The Supreme Court of India, in a judgment dated October 29, 2025, affirmed the conviction and life imprisonment of three men for murder and attempt to murder, applying the principle of vicarious liability under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
A bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi dismissed appeals challenging a Bombay High Court judgment. The High Court had reversed the trial court’s acquittal of the appellants, finding they were members of an unlawful assembly sharing a “common object” to commit murder, even if they did not strike the fatal blows. The Supreme Court upheld this finding, ruling that transporting armed assailants to a crime scene and participating in the assault constitutes active participation.
The appeals were filed by Haribhau @ Bhausaheb Dinkar Kharuse (accused no. 3), Raju @ Rajendra Bhiwrao Shirwale (accused no. 4), and Subhash Raghunath Pawar (accused no. 6).
Background of the Case
The prosecution’s case originated from events in village Kari, Pune District. On April 26, 1999, during a wedding, Ankush Gholap was assaulted by the brother of Pandharinath Devba Gholap (accused no. 1). Ankush registered a police complaint that night.
The following day, April 27, 1999, Ankush, along with Dnyanoba Ravba Gholap, Rajendra Gholap (PW-7), and Shivaji Sanas (PW-9), was returning in a jeep driven by Sopan Dagadu Gholap (PW-1).
At that point, two motorcycles intercepted them. The first was driven by accused no. 3 (Haribhau), carrying accused no. 1 (Pandharinath) and accused no. 2 (Maruti Ramchandra Gholap). The second motorcycle was driven by accused no. 4 (Raju), carrying accused no. 5 (Vitthal Baburao Shinde) and accused no. 6 (Subhash).
According to the prosecution witnesses, accused no. 3 removed the jeep’s keys and punched the driver (PW-1). The other accused persons then dragged Ankush, PW-7, and PW-9 from the jeep. Accused no. 1 and 2 attacked Ankush with sharp weapons, causing his death on the spot. PW-7 and PW-9 sustained serious injuries in the attack.
Procedural History: Trial Court Acquittals and High Court Reversal
The VIII Additional Sessions Judge, Pune, conducted the trial. In its judgment dated May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted the main assailants, accused no. 1 and 2, for murder (Sec 302 IPC) and attempt to murder (Sec 307 IPC).
However, the trial court acquitted accused no. 3 (Haribhau) and accused no. 4 (Raju) entirely due to insufficient evidence. It convicted accused no. 6 (Subhash) only for attempt to murder (Sec 307 IPC) but acquitted him of the murder charge (Sec 302 read with Sec 149 IPC).
The State of Maharashtra appealed these acquittals to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, while the convicted accused appealed their convictions.
The High Court, in its final judgment dated February 2, 2011, partly allowed the State’s appeal. It reversed the acquittal of accused no. 3 and 4, convicting them for offences under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 149 of the IPC. The High Court also reversed the acquittal of accused no. 6 for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. The High Court sentenced all three appellants (accused 3, 4, and 6), along with accused 1 and 2, to rigorous imprisonment for life for the murder and ten years for the attempt to murder.
Submissions before the Supreme Court
Appellants’ Arguments: The counsel for appellants Haribhau (accused no. 3) and Raju (accused no. 4) argued that the ingredients of Section 149 IPC (unlawful assembly) were not met. They contended that with accused no. 5 acquitted, the prosecution failed to prove the assembly consisted of the requisite five persons. They also argued that the High Court “overstepped its jurisdiction” by interfering with a “plausible view of acquittal” taken by the trial court, citing Murugesan v. State (2012).
The counsel for appellant Subhash (accused no. 6) submitted that the evidence did not establish he shared a common object to commit murder, as he did not inflict any injury on the deceased, only on PW-7. It was argued the incident was “sudden and without premeditation” and that the Test Identification Parade was “procedurally flawed” due to a 52-day delay.
Respondent’s Arguments: The State of Maharashtra argued that the conviction was based on the “consistent and credible ocular evidence of injured witnesses,” (PW-7 and PW-9), corroborated by medical evidence. The State relied on Section 149 IPC, citing Masalti v. State of U.P. (1965), to argue that once an unlawful assembly and a common object are established, “every member is equally culpable, irrespective of who inflicted the fatal act.” The State contended that the appellants, by transporting armed co-accused, “facilitated the commission of murder and thus shared the requisite knowledge and common object.”
Supreme Court’s Analysis and Findings
The Supreme Court bench, authored by Justice Vipul M. Pancholi, first addressed the issue of reversing an acquittal. The Court cited Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007), holding that an appellate court “possesses full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.”
The bench held that the trial court’s acquittal “suffered from a fundamental misappreciation of evidence” and that the High Court’s reversal was based on “cogent and well-reasoned findings.”
Ocular and Medical Evidence: The Court scrutinized the depositions of eyewitnesses PW-1, PW-7, and PW-9. It found their testimonies to be “natural, coherent and mutually corroborative on all material particulars.” The judgment noted that the witnesses consistently identified the appellants arriving on motorcycles, armed with weapons, and participating in the coordinated assault.
The medical evidence, including the postmortem report by PW-16, confirmed Ankush died of “haemorrhagic shock due to multiple injuries to vital organs” from sharp weapons. The injuries to PW-7 and PW-9 were also confirmed as “grievous” and caused by similar weapons (PW-19 and PW-21). The Court found these findings “align perfectly with the ocular evidence” and “highlight the brutal and coordinated nature of the attack.”
Common Object and Vicarious Liability (Section 149 IPC): The Court rejected the appellants’ defence that the intention was only to cause hurt, calling the contention “untenable in light of the evidence on record.”
The judgment stated: “The nature of the weapons used, coupled with the ferocity and precision of the attack, unmistakably demonstrates that the common object of the assembly extended well beyond merely causing hurt and encompassed the commission of murder.”
Reaffirming the principle of vicarious liability under Section 149 IPC and citing Masalti (supra), the Court held that “it is not necessary for each member of the unlawful assembly to have committed a specific overt act.”
The Court found that the appellants’ roles were crucial: “The cumulative evidence clearly shows that the appellants were not passive spectators but active participants and facilitators in a deliberate and planned assault. Their conduct and presence at the scene… establish their common intention and vicarious liability under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 149 of the IPC.”
The Decision
The Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution had “proved beyond reasonable doubt that all three appellants were members of an unlawful assembly sharing the common object to commit murder and grievous assault.”
The bench found “no error in the conviction recorded by the High Court” and held that the trial court’s acquittal was “unsustainable.”
“Accordingly, this Court finds no merit in the present appeals. The conviction and sentence imposed on accused no. 3, 4 and 6 (the appellants herein) by the High Court vide the impugned judgment dated 02.02.2011 are affirmed. The appeals are dismissed as devoid of merit,” the Court ordered.
