The Supreme Court of India, in a significant ruling on criminal jurisprudence, has acquitted a man convicted for murder, holding that a First Information Report (FIR) of a confessional nature lodged by the accused himself is inadmissible in evidence and cannot be used to secure a conviction. The Court ruled that relying on such a confession to corroborate medical evidence is a fundamental legal error.
A bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan set aside a judgment of the Chhattisgarh High Court, which had convicted Narayan Yadav under Section 304 Part I of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The Supreme Court acquitted Yadav of all charges, concluding that the prosecution’s case was based on legally inadmissible evidence, resulting in a case of “no legal evidence.”
Background of the Case
The case originates from an FIR lodged by the appellant, Narayan Yadav, on September 27, 2019. In the FIR, Yadav confessed to killing his acquaintance, Ram Babu Sharma. He stated that on September 24, 2019, while drinking with Sharma at his house, he showed Sharma a picture of his girlfriend. Sharma then allegedly told Yadav to “get your girlfriend at my place and leave her with me for one night.”
According to the confessional FIR, a quarrel ensued, and in a fit of anger, Yadav attacked Sharma with a vegetable knife and a log of wood, inflicting fatal injuries. He then stated he dragged the body, covered it, took Rs. 7000 from the room, and fled in the deceased’s Bolero car.
Following the FIR, police investigation commenced. The dead body was recovered from the deceased’s residence, and a knife was seized from the scene. The post-mortem report, proved by Dr. R.K. Divya (PW-10), recorded six incised wounds and concluded that the cause of death was “shock resulting from excessive bleeding from the right side of the chest and injury to the upper lobe of the right lung.”
The Sessions Court in Korba convicted Yadav of murder under Section 302 of the IPC. On appeal, the High Court of Chhattisgarh altered the conviction to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I of the IPC, granting the appellant the benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC (related to sudden fights).
Supreme Court’s Analysis
The Supreme Court found the High Court’s judgment to be “erroneous on several grounds,” primarily its reliance on the confessional FIR.
On the Admissibility of a Confessional FIR
The Court held that the High Court’s first misstep was to examine the medical evidence and then “proceeded to directly corroborate it with the contents of the FIR lodged by the appellant himself.” The bench emphasized that a confession made to a police officer is hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and is inadmissible.
Citing landmark precedents like Nisar Ali v. State of U.P. and Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar, the Court observed:
“A first information report is not a substantive piece of evidence and can only be used to corroborate the statement of the maker under Section 157, Evidence Act, or to contradict it under Section 145 of that Act. It cannot be used as evidence against the maker at the trial if he himself becomes an accused…”
The judgment clarified that if an FIR contains a confession, the entire statement is inadmissible. The Court stated, “Once we say that the contents of the FIR are hit by Section 25 of the Act of 1872, being a confession before a police officer, the only remaining evidence on record is the medical evidence and the oral evidence of the panch witnesses.”
On Expert and Panch Witness Evidence
The Court further noted that the High Court had wrongly based the conviction on the testimony of the medical expert. It clarified the role of an expert witness, stating, “A doctor is not a witness of fact… The evidence of such an expert is of an advisory character… An accused cannot be held guilty of the offence of murder solely on the basis of medical evidence on record.”
The bench also pointed out that most panch witnesses had turned hostile and the prosecution failed to prove the contents of the panchnamas, meaning no legally admissible discovery of fact under Section 27 of the Evidence Act was established.
On Conduct and Incorrect Application of Exception 4
While the State argued that the appellant’s conduct (lodging the FIR, pointing out the body) was relevant under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, the Court issued a caution:
“While the conduct of an accused may be a relevant fact under Section 8 of the Act of 1872, it cannot, by itself, serve as the sole basis for conviction, especially in a grave charge such as murder.”
The Supreme Court also extensively analyzed why the High Court was wrong to apply Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC. For this exception to apply, the act must be committed without premeditation in a sudden fight, and the offender must not have “taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.”
The Court found that this was not a case of a “sudden fight” as the deceased was unarmed and it was not a mutual combat. It concluded:
“The deceased was absolutely harmless when the appellant inflicted injuries all over his body indiscriminately… Having regard to the manner in which the assault was carried out, could it not be said that the offender i.e., the appellant-herein took undue advantage and also could be said to have acted in a cruel or unusual manner.”
The Court suggested that Exception 1 (grave and sudden provocation) might have been a more appropriate lens to examine the facts, given the deceased’s alleged obscene remark, but did not delve into it since the acquittal was based on the complete lack of admissible evidence.
The Decision
Concluding that the conviction was based on legally untenable grounds, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal. The judgment stated, “In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the Impugned Judgement passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh… is not sustainable in law.”
The Court acquitted Narayan Yadav of all charges and ordered his immediate release.
