her hymen was torn, but found “no external or internal injuries… that would suggest the use of force.” The FSL reports found “no semen” on the vaginal smear of the prosecutrix or the penile swab and underwear of the appellant. The Court noted this evidence “remains inconclusive and does not lend support to the allegation of forcible sexual intercourse.”
Appellant’s Defence
In his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the appellant denied all incriminating evidence. He asserted he “never had physical relations with the prosecutrix nor made any promise to marry her.” He claimed the prosecutrix’s mother wanted him to marry her daughter, and when he refused, he was “falsely implicated.” He stated he occasionally gave the prosecutrix a lift from her dance classes, and that it was she who repeatedly proposed marriage, but he “asked her to speak to his parents.”
High Court’s Analysis and Reasoning
The High Court, upon careful appraisal of the record, highlighted several factors that created “substantial doubt” about the prosecution’s case.
The Court noted the “lapse of time between the alleged first act on 09.02.2012 and the eventual complaint in June 2012.” It also observed that the prosecutrix’s own testimony “establishes that the parties maintained a close and voluntary association for several months during which sexual intercourse took place multiple times.”
Justice Ohri identified a “material aspect” of inconsistency in the testimony of the maternal uncle regarding the appellant’s alleged admission.
The judgment laid down the clear legal distinction between a “false promise” and a “breach of promise.” The Court stated, “A sexual relationship maintained over a period of time between two adults ordinarily raises a presumption of valid and conscious consent. However, if it is shown that, at the very time of making a promise of marriage, the promisor never intended to honour it and made such promise solely to induce the woman into sexual relations, the consent so obtained would stand vitiated by misconception of fact.”
The Court emphasized, “A subsequent refusal or failure to marry, by itself, would not render the original promise false. To establish that the promise was false from the inception, the prosecution must prove that the intention to deceive existed at the very outset.”
Citing the Supreme Court in Deepak Gulati Vs. State of Haryana, the High Court reiterated the “distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise.”
The Court also referred to a recent Supreme Court judgment, Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhi (2025), which observed, “what began as a consensual relationship between the parties cannot later be coloured as non-consensual merely because it did not culminate in marriage.”
Applying these principles, the High Court found that the “unexplained delay in approaching the authorities,” the “continued association with the appellant for several months,” and the “absence of any corroborative medical or forensic evidence cumulatively create doubt about the prosecution version.”
The Decision
Concluding its analysis, the High Court held, “Having regard to the totality of the material on record, this Court is not persuaded to hold that the prosecution has proved that the physical relationship, if any, was without her consent or that her consent stood vitiated.”
“Accordingly, the impugned judgment of conviction is set aside, and the appellant is acquitted,” the Court ordered. The appellant’s personal bond was cancelled and his surety discharged.
