The High Court of Judicature at Patna, in a significant matrimonial dispute ruling, has set aside a judgment and decree of judicial separation granted by a Family Court. The division bench, comprising the Chief Justice P. B. Bajanthri and Justice S. B. Pd. Singh, held that the respondent-husband had failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove his allegations of cruelty, desertion, and adultery against the appellant-wife. The court allowed the appeal filed by the wife against the order of the Principal Judge, Family Court, Darbhanga.
Background of the Case
The case stems from a petition filed by the respondent-husband under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, seeking a divorce from his wife. The couple was married on July 7, 2003, as per Hindu rites and has three children from the wedlock.
The husband had approached the Family Court in Darbhanga (Matrimonial Case No. 127 of 2011), alleging cruelty, desertion, and adultery by his wife. On March 31, 2017, the Principal Judge, Family Court, instead of granting a divorce, passed a decree for judicial separation between the parties under Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Aggrieved by this decision, the wife filed the present Miscellaneous Appeal (No. 420 of 2017) before the Patna High Court.
Arguments of the Parties
The Respondent-Husband’s Submissions:
The husband’s petition before the Family Court alleged that shortly after the marriage, he discovered his wife had an illicit relationship. He claimed that she, under a conspiracy, implicated his father in a false case after he stopped providing financial help to her parents. He further alleged that on March 21, 2010, his wife left the matrimonial home with their minor child, gold ornaments, and Rs. 30,000 cash. According to the husband, when his father went to inquire, he was assaulted by the wife’s father and brother, leading to the registration of Laharia Sarai P.S. Case No. 119 of 2010.
He contended that his wife filed false cases of dowry and torture against him and his family, causing immense mental agony and financial hardship. He also argued that the long period of separation since 2010 meant the marriage had broken down irretrievably, which amounted to mental cruelty. In support, his counsel cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Rakesh Raman vs. Kavita.
The Appellant-Wife’s Submissions:
The wife, in her written statement and subsequent appeal, denied all allegations. She contended that she was the one subjected to torture for dowry demands and was compelled by her husband to leave the matrimonial home. She stated that she had only availed her legal remedies against the cruelty meted out to her.
Her counsel argued that the husband failed to provide any specific date or evidence for the alleged cruelty. No injury report was produced to substantiate the claim of assault on his father, and no documents related to the police cases were filed in court. Crucially, the husband never disclosed the name of the person with whom the wife allegedly had an illicit relationship. She maintained that she was still ready to live with her husband for the sake of their three children.
High Court’s Analysis and Findings
The High Court, in its judgment authored by Justice S. B. Pd. Singh, conducted a thorough analysis of the evidence and legal principles concerning cruelty, desertion, and adultery.
On the Ground of Cruelty:
The Court observed that the “burden of proof of cruelty rests upon the respondent-husband of this case,” and he had “failed to prove the cruel behaviour of the appellant towards him and his family members by the strength of cogent, relevant and reliable evidence.”
The judgment noted the absence of specific details, stating, “Not even single incident with reference to specific date of alleged cruelty has been urged in the plaint before the Family Court.” The court emphasized that normal marital discord does not constitute legal cruelty. It observed:
“Some trifling utterance or remarks or mere threatening of one spouse to other cannot be construed as such decree of cruelty, which is legally required to a decree of divorce.”
Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Samar Ghose vs. Jaya Ghose, the High Court reiterated that cruelty involves “sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse.” The Court found no such evidence on record.
On the Ground of Desertion:
The High Court found that the husband’s actions did not support his claim of being deserted. The judgment noted:
“From perusal of the record, it clearly transpires that just after few months of the alleged desertion by the appellant-wife, the respondent-husband has filed the present Divorce Petition which clearly indicates that respondent-husband did not make reasonable efforts to settle the dispute with her wife (appellant) and hurriedly filed the divorce petition.”
The Court also pointed out the Family Court’s failure to attempt reconciliation, especially given that the couple has three children whose future was at stake.
On the Ground of Adultery:
The Court dismissed the allegation of adultery as entirely unsubstantiated. It defined adultery as voluntary sexual intercourse outside of marriage and found that the husband had failed to meet the evidentiary standard. The judgment stated:
“The respondent has not brought on record the name of adulterer or any proof to show that appellant was having illicit relationship with any person nor he has proved that they were living in adultery and only in order to make a valid ground in the divorce petition, these allegations were levelled against the appellant without any supporting material evidence.”
The Final Decision
Concluding its analysis, the High Court held that the husband had failed to prove any of the grounds on which he sought matrimonial relief. Consequently, the court allowed the wife’s appeal.
The judgment declared, “Hence, after going through the entire facts and evidence of both the parties, the judgment dated 31.03.2017 and decree dated 13.04.2017 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Darbhanga in Matrimonial Case No. 127 of 2011, is hereby set aside.”
