The Supreme Court of India, comprising a Bench of Justice S.V.N. Bhatti and Justice N. V. Anjaria, has set aside orders of the High Court for the State of Telangana and the Executing Court that had rejected a third-party claim petition resisting delivery of possession in an execution proceeding. Holding that findings recorded by the lower courts did not conform to established legal principles, the Court allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the VII Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court at Hyderabad, directing it to permit fresh pleadings, conduct a full inquiry, and decide the dispute afresh.
Background of the Case
The dispute arose out of O.S. No. 2204 of 2012 instituted by Mohammed Saleem alias Mohd. Wajid Ali (Respondent No. 1 / Decree Holder) before the VII Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court at Hyderabad. The suit sought specific performance of an Agreement of Sale dated February 23, 2001, allegedly executed by Ali Ahmed, father of Respondent No. 2, for an extent of 375 square yards with structures and mulgies situated at Rikabgunj, Pathergatti, Hyderabad, for a consideration of Rs. 8,00,000 paid in cash. Respondent No. 2 remained ex parte, and on March 18, 2015, the trial court decreed the suit ex parte, directing the execution and registration of a sale deed and delivery of possession of the suit property.
On January 5, 2016, Respondent No. 1 filed E.P. No. 4 of 2016 seeking delivery of physical possession. The appellant, Alladin Charities and Zakat Wakf, represented by its Managing Trustee, intervened as a stranger/third-party objector by filing E.A. No. 94 of 2016 to resist delivery of possession. The appellant asserted title and possession tracing back to a Farman Mubarak issued by the Nizam of Hyderabad conveying land at Pattharghati to Khan Bahadur Ahmed Alladin Nawab Ahmed Nawaz Jung Bahadur to create a waqf for charitable purposes, followed by an entry in the Muntakhab dated June 6, 1949, a Trust Deed dated September 23, 1976 covering approximately 3,151.51 square yards, and an A.P. Gazette Notification dated November 20, 2003 under the Waqf Act, 1995.
On January 29, 2019, the Executing Court dismissed the claim petition. It held that the appellant failed to prove ownership of the specific schedule property because Municipal Nos. 21-1-1098/9 to 11 were not explicitly mentioned in the Gazette notification, that the petition was filed under Order XXI Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) which was not maintainable against an execution petition seeking delivery of possession rather than attachment, and that the claimant failed to establish that the property was declared waqf property.
The appellant challenged this dismissal in CCCA No. 94 of 2019 before the High Court for the State of Telangana. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding, among other grounds, that the Managing Trustee lacked locus standi in the absence of an authorization document, that neither the Farman nor the plan was produced, that the appellant did not challenge the underlying 1943 sale deed (Document No. 69 of 1353 Fasli) of the Decree Holder’s predecessor, and that the application under Order XXI Rule 58 of the CPC was not maintainable as it ought to have been filed under Order XXI Rule 97 of the CPC.
Submissions of the Parties
Appearing for the appellant, Senior Counsel Mr. C. Aryama Sundaram relied upon the Supreme Court’s ruling in Periyammal (Dead) Through Legal Representatives and Others v. V. Rajamani and another (2025) 9 SCC 568 to argue that quoting a wrong provision of law cannot justify rejecting a third-party objector’s prayer. He contended that under Rules 97 to 101 of Order XXI of the CPC, the Executing Court is legally obligated to conduct a detailed, full-fledged inquiry into all questions of right, title, or interest.
Counsel further urged that the decisive issue was the identity of the property across old and contemporaneous revenue or municipal records rather than the claims alone. It was submitted that the Decree Holder’s documents were sketchy, the boundaries in the 1943 sale deed differed from the decree schedule, and the burden had been wrongly fastened upon the third-party objector. The appellant sought a remand to the Executing Court for a fresh disposal or permission to establish its claim on record.
Appearing for Respondent No. 1, Senior Counsel Mr. Basava Prabhu S Patil contended that no ground was made out to interfere with the lower courts’ orders and that the Decree Holder was merely taking possession of the property covered by the agreement and decree. However, upon being queried by the Bench as to whether the schedules in the 1943 sale deed, the agreement of sale, and the court-executed sale deed had been correlated and established through documentary evidence, counsel fairly acknowledged that the Decree Holder had proceeded under the impression that the burden lay on the third-party objector. He concurred with the suggestion that the matter be remanded to allow both sides an opportunity to submit additional pleas and evidence.
Legal Principles and Court’s Analysis
Addressing the scope of third-party resistance in execution proceedings, the Bench referenced the principles reiterated in Periyammal (Dead):
“Order XXI Rule 35 of the CPC confers jurisdiction on the Executing Court to remove any person bound by the Decree who refuses to vacate the property. Rules 97 to 101 of Order XXI deal with situations where execution is obstructed or resisted by ‘any person’, including even a stranger to the Decree who is not bound by it or who claims an independent right, title or interest in the property.”
The Court emphasized the statutory scheme distinguishing pre-possession and post-possession remedies:
“Order XXI Rule 97 applies before a Decree for Possession is executed, allowing the Court to resolve an obstructionist’s grievance before delivering the Decree to the DHR. Rule 99 applies later, when a stranger claiming rights in the property has been dispossessed and seeks restoration.”
“If a purported stranger to the Decree resists execution, the DHR’s sole remedy lies under Order XXI Rule 97 of the CPC. The Holder cannot bypass such obstruction and insist on the reissuance of the warrant for possession under Order XXI Rule 35.”
“Courts adjudicating an Application under Order XXI Rule 97 must do so in accordance with Rule 101 of the CPC and conduct a full-fledged inquiry into all questions, including those relating to the right, title, or interest in the property arising between the parties.”
Applying these settled principles, the Bench observed:
“In view of the above, we are convinced that some of the findings recorded in the impugned Judgments do not conform to well-established principles of law.”
Decision of the Court
The Supreme Court allowed the Civil Appeal and set aside the impugned judgments of both the High Court and the Executing Court. The dispute was remanded to the VII Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court at Hyderabad, with specific instructions:
“The Executing Court is directed to allow further or fresh pleas on behalf of both parties, conduct a fresh inquiry in light of the decision referred to above, and dispose of the matter afresh.”
The Court made no order as to costs and disposed of all pending applications.
Case Details
Case Title: Alladin Charities and Zakat Wakf v. Mohammed Saleem alias Mohd. Wajid Ali and Another
Case No.: S.L.P. (Civil) No. 23573 of 2025
Bench: Justice S.V.N. Bhatti, Justice N. V. Anjaria
Date: October 14, 2026
